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WRITING DOWN FIXED ASSETS AND STATED CAPITAL
FRom 1929 to the end of 1932, alone, estimated net profits of all privately-
owned corporations in the United States declined by about seventy-six percent.1
An important contributing cause of the sharpness of this decline was the fact
that, despite the drop in gross earnings, corporations continued to estimate
depreciation expense on the basis of the original cost of fixed assets,2 or orig-
inal cost, plus later upward revaluations. Since most fixed assets were pur-
chased during the period of higher prices, the allowance in dollars for the capital
1. STATn iSTAL ABSTRACT or THE U=TEm STATEs-1933 (U. S. Bur. of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, 1933) 272. This includes industrial and mercantile companies, public
utilities and Class I Railroads. During the same period, average closing prices of industral
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange dropped by some 74%, and average clorin;
prices of twenty-five selected railroad stocks dropped by some 84%. The drop in market
value of forty selected bonds was about 37%. Supra at 275. The write-down practices
under discussion began in the latter part of 1931 and had gotten well under way in 1932.
Infra note 59. These practices were the direct outgrowth of price level and net income
changes which had occurred by the end of 1932.
2. To the effect that, in the past, this has been the normal bais for estimating depre-
ciation expense, see dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in United Railways of Baltimore v.
West, 280 U. S. 234, 265-269 (1930).
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investment lost by expiration of the service life of the fixed asset during the
current accounting period reflected the previously greater costs of the commodi-
ties and services necessary to make up the asset.3 Therefore, while the corpor-
rate profit and loss statement currently reflected lower gross earnings, grosS
earnings being made up of current dollars of greater purchasing power, the de-
duction for depreciation losses was nevertheless unreduced because expressed in
terms of past dollars of lesser purchasing power; 4 thus leaving a smaller
margin of net profit.
As a result of the drop in corporate net income and the consequent curtail-
ment of dividends, corporation managements found their retention of control
threatened. Presumably, for this reason the present depression has witnessed
the widespread adoption of a novel method of reducing depreciation costs and
thus freeing current income for the payment of dividends. This method, sug-
gested by stock market brokers, investment trusts and finance companies, and
taken up by many manufacturing and merchandising corporations,0 consists of
reducing stated capital in accordance with methods provided by state statutes.
But, instead of utilizing the resultant capital surplus for dividend purposes, the
practice is to cancel it in whole or in part against a reduction in the valuation
of fixed assets to represent purported current price levels.7 With the stated
3. Construction costs in 1929 averaged about 28% higher than at the end of 1932.
GRAnni, PUBLIC UTmn VALUATION (1934) 22.
4. Mffeasured by the drop in the general index of prices of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, the purchasing power of the dollar increased by about 26% from the
beginning of 1929 to the end of 1932. GRAHAm, op. cit. supra note 3 at 22. As meas-
ured by the general index of wholesale prices of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the increase in purchasing power of the dollar seems to have amounted to 32%. Danlels,
The Valuation of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 AccoumTING RaV. 302, n. 2.
5. To the effect that the primary purpose of the use of this method is to free future
income for the payment of dividends, see KasmR, ADVAfcED AccouNvmO (3d ed. 1933)
499; Daniels, Principles of Asset Valuation (1934) 9 ACCOUNTIO Rav. 114, 116; cf. HOAG-
LAND, COrpATION FnANcE (1933) 140.
6. "Should Not Block Asset Write-Offs," N. Y. Times, February 5, 1933, II, at 16,
col. 1; "Business Begins to Write Down Book Values of Fixed Assets" (May 4, 1932)
Busnmss WEEK 24; "Urge Write-Downs of Fixed Assets", N. Y. Times, January 31, 1932,
II, at 9, col. 3. It was pointed out that security values would thus be increased, because
the investor has relied, particularly since 1929, almost entirely on the corporate showing
of earnings, irrespective of the book equities behind securities. See also Daniels, supra
note 5, at 116.
7. For possible methods of accounting for the write-down, see KxsTR, ADVANCeD
Accot-Nwo (3d ed. 1933) 544-546; cf. note 25, infra. Stated capital may be reduced
in various ways, such as by a reduction of the par or stated value of the capital stock,
a change from par to no-par stock of a lesser stated value, or vice versa, a redemption
of certain classes of shares, a stock donation by owners. See, for example, TFvx. Coon
AxN. (Williams, 1934) § 3736; Kasma, supra, at 541-542.
For examples of companies which have accomplished write-downs of fixed assets against
capital surplus transferred from stated capital, as well as other surpluses, see the state.
ments of the American Woolen Company, Barnsdall Oil Company, G. R. Kinney and
Company, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Doehler Die Casting Company, Ever Ready Com.
pany, Radio Corporation of America, and United Fruit Company in Moony's, IVvESTots
SERvicE since 1931. See also Cartinhour and Dewey, Capitalization Changes as a Result
of the Depression (1932) 4 Cor. PRAc. REv. 26, 29.
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value of fixed assets thus reduced, the expense of periodically accounting for
the lost, or depreciated, service life of the asset is reduced by an amount which,
over the period of the remaining service-life of the asset, will exactly equal the
amount of the capital surplus against which was cancelled the devaluation of
fixed assets. Consequently, the total credits to the profit and loss account
over the remaining service life of the asset will be larger by the same amount9
and will ordinarily be reflected in the earned surplus account as assets available
for dividends.
The apparent reason for crediting the fixed asset account for the amount
of the write-down and at the same time debiting capital surplus, transferred
from stated capital, is that, otherwise, the necessary offsetting debit would
have to be made either against earned surplus or against an already existent
paid-in surplus, or else against a capital loss account indicative of a capital
impairment. Were the debit made against earned surplus, no assets, not
already free, would be freed in the future for dividends0 and in most states
S. It is assumed in the illustration below that the fixed asset has a ten year serice life,
that depredation is on a straight-line basis, and that the write-down is made at the end
of the third year of the asset's service life.
Old Basis of Depreciation
Plant Cost $5,000
Less:
Reserve for Depredation 1500 (3 years at '500 per year)
Net Book Value $3500 $3500
New Basis
Revalued Plant $3000
(on basis of replacement cost new)
Less:
Reserve for Depredation 900 (3 years at $300 per year)
Net Book Value $2100 $210c
Amount of Write-Down $140
One tenth of the service life of the fixed asset being lost each year, that parcentage of
annual depredation will be multiplied against the new depreciation base of $30=), just as
it was formerly multiplied against the old base of $5000. But, whereas one-tenth of $SC:3
brought a $500 annual depredation charge, one-tenth of $3000 brings a $30 annual charge,
or a savings on depredation expense of $200 per year. Since there ate seven years of ssr-
vice life of the fixed asset remaining, there will be a total savings on deprecation expsns2
of seven times $200, or $1400, over the total remaining service life. It will be noted that
this sum is exactly equal to the amount of the write-down of the fixed a-et, as shown on
the above account.
9. But some companies seem to be writing off the loss against earned surplus, where
earned surplus has not already been wiped out by past deficits, the purpose being merely
to replace an annual deficit with net earnings, or to improve net earnings on future profit
and loss statements. Radio Corporation of America followed this procedure in 1931, al-
though, at the same time, it transferred from stated capital to capital surplus an amount
substantially equivalent to the earned surplus used in cancelling losses, thus freeing capital
for future dividends or other uses and creating various unexplained reserve accounts.
PooR's, LNnus iAr. (1934) 2404; Farr, Give the Stockholder the Truth (1933) 93 ScLi.ma's
228, 231. Although Kester [AnvAxcD Accousnxo (3d ed. 1933) 543] is of the opinion
that most write-downs are being cancelled against capital surplus, even where earned sur-
plus exists, the motive being to leave the earned surplus available for dividends, a urvey
of 135 companies made early in 1933 by the National Association of Cost Accountants states
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the same is true as to paid-in surplus.10 Were it made to a capital loss account,
the corporation would be bound under the laws of most states to apply future
net income created by the reduced depreciation charges to make up that capi-
tal impairment. 1 Furthermore, other means of making possible the same
amount of dividends are unavailable. While the same amount of assets, freed
for dividends by the write-down method could be freed by simply reducing
depreciation charges, without writing down the book value of fixed assets and
of state capital, this would invite a legal attack on the ground of fraudulent
payment of dividends as a result of insufficient provision for depreciation.
1 2
that, at least among the 68 companies which replied to the effect that they had accom-
plished write-downs of fixed assets, 28 had charged the write-down against earned surplu
and only 13 against capital surplus. It was not stated, however, whether these 28 had re-
duced their stated capital at the same time, as in the case of the Radio Corporation of
America, and either paid out dividends from the resultant capital surplus or used it to offset
other expected future losses or to set up unexplained reserves, possibly to meet those losses.
"Survey Confirms Write-Off Trend," N. Y. Times, February 26, 1933, II, at 15, col, 7.
The problem of misrepresentation to future investors, discussed later is substantially similar
in the case where the write-down is cancelled against earned surplus to the case where It Is
cancelled against capital surplus. Also, where the method used by the Radio Corporation of
America is adopted, the resulting problems as to creditors are similar to those involved where
the fixed asset losses are cancelled against capital surplus transferred from stated capital.
10. Comment (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 844. To make the corresponding debit against
paid-in surplus, however, would similarly result in an improved showing of earnings in
the future. Thus, in such states as Illinois, Ohio, Louisiana and Michigan, where the reci-
pient of dividends from paid-in surplus must be informed of the source at the time of
payment, the corporation might find it to its advantage to cancel a loss in book value of
fixed assets against paid-in surplus and thus make it possible in the future to declare
dividends out of what may be represented to the stockholder to be earnings, instead of
paying dividends directly from what must be represented to the stockholders as coming
from capital.
11. See note 15, infra; Comment (1933) 3 BRooiaLX, L. REV, 91, 99; MEAD, CORroRA-
TION F1NANcF (6th ed. 1930) 570. The rule is to some extent modified in three states by
allowing payment of dividends despite a capital impairment, from net earnings for the cur-
rent or preceding fiscal year, as in Minnesota, or from net earnings for the current and/or
the preceding fiscal year, as in Delaware, or from net earnings of the preceding accounting
period which shall not be less than six months nor more than one year in duration, as in
California. CAL. CiV. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 346 (2); Del. Laws 1929, p. 392;
Minn. Laws 1931, c. 300, § 21 (II). All three statutes, however, prohibit payment from
current net profits where the value of the dissolution preference of any class of shares has
been impaired.
New Jersey seems to be following the rule adopted in these three states, although without
specific statutory provision to the same effect. Borg v. International Silver Co., It F.
(2d) 147 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 N. J, Eq.
692, 69 AtI. 1014 (1908).
12. See cases summarized in Briggs, Asset Valuation in Dividend Decisions (1934) 9
AccouNxrNG RV. 220, 231-232. The following corporation statutes specifically require a
deduction for depredation in calculating assets available for distribution as dividends:
Oiao GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-38; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1106
(IV); Minn. Laws, 1931, c. 300, § 21 (I); Pa. Laws, 1933 p. 404; VT. Pun. LAWS (1933)
§ 5850.
Another possibility is that the amount of the loss in value could be credited to the fixed
Again, while the same amount of assets could be freed merely by reducing
stated capital and paying dividends directly from the resultant capital surplus,
as permitted by the laws of practically every state and the District of Colum-
bia, this method would make it apparent to future investors or lenders and
to present stockholders that the dividends are from capital and not from
income. This is particularly true in the three states where statutes require
that the source of such liquidating dividends be revealed to the recipient at
the time of payment.1 3 But by the expedient of writing off the purported loss
in value of fixed assets against a capital surplus transferred from the stated
capital, the corporation seemingly may represent and pay out in the future
as earnings what otherwise either would render management liable for wrongful
payment of dividends, or, even if legally paid out by reducing stated capital,
would be paid out as capital and not as earnings.
This method of freeing future income for dividends raises several problems.
First, is management justified in reducing stated capital to offset a purported
loss from a reduction in value of fixed assets? And, as corollary to the same
question, what is the proper measure of this loss, and, therefore, of the reduc-
tion in stated capital? Second, if there is a theoretical justification, does the
actual practice nevertheless endanger the rights of creditors, stockholders and
future lenders and investors? Third, is the existent protection to these inter-
ests sufficient to meet the possible dangers? If not, the final question is, what
remedies ought to be made available?
If a company were capitalized with one class of shares and neither creditors
nor future lenders nor investors were involved, no question would ordinarily
arise as to the justification for reducing stated capital in order to offset an
alleged loss in value of fixed assets, after the necessary proportion of stock-
holders have consented to the reduction in accordance with the state statute.
No one could object to the company's act of liquidating a part of its business
by making no attempt in the future to depreciate on the old basis so as to
recover lost capital out of gross income. If a company were capitalized with
more than one class of shares, the other circumstances remaining the same,
a question might arise as to whether one class was being treated unjustly as
compared with another by the particular plan proposed for transferring stated
capital to capital surplus. Here again, however, no objection could normally
arise as to the validity of the write-down process, per se, or as to the validity
of the extent to which the write-down is made, as long as the recapitalization
asset account and debited to another asset account as a deferred charge for aszets written
off, the loss being periodically amortized as an expense over the remaining service-life of
the fixed asset. But this would not increase future dividends, since the plariodic amortiza-
tion expense would exactly equal the gains in net income by reason of reduced deprecation
charges.
13. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 346; ILL. STAT. Aui?. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)
§ 157.60. Section 1106 (II) of LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) seemingly applies to dividends
paid from capital surplus transferred from stated capital, under § 1126 (H); and thus re-
quires notice to the recipient. The point is not made very clear by the statute, hovever.
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is in accordance with the state statute.14 This question can only arise where
creditors are concerned.
With various individual modifications, the corporation statutes of thirty-
seven states and the District of Columbia attempt to protect creditors by
assuring the maintenance of a minimum capital investment by the stockhold-
ers of the corporation. This is done by provisions which in effect would pro-
hibit the payment of dividends when the stated capital of the corporation is
impaired, or will be impaired by the payment.15 While probably none of these
statutes would afford creditors a remedy against the management or the stock-
holders without proof of actual or threatened damage because the corporation
is thus rendered insolvent, 16 the statutory prohibition may nevertheless check
14. In each of these cases, however, a question might arise as to whether management
is misleading stockholders and future investors and lenders to their possible injury by thus
writing off losses due to bad management and not to price level change. See notes 31 and
32, infra. An additional problem might arise where the stated capital Is reduced below
the amount of the asset preference to which certain classes of stockholders may be entitled
in event of dissolution. Cf. note 42, infra.
15. ARx. STAT. ANx. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 1701 y; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Courtrlght,
1930) § 1009; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Revision of 1930) § 3386; D. C. CODE (1929) § 278;
Ga. Acts, 1877, p. 35; IDAo CODE ANN. (1932) 29-129; IL.. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd,
1935) § 157.41; IND. STAT. ANN. (BuRNS, 1929) § 4856.17; IOWA CODE (1931) § 8378; Ky.
STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 548; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart. 1932) § 1106 (Ia.); ME. REV. STAT.
(1930) p. 874, § 37; Md. Laws 1931, c. 480, § 87; Mich. Laws 1931, p. 575-6, § 22; MOnT.
REv. CODE (1921) § 5939; Nsv. CoMP. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 1625, 1760; N. J. Comp.
STAT. (Supp., 1931) § 47-30; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 32-135; N. Y. CON-
SOL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 60, § 58; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1179; N. D. Laws
1931, p. 197; Omo GEN. CODE ANN . (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-38; Oa.A, STAT. (1931) §
9763; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 25-219; PA. STAT. ANl. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 631;
S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 1353; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 8789; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Williams, 1934) § 3737; TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. (Vernon, 1927) art. 1078; UTAu Rrv. STAT.
ANN. (1933) § 18-2-17; VT. PuB. LAws (1933) § 5850; VA. COos ANr. (Supp. 1932)
§ 3840; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 185, § 24 (IV); Wxs. STAT. (1931) § 182.19 (1); Wyo. REV.
STAT. ANN. (1931) § 128.131. The statutes of California, Delaware and Minnesota, with
the limitations pointed out in note 11, supra, also state this rule. Many of these statutes,
however, consider capital to be the aggregate amount of par-value stock, plus that portion
of the consideration paid for no-par stock which is stated on the accounts as capital. Since
practically 85.49o of the capitalization of public utility and industrial companies is now com-
posed of no-par, or par of such low nominal value as to be virtually no-par [Drwino,
CoRP'oAnIoN SEcua rnEs, (1934) 87-891, these statutes give management an almost limit.
less discretion in determining what amount of capital it intends to keep unimpaired. See
DEWING, supra, at 70-73. Vermont and Virginia are examples of states which require that
the full consideration received for no-par stock be regarded as part of the capital to be
maintained unimpaired.
16. Of the statutes cited in note 15, supra, those of Arkansas, Connecticut, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin expressly give the creditor or his repre.
sentatives a remedy only in event of dissolution or insolvency. Of the rest of the thirty-
seven statutes and that of the District of Columbia cited, ten, those of Colorado, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Oregon, Virginia, and Wyoming,
state, in substance, that the creditor may claim against the directors who wrongfully pay
dividends to the extent of the claims outstanding at the time of the wrongful payment or
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management by the threat of possible litigation. 17 If creditors rely on the main-
tenance of that minimum capital investment, supposedly guaranteed by these
statutes, practical considerations of keeping the good will of creditors would
demand that management offer some justification for transferring part of that
minimum capital to capital surplus,' 8 despite the fact that the laws of most of
the states seem to permit the transfer with little or no restrictions, so far as
creditors are concerned.
There may be at least two alternative justifications for transferring stated
capital to capital surplus in order to absorb a purported loss in the value of
fixed assets. These two may at the same time afford the standard by which
the loss should be measured. The first is that the creditors' security is suffi-
dent when the company maintains at least that capital currently necessary to
replace such a fixed asset as was originally acquired by the company, and set
up on the accounts at its original cost, and that, correspondingly, the depre-
ciation expense account should only reflect the cost of currently replacing that
part of the service-life of the fixed asset which expired during the current
accounting period. Since the current replacement cost of most fixed assets
is well below the original cost of the same assets, this theory would justify a
representation of loss on the balance sheet'0 and a cancellation of that loss
contracted thereafter, and another, that of Indiana, is similar in statement to these ten.
Probably, however, all of these statutes would be construed to give the creditor a remedy
only in event of actual damage by reason of insolvency or dsolution. The statutes of
Idaho and Washington, both based on the UirmoRm Busnm s Copoan 0.:: L.W, do not
mention rights of creditors in event of wrongful payment of dividends. They seem to render
management and shareholders liable only to the corporation. Probably, creditors would
here also have a theoretical right to recover, but only in event of insolvency or di--olution.
Thus it is likely that these provisions as to impairment of capital protect the creditor
little more than do the statutes of Minnesota, Mississippi, Mifssouri, Nebra--" and West
Virginia which state in substance that a dividend is wrongful only when its payment
would render the corporation insolvent, or if it should be made at a time when the cor-
poration is insolvent.
17. But cases in which creditors have been able to force directors and stockholders to
return dividends paid out of capital are rare. DwwGc, CoRroRATio:o SEcunrnms (1934) 73.
18. HoxzsEY, WRmnG Doww AssrTS AND WRnTIG Orr LossEs (Address before the
lass. Soc. of Cert. Pub. Accountant% 1933) 23-24. It does seem to be a valid answer
to creditors' objections to argue, as does Professor Kester, that the write-down of fixed
asset values against the capital surplus transferred from stated capital does not affect the
creditor because his position "is certainly no worse when the value facts are stated than
when they are not stated." K=sER, AnvAxcm Accouxnxo (3d ed. 1933) 542. When the
corporation writes down its stated capital investment, it is thereby bound under the statutes
to retain only enough income out of its gross returns to maintain that lower capital in-
vestment unimpaired. If the write-down is excessive so that, assuming that the corpora-
tion has not a substantial surplus, that lower capital investment is insufficient to maintain
the business in a solvent condition, the creditor is certainly not protected, despite the fact
that the revaluation of fixed assets concurrently with stated capital may acquaint him more
realistically with the actual value of the assets securing his claim.
19. For the argument in favor of this method of accounting for depredation, see Schmidt,
The Basis of Depreciation Clzarges (1930) 8 HAnv. Bus. Rsv. 257. In a recent divideni
decision, the court, while reaching a result that in effect justified a current maintcnan=2
instead of depreciation policy, nevertheless theoretically espoused the replacement c:-4
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against capital surplus transferred from stated capital. A second possible
justification is that the creditors' security is sufficient when the company main-
tains at least that number of current dollars worth of capital investment which
will, as measured by a general index of prices, currently purchase an amount
of commodities and services of any kind (not a particular fixed asset, as in
the case of the replacement cost basis) equivalent to the amount which could
have been purchased at the time the fixed asset was originally purchased with
the number of dollars originally invested in that asset. By this theory the
depreciation expense account would reflect that number of current dollars sub-
stantially equivalent in general purchasing power, although not in number of
dollars, to the proportionate part of the original investment which was lost
during the current accounting period by the expiration of part of the service-life
of the fixed asset. Since the general purchasing power of the dollar has in-
creased materially from the time when many of these fixed assets were orig-
inally set up on the accounts, this theory would also justify a representation
of loss20 to be cancelled by reducing stated capital. Either theory of valuation
21
theory by defining depreciation as "represented by the number of dollars necessary to re-
habilitate the property sufficiently to place it in safe condition for operation." Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids, Grand Haven and Muskegon Ry. Co., 7 F. Supp. 511, 520 (W.
D. Mich. 1931).
Distinguish between the replacement cost theory of depreciation and the suggestion made
by Castenholz [A SoLUTIox To TE APPaCAToN PROBLEiM (1931); The Accountant and
Changing Monetary Values (1931) 6 ACCOUNTING Rxv. 2821 that expected replacement costs
be treated as a deferred charge to be accounted for as depreciation expense only when real-
ized, and without allowing the appreciation or decrease in value of the fixed assets due to
price level changes, to affect earned surplus available for dividends. Cf. GRAUAs AND KATZ,
ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRAc'nc (1932) 192-193.
20. Among recent advocates of this theory of depreciation are Kzsma, ADVANCED Ac-
COUNTING (3d ed., 1933) 540-541; Hoxsx', op. cit. supra note 18; cf. Sweeney, Capital
(1933) 8 ACCOUNTING Rzv. 185, 198. It is significant of the change in attitude of some
accountants, probably brought about by the pressure of the depression upon corporate man-
agement, that Kester, for example, formerly decried any other system of depredation ac-
counting than that based upon the original cost of the fixed assets. KEs'rn, AccoUnTINo
TEORY AND PRAcrcE (2d ed. 1925) 292.
21. It has also been suggested as justification for the devaluation of fixed assets in order
to reduce depredation charges that depreciation charges should be adjusted periodically In
accordance with changes in the intensity of use of the fixed assets. This theory seems similar
to that advanced by the railroads in opposition to having accrued depreciation deducted
from the valuation of railroad property in determining the base for rate regulation. De-
preciation Charges of Telephone and Steam Railroad Companies, 177 I. C. C. 351, 392
(1931). While theoretically this method would accomplish perhaps the most equitable
apportionment of fixed asset costs, since the most intense use of fixed assets would prob-
ably occur when gross returns are greatest, nevertheless, it is objected that it would fall
to accomplish the purpose of writing off the cost of the fixed asset during its service life,
unless gross earnings or intensity of use could be estimated in advance with any degree
of accuracy, which latter is deemed improbable, or unless the length of its service life
depends substantially upon the number of units of output that the fixed asset is made to
produce. GRAnAx, PuBLIc Uznirr VALuATIN (1934) 86-87; for further criticism see
Paton, Aspects of Asset Valuations (1934) 9 ACCOUNTING Rav. 122, 125.
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might in any particular case result in substantially the same representation
of capital loss, but not necessarily so.2
The replacement cost method of revaluation indicates to management what
current sales price is necessary in order to recover at least a sufficient amount
currently to maintain the unimpaired usefulness of the company's fixed assets,
so that if management is able to adjust its sales prices accordingly, creditors
may be assured that, despite the lower capitalization of the company accom-
panying the revaluation of the fixed assets, the fixed assets necessary to
continued smooth functioning of the company will not be neglected. How-
ever, depredation charges based upon the purchasing power method of revalua-
tion, as measured by a general index of prices, may enable management most
accurately to adjust sales prices to the ability of buyers, themselves sellers
in another market, to make purchases. It would also tend to assure creditors
that, despite the recapitalization of the company on the lower level, the new
depreciation charges will recover sufficient gross income to enable management
to maintain a constant approximate equivalence of ability to purchase any
commodities and services necessary to the smooth functioning of the busines.s
22. See Daniels, The Valuation of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 Accou.,=c; REv. 302, 305.
The larger the company and the more far-flung and complex the array of its fixed asze,
the more likely will it be that the sum total of the changes in replacement costs "win car.
respond in considerable measure to the movements in the value of money as expresZ.d in
indexes of prices in general." Paton, Aspects of Assets Valuations (1934) 9 Accor=.o
REv. 122, 126; cf. GRAums, Punuc Urrr=rr VALUATiO.c (U. of Chicago Studies, 1934) 21-29.
In a survey of 135 companies made in 1933 by the National Association of Cost Account-
ants, 50% of the replies favored writing down assets to "net sound values" (viz., present
replacement cost, less depredation over the past life of the assets); 17 replies favored present
market value; 15 suggested various other values, such as those based on complete appraials,
which take into consideration not only present replacement costs and market vmlue but also
the future trend of industry. "Survey Confirms Write-Off Trend," N. Y. Times, February
26, 1933, 11, at 15, col. 7.
23. Furthermore, it may be that either basis for depreciation accounting, if generally
accepted, is to be preferred to the original cost basis from the standpoint of adjusting national
purchasing to consuming power and therefore making for a balanced social economy. Thus,
assuming that management is guided in its sales policy by the depreciation expense account
as one of the expenses that sales price must cover, either basis would result in higher sales
prices in a time of rising prices than in a time of falling prices. In a time of rising prices,
this, plus the lower dividends to investors which would follow higher depreciation charges
would tend to prevent an artificial demand for commodities and services, as in the pre-
1929 years, with the attendant over-expansion of plant and equipment and insufficient re-
serve for cost of replacement of fixed assets or for costs of purchasing other commodities
and services. It would likewise tend to prevent the resultant over-borrowing, unemploy-
ment and reduction of wages at the very time when sales prices have to be raizsed in order
to provide the necessary replacements or other commodities and services for which insuffi-
dent provision was previously made. Furthermore, by bringing about higher prices at
the time when the average worker is receiving higher wages, and vice versa in a time of
falling prices, either basis for depreciation would tend to bring production and con-
sumption into equilibrium. These arguments impressed the German economists, who
experienced the German currency inflation of a decade ago, with the need for accounting
in terms of changing price levels. Sweeney, Capital (1933) 8 Accousrns o REv. 185, 193;
Schmidt, Is Appreciation Profit? (1931) 6 Accouacrixo REv. 239; Schmidt, The Basis of
Depreciation Charges (1930) 8 HARv. Bus. REv. 257; "International Congress of Account-
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But if either of these theories of revaluation of fixed assets and concomitant
readjustment of stated capital is a legitimate answer to creditors' objections
to the write-down movement in time of declining prices, when it will make
possible a declaration and distribution of income not otherwise possible, it is
such only on the theory that it will also be applied in times of rising prices,
when it will result in withholding income otherwise distributable as dividends.
If fair dealing between the corporation and its creditors requires that the
corporation recover from gross income by means of the deduction for depre-
ciation expense at least that amount currently necessary to replace the pro-
portionate part of the fixed asset's service-life which expired during the current
accounting period, the recovery for depreciation will have to be increased in
a period of rising costs of replacement.2 4 That will necessitate a periodic
revaluation of the fixed asset account, and concurrently, an increase of stated
capitalization in order to assure creditors that "real" capital, as measured by
replacement costs, will not be impaired 2 5 But in a time of rising prices the
ing," The Times (London) Sept. 13, 1929, at 18, col. c. One answer to these propositions
has been made on the ground that depreciation accounting has substantially nothing to do
with sales price, since in the long run companies will in any event collect from their cus.
tomers, "not an amount equal to their individual expenses of production, but one equiil
to those (plus interest and normal profits) of the marginal producer." Daniels, The Valua.
tion of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 ACCOUxm=rG Rav. 302, 304-305; cf. GRAA_., Puaesa Untany
VALUAT ON (1934) 53; MFAD, CoRPoRATIoN FiNrArc (6th ed. 1930) 301-302; in general, see
Hoxsy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 13; Nissley, Effects of Recent Events on Financial State-
ments (1933) 55 JouR. or AccouirTANcy 272, 287; "Answers Criticism of Write-Off Plan,"
N. Y. Times, January 29, 1933, II, at 15, col. 5.
24. Thus, in denying the validity of the purchasing-power-of-the-dollar theory of mort
gage liability advanced by the defendant in Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Wilmarth
252 N. W. 507, 512 (Iowa 1934), the court stated: "Assuming ... that the appellant's
philosophy is correct, then, were the situation reversed, would the appellant, in what he
would term prosperous times, be in court asking that he not be permitted to pay $20,000
in satisfaction of the obligation, but that he be required to pay $40,000."
25. The following is an illustration of the method which might be used in accounting for
such periodic revaluations under either of the two suggested theories. Assume: Original cost
of the asset machinery is $5000, its service-life estimated to be 10 years; at the end of the
third year, it is revalued and the value of the asset new is determined to be $3000; at
the end of the fourth year, it is revalued and its value new is determined to be $6000; and
that depreciation is by the straight-line method.
Journal Entries
1. Machinery (Cost) $5000
Cash $5000
2. Depreciation (for three years) 1500
Reserve for Depreciation (Cost basis) 1500
3. Revaluation Surplus 1400
Revaluation Reserve for Depreciation 600
Revaluation of vlachinery (1st revaluation at the end of the
third year) 2000
4. Depreciation 300
Revaluation Reserve for Depreciation 200
Reserve for Depreciation-Cost basis 500
(4th year of depreciation)
5. Revaluation of Machinery 3000
Revaluation Reserve for Depreciation 1200
Revaluation Surplus Account 1800
(2nd revaluation at end of 4th year to cost new, $6000;
sound value, $3600).
corporation's depreciation costs, rising with the upward revaluations of fixed
assets, may ascend faster than the prices which the corporation can obtain
for its products. To avert the resultant necessity to reduce dividends dras-
tically, management will be pressed to find a new scheme for valuation. If,
to avoid cutting dividends, management should maintain the decreased value
fixed as its depredation basis at the time of low prices, the result might well
be the impairment of that "real" capital, with the eventual breakdown of
the company as it seeks later to replace necessary working equipment for
which it has made insufficient provision. Therefore, sufficient security for
the creditor is likely to be provided only where the corporation segregates in
the form of a surplus reserve account at least a substantial part of the earnings
made available for dividends during the period of declining prices by the use
of the replacement-cost method of revaluation. This surplus reserve will enable
management to pay dividends during the period of rising prices, without making
it necessary to skimp dangerously on depreciation charges. Similar considera-
tions apply if, rather than the replacement cost method, the corporation adopts
the general purchasing power method of revaluation of fixed assets and con-
comitant adjustment of capitalization.
II
The actual practice of the present write-down movement seems inconsistent
with the apparently reasonable theoretical justifications offered to creditors.
In general, the reduction in book values of fixed assets and concurrent re-
ductions in stated capital fail to approximate even fairly closely either the
percentage of decrease in replacement costs from the time when most of these
fixed assets were set up on the accounts, or the increase in general purchasing
power of the dollar during the same period. They evidence, rather, an inten-
tion arbitrarily to write down these valuations to a point where depreciation
charges will "reflect as small a part of future costs as possible," and thus
to make possible greatly increased dividends in the future. - 3 The probable
6. Depreciation coo
Reserve for Depreciation-Cost basis SO
Revaluation Reserve Account IC
(depreciation for 5th year)
26. A 1933 survey of 34 companies showed that the average write-down of tangible
fixed assets was 46% of the former net book values, or anywhere from 30 to 60% in the
individual cases. It was noted that the increasingly frequent practice is to write intangible
fixed assets down to one dollar. Hornberger, Accounting for No-Par Stochs During th~e
Depression (1933) 8 AccouNr=nG REv. 58, 59. Assuming even that all these assets were pur-
chased or revalued upwards at peak prices of 1929, average write-down of tangible fixed
assets was at least 207 in excess of the actual drop in general price level, and at least 26%
in excess of the actual drop in general construction costs (on the basis of public utility
construction costs) from 1929 to the end of 1932, as measured by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Index of General Prices. See figures given by Grumur, PuDnrc Urn=
VALUATiON (1934) 22. And certainly in the many cases where intangible fixed asts (and
sometimes tangible fixed assets) were written down to one dollar, the extent of the write-
down bore no relation to the price level changes. The proponents of the write-down method
have defended these seemingly excessive write-downs as giving a true picture of the pressnt
values of fixed assets, and erring, if at all, in the direction of "conservative accounting":
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result in many cases will be that future working capital will be insufficient
either currently to maintain the company's necessary fixed assets at full work-
ing efficiency, or to purchase the necessary amount of commodities and services
of other kinds. This may mean either that the company will make insufficient
provision for repayment to creditors in order to gain necessary additions to
working capital or that it will have to borrow further and thus render its
position even more precarious.
In addition, there is little to indicate that either the replacement cost or
general purchasing power methods of revaluation, now offered in justification
of the write-downs, will be applied consistently in times of rising prices so
that the theoretical security for creditors will be realized.21 There is no
evidence on balance sheets and profit and loss statements of companies which
have made write-downs in recent years that any part of the current earnings
made possible by reduced depreciation charges are being segregated in some
reserve account to meet the contingency of a future period of rising prices.28
Therefore, it is likely that if the costs of replacement or the index of the
general-level-of-prices rises faster than the company's sales returns during such
a future period, management will abandon adherence to either method of re-
valuation, in order to avoid sharply cutting into dividends, and the creditor's
theoretical security will be jeopardized thereby.
Furthermore, the history of most corporations during the period of rising
price levels shows the inconsistency of the present theoretical justifications
Daniels answers: "Commercial Solvents Corporation reached the pinnacle of conservatism
by writing down plant and equipment from $7,329,121.56 to $1. Daniels, Principles of Asset
Valuation (1934) 9 ACCOUNTING Rxv. 114, 116; and see similar examples, particularly as to
patents and leaseholds, presented in Farr, Give the Stockholder the Truth (1933) 93 ScRm.
Nm's 228. "In setting up the blanket amount by which plant assets are to be written
down there is some loose discussion of obsolete plants, price levels, water, past appreciation,
and overcapacity, but as a rule no effort is made to analyze the plant account carefully and
to set up a clear basis for valuation." Paton, Aspects of Asset Valuations (1934) 9 Ac.
coUNTiNG REv. 122, 128.
27. Proponents of the write-down plan have contended that present deflated price levels
have come to stay. "Should Not Block Asset Write-Offs," N. Y. Times, February 5, 1933,
I, at 16, col. 1. But patently this is a mere guess, and would not seem to offer adequate
answer to the objection that the write-down plan may result in insufficient protection against
a sharp rise in price levels, in view of past experience and current inflationary monetary
measures.
28. In reducing their stated capital as well as in cancelling off earned surplus or paid-lu
surplus of the past to offset purported losses in values of fixed assets, many companies have
transferred large amounts to surplus accounts variously known as Reserve for Special Con.
tingencies, General Reserve, Reserve for General Contingencies, without any additional ex.
planation of the meaning of these segregations of assets. Farr, Give the Stockholder
the Truth (1933) 93 ScmaNzR's 228. These, however, are clearly not segregations of in-
creased earnings made available by reduced depreciation charges on the basis of the new
valuations of fixed assets. Thus if the company chooses to preserve in the business the
amount of assets represented by these reserve accounts, these assets may in the future fur-
nish some protection against a sharp rise in replacement costs. Nevertheless, the fact that
they are so ambiguously described indicates that management does not intend in any way
to limit itself to such use of these assets as a buffer fund and that they may at any time
be paid out in the form of dividends.
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with actual practice in the past. On the surface, the fact that most corpora-
tions revalued their fixed assets upward during the period of rising prices and
depreciated on the higher basis would tend to indicate that they adhered to
the replacement cost or general purchasing power theory of revaluation. Actu-
ally, however, the purpose in many cases was only to improve the appearance
of the balance sheet by raising the valuation of assets, and, concomitantly,
the valuation of invested capital. The fixed asset account or the revaluation-
of-fixed assets account was debited for the amount of the unrealized appreciation
in value; where this unrealized appreciation was not distributed immediately
as dividends, it was treated as an increase of capital, and not of realized income,
by making the off-setting credit to a revaluation surplus account. But at
the end of each accounting period, management transferred from revaluation
surplus to earned surplus account the exact amount by which earned surplus
would otherwise have been reduced during that accounting period, due to
the increased depreciation charges. Thus, dividends were in no way affected;
and management did not in reality retain out of gross income the amount
that the increased costs of replacements or rising level of general-index-of-
prices indicated would be necessary to keep the company's capital unimpairedP
In many cases, this resulted in excessive borrowing and in a socially injurious
sales price and wage policy at the time when the actual replacements had
to be made.30
It would seem, therefore, that the methods of revaluation upon which the
write-down movement is purported to be based are likely to prove inconsistent
in practice, with consequent danger to creditors. Furthermore, the actual
practice indicates that the present write-down movement may injure, first,
stockholders, and, secondly, future lenders and investors.
Normally, the average voting stockholder has a self-interest in exercising
his vote to retain an efficient and reliable management. An important means
of checking on the efficiency and reliability of management must necessarily
be the financial statements issued by the corporation. If losses due to bad
management can be hidden from the stockholder by management's failure to
present them as deductions from current gross income or from earned surplus,
the stockholder's check on management is to that extent nullified. It is appar-
ent that a very large portion of the present purported losses in value of fixed
assets represent poor judgment of management in purchasing obsolete, un-
necessary, or poorly constructed assets.3 ' This, perhaps, is one reason why
the actual write-downs of fixed assets have generally far exceeded the drop
in replacement costs or in the level of the general-index-of-prices. To cancel
29. Daniels, The Valuation of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 AccouxrnG REV. 302, 305-30.
This would not apply, however, to the instances in which the appreciation in value of fixed
assets was capitalized by means of a dividend of par-value stock to an equivalent amount.
In such cases the corporation presumably was required to maintain that capital unimpaired
by actually recovering its appreciated value through future depreciation charges.
30. Schmidt, The Basis of Depreciation Charges (1930) 8 HARv. Bus. REv. 257.
31. Homberger, Accounting for No-Par Stocks During the Depression (1933) 8 Ac-
couxn. Rrv. 58, 60; Daniels, The Valuation of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 Accou:x;rn REv.
302, 313-314. To the effect that the same type of abuse is increasingly evident in write-
downs under the English Companies Law, see Morgan, Company Reconstructions (London,
1934) 140 Tan AccouNT r 346, 347.
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losses due to bad management against a reduction in stated capital of the
company, without presenting them as expenses on the profit and loss statement
or at least as deductions from earned surplus available for dividends, is apt
to mislead the stockholder into believing that the losses were due to causes
over which the management has no control.
32
This failure to make a true disclosure of the cause of the losses may also
mislead prospective investors and lenders, just as it may mislead present stock-
holders; and thus result in purchases of stock or loans of money that would
not otherwise be made.
Furthermore, even where the write-down is made consistently in relation
to the replacement cost or general-index-of-prices standard, it would seem that
the present unexplained representations of increased earnings on profit and
loss statements, or explanations which infer or openly state that the earnings
are due to improvements in the market for the company's commodities or
services,33 are misrepresentations with respect to future lenders or investors.
For, when the corporation writes down the book values of its fixed assets, it
is in effect discounting all future expected earnings from those assets to the
extent that the earning power of its fixed assets tends to fluctuate with replace-
ment costs or the general index of prices. Since those expected earnings are
less than what was expected when the asset was originally purchased, or when
later revalued upwards, the discounted present value amounts to a lesser sum
32. This is true even where the corporation statute, as in Illinois [ILL. STAT. ANu. (Smith.
Hurd, 1934) § 157.60a] and Ohio [Orno GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-39], seems
to require that the requisite proportion of stockholders, whose assent to the reduction of
stated capital is necessary to its validity, must also consent to the particular write-offs to
be made against the resultant capital surplus. In effect stockholders are forced to accept
the statements of management that these write-downs represent actual price level changes,
and they are in no position consciously to assent to or dissent from a write-down actually
made necessary by poor management. As to the same problem under the English Com-
panies Law, see Morgan, supra note 31.
Daniels, supra note 4, at 116 states that, if earned surplus is unavailable for purposes of
off-setting such losses not due to uncontrollable trends in price levels, the losses should be
set up as deferred charges and amortized over future income. Cf. HoxsEy, op. cit. supra
note 18, at 13-16; KESTER, ADvAucxD AcCOUNTING (3d ed. 1933) 542.
33. Thus, United Fruit Company wrote-down its fixed assets by over $40,000,000 In
1931, which increased its profits for 1932 by about $5,000,000 and presumably by that amount
or more for each year thereafter. Yet, its report for 1934, as given to the New York Times,
speaks of earning $12,049,299 in that year, and infers that the increase in earnings over 1933
and before was due to a lessening of import quota restrictions on bananas in various coun-
tries, and to similar improvements in business conditions. No mention is made of earnings
due to having written down fixed assets at the end of 1931. "United Fruit Made $12,049,-
299 in 1934," N. Y. Times, February 5, 1933, at 36, col. 1. The fact that depreciation
charges have been decreased may be hidden by recording net operating profit, with no spe.
cific deduction for depreciation, but with merely a footnote explanation to the effect that
depreciation has already been deducted. See statements of the Doehler Die Casting Com.
pany and Radio Corporation of America in PooR's, IinusT=xL (1934); cf. the statement
of the Ever Ready Company, Ltd., also reported there.
These misleading presentations of corporate accounts substantially impair the value of
comparative balance sheets and income accounts. Nissley, Effects of Recent Events on
Financial Statements (1933) 55 JoT,. or AccouNrAxc 272, 288-289.
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than the discounted value of the earnings as of the time when the
asset was purchased. Thus, when the company reduces stated capital con-
comitantly with the write-down of fixed assets, it is accepting a yet-unrealized
loss in advance. If the reduction of stated capital were not now accomplished,
those losses would, as realized over the life-time of the fixed assets, presumably
impair stated capital approximately to the extent of the present reduction of
capital made to offset the write-down of the fixed assets.&3 4 Under the general
American rule, management would then be legally bound in the future to
repair that lost capital before paying dividends. 3 By now reducing capital
to the approximate extent of that future loss as discounted in advance, the
corporation presumably does not intend to attempt to repair those capital
losses and is permitted to proceed in the future on a lower capital investment
basis without recording the losses (which exist, as calculated on the former
investment basis) on its profit and loss statement, as they accrue. Thus, it
will in the future have to recover less out of gross income by means of the
depreciation charge in maintaining unimpaired the stated capital as reduced.
This does not mean, however, that the corporation will not in the future suffer
losses, at least as measured in number of dollars, if comparison be made with
its capital investment before the reduction in stated capital. Therefore, no
matter how much the write-down improves the showing of earnings in the
future, as compared with earnings of the past few years, the extent of that
improvement from a historical standpoint is the extent of a dollar loss which
the corporation, by now reducing its stated capital, has chosen not to repair.
Obviously, however, the lender or investor assumes that that showing of
improvement in earnings is the measure of the increased value of the cor-
poration's shares, or the decreased risk in purchasing its bonds. For these
supposed actual earnings are the primary bases on which he may calculate the
present discounted value of all expected future earnings of the company, and
therefore the present value of the company's securities, or the risks he takes
in lending it money.
It is, therefore, misleading for the corporation to give the impression on
future profit and loss statements, either by absence of any explanation or by
an express statement, that the improved showing of earnings is due to improved
efficiency or an improved market for the company's commodities and services.
Nor is it sufficient merely to note the revaluation of fixed assets and concurrent
adjustment of capital on the balance sheet at the time of the vaite-down.
Since from a historical standpoint, which is the only safe standard for gauging
a company's relative success or failure, the company will be realizing a loss
in the future to the extent of all future dividends made possible by the write-
down, it is in those future profit and loss statements that the truth should
be told to the investor. At least, notation on those statements should be made
as to the portion of total earnings that would accrue were depreciation based
on the original cost of the fixed assets, and the added amount accruing by
reason of the revaluation.
34. Daniels, The Vahation of Fixed Assets (1933) 8 Accounmo REv. 302, 303; Sweeney,
Income (1933) 8 Accom;=xG REv. 323.




Despite the possibilities of inconsistency and abuse presented by the write-
down movement, little legislative attention has been given to the problem.
There are five main groups of existent state statutes which may possibly afford
some protection to creditors.
The first group3 6 is represented by the statutory provisions of seven states
to the effect that "no reduction shall be made in capital unless the assets
remaining after such reduction are sufficient to pay any debts." 37  These
provisions seem to be intended primarily to apply to the situation where liqui-
dating dividends are paid directly from the capital surplus transferred from
stated capital. If a company is unable to pay its debts in the future as a
result of having paid dividends out of the supposed earnings derived from the
present write-down of fixed assets, concurrent with reduction of stated capital,
that inability will be due presumably, not to paying dividends directly out
of assets represented by the capital surplus transferred from stated capital,
but to having written capital investment down too far in offsetting the de-
valuation of fixed assets. Thus the future capital retained in the business
will be insufficient to replace fixed assets or to purchase necessary commodities
and services of other kinds. Therefore, if statutory provisions of this type
are strictly construed, they would seem inapplicable to the cancellation of
fixed asset losses against capital surplus transferred from stated capital.
Liberally construed, however, they may perhaps be held to render management
liable where the future inability to pay debts results from the present reduc-
tion of stated capital below an amount which, if maintained unimpaired in the
future, would be reasonably sufficient, as indicated by the present level of
replacement costs or general-index-of prices, to maintain the company in a
solvent condition.
The second group is represented by the provisions of three statutes to the
effect that the reduction of capital must not injure the rights of creditors00
Possibly by reason of their ambiguity, these provisions seem more applicable
to the method of using the capital surplus, transferred from stated capital, to
offset a devaluation of fixed assets. Nevertheless, that very ambiguity as to
the particular conduct forbidden renders the protection doubtful.
A third type is illustrated by the relatively unimportant corporation law
of Arizona, which provides that "a fictitious increase or decrease of stock shall
36. The ten statutes (those of Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Minne-
sota, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and Wyoming) which provide that the reduction in stated
capital may not go below a stated sum, varying between $300 and $1000, and/or that the
corporation may distribute any of its assets over liabilities plus capital stock as reduced
would make possible practically unlimited reduction of stated capital and concurrent write-
off of fixed asset valuations to the same extent. Hence they seem to furnish no protection
to creditors against abuse of the write-down movement, and are not included in the dis-
cussion.
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3420; Del. Laws 1929, p. 389; Ilr. STAT. ANN. (Smith-
Hurd, 1934) § 157-60; MAss. ANw. LAWS (1932) c. 156, § 45; NEV. Co rP. LAWS (Hillyer,
Supp. 1934) § 1624; Onro GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-40; R. I.. Laws 1931-1932,
c. 1941, § 53 (B and C).
38. ME. REv. STAT. (1930) p. 874, § 51; S. C. CODE (1932) § 7689(a); VA. COD (Michle,
Supp. 1932) § 3781.
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be void." 39  This provision is similarly ambiguous. Its language may be con-
strued to mean, however, that a reduction of stated capital and concomitant
devaluation of fixed assets below any reasonable estimate of the actual drop
in replacements costs of the company's fixed assets or of the general-index-of-
prices level is "fictitious" and therefore illegal.
A fourth group is represented by the statutes of four western states and
the District of Columbia.40 In substance, these require that stated capital
must not be reduced below the amount of the company's liabilities or any
probable liabilities, the latter as measured by the estimated cost of the fixed
assets which it may be the purpose of the corporation to construct. The Utah
statute allows the reduction of state capital to an amount equal to one-half the
amount of the company's liabilities. These provisions may offer more ade-
quate protection to the creditor in that he may be assured that at least a
substantial "capital cushion" will be maintained unimpaired following the
reduction of stated capital. But the mere fact that stated capital, as reduced,
is equal to the amount of the outstanding liabilities, or in the one case, to
one-half those liabilities, does not assure the creditor that that capital will
be sufficient to enable the company to replace its fixed assets in the future
or to purchase other commodities and services necessary to maintaining the
company in a solvent and fairly secure position.4 ' In the final analysis, such
an assurance is usually the only real protection to creditors.
All of the foregoing statutes have the common defect that they offer no
special provisions for enforcement. 42 All are seemingly governed as to en-
forcement by the ordinary dividend provisions of the state corporation law,
which usually make the directors or stockholders liable to creditors in the
event of dissolution or insolvency caused by failure to comply with the statutory
requirements as to reduction of capital.43 Creditors, therefore, are probably
39. Am. REv. CODE (Struckmleyer, 1928) § 589.
40. N. D. ComrP. LAWs Amr. (Supp. 1925) § 4557(2); OE.. STAT. (1931) § 9775; Wvo.
Rev. STAT. AxN-. (1931) § 28-136; UTAH REv. STAT. Aim. (1933) § 18-2-44; D. C. Coanp
(1929) §§ 289-295. The California statute falls in a similar category by requiring that no
payment of dividends be made from the surplus resulting from reduction of stated capital.
unless remaining assets "taken at their fair present value vill at least equal one and one-
quarter times its debts and liabilities." CAL. Crv. CODE (Supp. 1933) § 348(b). The
statute of North Carolina seems to require that the remaining assets equal one and one-third
the total amount of liabilities. N: C. CODE Am;zr. (Michie, 1931) § 1179.
41. It has also been criticized as neglecting the importance to creditors of the distinction
between liquid, as opposed to frozen assets. Legis. (1934) 47 Htuy. L. REv. 693, 696.
42. Three statutes provide that stated capital may not be reduced below the value of
preferred stockholder's preference on dissolution, unless, as stated in the Minnesota statute,
a majority of such class assent to the reduction of its preference. CAr.. Crv. CODE (Deering,
Supp. 1933) § 348; T.. STAT. An-. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) § 157.60; Blinn. Laws 1933, c. 3C),
§ 38. These statutes, while intended to protect holders of preferred stock .ith diazolution
preference rather than creditors, also may tend to assure creditors of the maintenance of a
minimum "capital cushion." This is clearly a doubtful protection, however, particularly
where, as in Minnesota, that class of stockholders is expresly allowed to renounce its rights.
43. See, for example, ARE. STAT. A-r. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 1701z; CoNN.. GEN-. STAT.
(1930) § 3386; F1. Comm. LAws A',r. (1927) § 6581; Mlinn. Laws 1931, § 38 (I); S.
D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8777-F; UTAH R v. STAT. A,sv. (1933) § 18-2-17.
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left with the dubious protection of being able to invoke these statutory limita-
tions subsequent to the actual reduction of stated capital and at the time of
insolvency. Furthermore, these plaintiffs would probably have the difficult
burden of proving the direct connection between the excessive write-down and
the subsequent actual damage sustained by them, perhaps many years later.
This result may be modified, however, by the provisions in five statutes
requiring that, shortly after the corporation files its certificate of reduction
of capital with the proper state officer, it shall publish a more or less detailed
notice of its plan of reduction of stated capital once a week for a period
usually of three or four weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the
county in which the principal office of the corporation is located.
4 4 In the
Delaware statute, this provision is coupled with a specific provision that, in
the event that the corporation fails to comply, its directors and stockholders
shall be liable to creditors to the amount of the damage suffered by them
as a result. 45 By interpreting these provisions as to publication as intended
to enable creditors to receive notice of the write-down and thus to protect
themselves, and by construing them together with the provisions limiting the
extent to which the corporation is permitted to reduce its stated capital, it
is possible to interpret the limitations on the reduction of capital in these
five statutes as intended to give creditors an injunctive remedy where creditors'
rights are threatened by the reduction proceedings, and not merely a claim
for recompense when the actual damage is suffered.
Only one statute has specifically provided for preventive, rather than merely
remedial measures in protection of creditors. The Texas statute, after direct-
ing that no reduction of stated capital shall prejudice the rights of creditors,
requires that the corporate management shall furnish the Secretary of State
with a list of the names and addresses of all the company's creditors, and the
amount due each, as well as with proof by affidavit of the financial condition
of the corporation. The Secretary of State may require that the company's
debts be paid or reduced as a condition precedent to allowing the reduction
in stated capital.46 This statute is the closest approach that any American
state has made to the comprehensive procedure provided by the English Com-
panies Act for the protection of creditors in event of a reduction of capital.
41
As compared with that Act, however, it is seriously defective, in that it makes
no provision for affording to any objecting creditors a hearing before a tribunal
competent for the purpose and with broad discretionary powers of approval,
modification or rejection, either of the claims of any creditor or of the com-
pany's plan for reducing stated capital.
44. GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 2201; KAx. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 17-219 to
17-217; N. J. STAT. SERVIcE (1932) § 47-29; N. M. STAT. AN. (1929) § 32-134; N. C.
CODE ANN. (VIfichie, 1931) § 1161.
45. Del. Laws 1929, p. 389.
46. Tx. AN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1332.
47. 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23, §§ 55-60 (1929). Section 56(2) of the Companies Law
seems to make the procedure provided in the act for the protection of creditors mandatory
upon the court only where the reduction of capital is to be followed by payment of dividends
from the resultant capital surplus, and discretionary where the purpose is to "cancel any
paid-up share capital which is lost or unrepresented by available assets." (Section 55b).
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In some cases, there is a possibility that creditors may find a remedy under
the provisions of the trust indenture between the settlor corporation and the
trustee holding the settlor's collateral securities for the benefit of bondholders.
Indentures may provide that the settlor corporation will not during the life-
time of the bonds reduce stated capital below a certain percentage of its stated
capital as it stood when the declaration of trust was made. 8  Or, in some
cases the settlor may be a holding company and may have deposited bonds
and stocks of its subsidiaries with the trustee as security for the payment to
its bondholders, covenanting that it would not during the lifetime of the bonds
permit its subsidiaries to reduce their capital stock below a certain percentage
of their stated capital, as of the date when the holding company's declaration
of trust was made.49 Or the settlor may have covenanted that it would during
the lifetime of the bonds retain in the business an amount of its future earn-
ings, equal to that set aside periodically in a sinking fund, to provide a sinking
fund reserve as a "capital cushion" over and above the amount guaranteed
to be set aside year by year in a sinking fund.Po
48. Thus, for example, the reorganization plan agreement which terminated the receiver-
ship of the Aetna Explosives Company in 1918 provided that the mortgage securing Series
A and B bonds should contain a provision to the effect "that the company shall not, on or
before Jan. 1, 1929, reduce its stated capital below an amount equal to 80% of the Series
B bonds then outstanding; and shall not, after Jan. 1, 1929, and prior to the retirement of
all the Series B bonds, so reduce such stated capital below an amount equal to 10% of the
par value of the Series B bonds then outstanding." (1918) 108 Co.nx ,'.M- Fxnz. CUno:.
2242. A simila provision is found in the trust indenture between the Duquesne Light Com-
pany and the Chase National Bank on 15 year 73/ Convertible Debenture Gold Bonds
(1921) art. 4, § 3, p. 27. A search of close to 100 other trust indentures failed, however,
to disclose any other simila provisions.
49. For example, see the AGaPaEnarr Or AssiGNErr AND PLxmoa nSEWr 3rnm GMza
WZsTER N UTnrnsEs Co Any AND THE DES Mon=rs NATioN;AL BAim, TRusTn (1923) §
4(c), p. 50; INDmzscuRE or TRusr BrvEw = Guzr STATES S=n. COIWAI.- ,im TH
UrnIM STATES MORTGAG ima Thusr Coitr.Au;, $6,000,000 15 year Sao Sinking Fund
Gold Debentures (1927) 18, Art. 11, § 5.
So. For example, see the FMs MORTGAGE AND COLLA.TERAL TRusT L"DErTurn or Tm
Htpsimy CHocoLATE CoRpoRATox To Tm NATIOzAL Crr BA.,-n or Nsw Yona (1920)
Art. 3, § 23.
Some protection may also be afforded by provisions in some indentures to the effect that
the trustee shall have the right to vote upon a proposed reduction of the capital stock of
companies whose securities have been given by the settlor to the trustee as collateral, or
that the stock of subsidiaries in the hands of the trustee shall not be so reduced "as to
render it less than a controlling interest in the hand of the trustee." For example, see Fzs=
AND REFUNDING MORTGAGE or Tm GREAT WESTr Powza CO1A.IxrA or CLrOtu,"A TO Tr
BAN=s TRusT Co 'pA' (1919) 105, § 5; TRusT IDn-zuN-m no,.u Tim Cuma Corran
CoBasA' To =E GUARANTY Thust COamANqY OF Naw YORK (1917) 61, Art. 7, § 6; F1rsr
LIEN I."Dnnrunn 57o 30 YEAR Goa.D BoNDs ROr THE GEOrGIA, L Tir, Powr AND PAMi-
WAYs ComANY To =KE Nnw Yoax ThusT CoMTAr (1911) 35, § 9; FnrST MonTra., 4%
g0 YEAR GoLD Boros or = Gaxqsmn R= RAUoAD Coz.p ,ua To nm STAND.Ar TRs
ColnAN- or NEW YORE (1907) 30, Art. 3.
For brief discussions of such covenants in the light of the write-down movement, see
HoXsEy, op. cit. supra note 18, at 23-24; KlsTn, ADVAzcED Accou.=rcn (3d ed. 1933)
543-544. To the effect that covenants in trust deeds may furnish an important legal weapan
to creditors in checking abuses of the write-down movement, see Hoyt v. E. I. Dupont de
Nemours Powder Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 196, 102 AtL 666 (1917).
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The existent statutory protection to stockholders against possible use of
the write-down plan by management as a means of covering up its errors or
fraud seems likewise inadequate. So far as appears, only two states require
that the company's stockholders assent to the particular use to be made of
the capital surplus transferred from stated capital, where a cancellation of
loss in fixed asset or similar values is contemplated. 2 Hence management is
free to cancel almost any losses against the capital surplus account, without
explanation to stockholders.51 Furthermore, probably few stockholders are
aware of the intricacies of depreciation theory, so that, even where stockholders
have consented to the cancellation of an excessive write-down of fixed assets
against capital surplus transferred from stated capital, not knowing that the
write-down is excessive, few if any would realize or remember in the future
that dividends then accruing, assuming that they are represented to the stock-
holders as earnings, are anything but indicative of good management. And
the likelihood, as evidenced by the actual practice, is that those dividends
will be unqualifiedly represented as from earnings. While at least four statutes
provide that notice of the source of dividends paid directly from the capital
surplus transferred from stated capital be given to the recipients at the time
of payment, 2 no states have enacted the logically corollary requirement that
recipients of dividends due to lowered depreciation charges under the write-
down plan be apprised of the fact that the dividends are not from earnings,
as that term is understood by the ordinary investor. Furthermore, a provision
of the Ohio statute specifically allows management to write off "any particular
loss or expense" against any paid in surplus and thereby to "make available
for dividends without notice as to the source of such dividends any earned
excess of assets resulting therefrom or thereafter arising"; and requires only
that a disclosure of such action be made "in the next annual statement of
the corporation."'3
This lack of protection for the stockholder, which may result in his injury,
may also result in misleading the future lender or investor in at least two
ways. First, the company's stocks and bonds may attain undeservedly high
market values by reason of a bad management being thus able, at least tem-
porarily, to show increased earnings, instead of losses. Secondly, even where
the losses are not due to the management, the fact that the true source of
51. This may be modified to some extent, however, by a recent ruling of the Stock List
Committee of the New York Stock Exchange. While not taking a "categorical" stand on
the subject of the write-down of fixed assets, the Stock List Committee has asked both
petitioning and already listed issuing corporations to report to stockholders in full detail
and for their "specific approval" the purposes and methods of capital stock reduction, to-
gether with the resultant adjustments. Information based on a communication of Novem-
ber 9, 1934, from J. M. B. Hoxsey, Executive Assistant of the Stock List Committee, to
the YALE LAW JouRLAL
52. CAL. Civ. CoDE (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 346 (3); ILs.. STAT. ANN. (Smith-HIurd,
1934) § 157.60. The statutes of Ohio, Louisiana, and Michigan have provisions as to divi-
dends, although not expressly as to dividends resulting from reduction of stated capital,
which seem to require such notice. Omo GEN. CoDn Awx. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-
38(d); LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1106 (II) and see § 1126 (II); Mich. Laws 1931,
pp. 575-576, § 22.
53. Omno G.rN. COD- (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-38(e).
[Vol. 44
future improved earnings is hidden is likely to result in an artificial inflation
of the values of the company's stocks and bonds, unjustified by the actual
financial condition of the company.
Under the Securities ActP4 and the Securities Exchange Act, 5 the Fed-
eral Securities and Exchange Commission may, perhaps, protect future lend-
ers and investors by requiring that the companies under its jurisdiction
inform the public by means of the documents filed with the Commission, as
to the basis chosen for revaluation of fixed assets and accounting for depre-
dation, the date of the write-down of fixed assets and stated capital, if any,
and the proportion of future earnings shown, which are actually due to the
company's having cancelled the present unrealized loss in fixed asset values
against stated capital. These facts would be shown in each balance sheet
and profit and loss statement of the company as the improved earnings accrue. 3
It is doubtful, however, that the Acts would also offer to the future lender
or investor any substantial means of recovering damages from company officers
who sign the statements filed with the Commission, to the extent of any injury
caused the lender or investor by the seeming misrepresentation of earnings
under the write-down plan. The plaintiff's burden under the Securities Ex-
change Act of proving the defendant's bad faith and knowledge of the false or
misleading character of the information or omissions in the statements, as well
as the plaintiff's reliance and the causal connection between the reliance and
the damage, and the somewhat lighter, but substantially similar burden under
the Securities Act,57 will probably close this avenue of redress. Courts would
be particularly loath to hold directors or other officers liable in such cases
where such persons have proceeded in apparent good faith under state statutes
which seem to allow cancellations of devaluations of fixed assets against capital
surplus transferred from stated capital, without any notice in future corporate
statements as to the source of the improved earnings derived from the write-
downs.58
IV
The reduction of stated capital to offset a write-down of fixed assets is only
one of the many methods by which corporate managements are seeking to
54. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (a) et seq. (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905, 15
U. S. C. A. § 77b (1934).
55. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78a (1934).
56. 48 STAT. 74, § 7, 15 U. S. C. A. §77g (1934); and Schedule A (25, 26); 43 STAr. 894,
§ 13, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78m (1934. In this connection, see "SEC Splits on Data Filed by a
Utility," N. Y. Times, November 22, 1934, at 31, col. 3.
57. See Comment (1935) 44 YrAL L. J. 456, 470-475.
58. While only the Ohio statute expressly allows such absence of notice (supra note 53)
the statute of Illinois may be interpreted to reach the same end, since it expresaly allows
the use of capital surplus, transferred from stated capital, to offset any deficits "arising ...
from a diminution in the value of ... assets." ILL. STAT. A,,z;. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32,
§ 157.60a. The statute fails to require any notice to recipients as to the source of dividends
arising therefrom, although expressly requiring notice where dividends are paid directly
from the capital surplus. Note 52, supra.
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continue dividends in spite of heavy actual and prospective losses.59 These
methods have also been much in evidence in England and the British dominions
in recent years. 0 Nevertheless, despite the extent and importance of the in-
terests involved, no litigation involving the write-down movement appears yet
to have arisen in the United States,0 ' although the cases abroad are increasing
in number.62  In the case of creditors, the lack of litigation involving the
write-down movement in the United States is probably due to many different
reasons. Thus, the creditors may be ignorant of the dangers presented. They
may in many cases lack sufficient organization and consequently depend on
the initiative of the investment bankers who floated the bond issues, but whose
self-interest may be more akin to that of the corporate management than to
that of the bondholders. Also, they may fear to press management too hard
by preventing it from paying dividends, thus encouraging it to choose the altern-
ative of reorganization proceedings, which might put at least certain classes
of creditors in an even worse position. Again, some creditors may believe that
the increased showing of earnings will perhaps improve the creditor's actual
security by facilitating the efforts of the company to obtain fresh capital by
means of new stock issues and also by enabling the company to float new bond
issues, with the proceeds of which to pay off present creditors at the time their
59. Other methods include the cancellation of past deficits, accumulated arrears in divi-
dends on preferred stock, expected inventory, securities, exchange and other losses against
capital surplus transferred from stated capital, or against paid-in surplus created by stating
capital at less than the full consideration received for no-par stock. See examples in Farr,
Give the Stockholder the Truth (1933) 93 ScamNml's 228. Often dividends are paid directly
from the capital surplus transferred from stated capital. The write-down movement seems to
have begun late in 1931 with the cancellation of expected security losses against stated capi.
tal by investment trusts and finance companies. "Should Not Block Asset Write-Offs," N.
Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1933, II, at 16, col. 1; see also Hoxszv, op. cit. supra note 18, at 1.
Similar measures seem to have been adopted, although in lesser degree, during the 1921-
1922 depression. Cartinhour and Dewey, Capitalization Changes as a Result of the De-
pression (1932) 4 CoaRoRATE PRAcric Rnv. 26. Other purposes for reducing stated capital
include the reduction of franchise tax and transfer tax charges (the latter where no-par Is
changed to par of low nominal value). In general, see Comment (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 562;
Hornberger, Accounting for No-Par Stocks During the Depression (1933) 8 AccouNvino
R . 58; Marple, The Source of Capital Surplus (1934) 9 AccoUINGo Rav. 75; Nisley,
Effects of Recent Events on Financial Statements (1933) 55 Jova. or AccouNTAIC 272;
"Trend to Cut Book Values" N. Y. Times, December 18, 1932, II, at 15, col. 3; "Urges
Better Accounting," N. Y. Times, April 22, 1932, at 34, col. 4.
60. Morgan, supra note 31, at 346; Anonymous, Financial Manipulation: A Project of
Reform (Canada 1933) 40 QUEEN's QuATERLY 264; Reconstruction and Reduction of Capi.
ta--An Important Judgment (1933) 2 So. ArascA1N L. T. 46; "City Notes-Important New
Issues," The Times (London), May 7, 1930, at 21, col. f.
61. An earlier decision, however, touches on important aspects of the problem, so far
as creditors with trust deed security are concerned. Hoyt v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours
Powder Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 196, 102 AtU. 666 (1917).
62. E.g., Atkinson-Oates Motor, Ltd., 1932-1933 South African Law Reports (Orange
Free State Provincial Division) 111. Several other similar cases are reported in (1933) 1
So. Amamc L. T. 152, 174. Morgan, loc. cit. supra note 1, states that "such schemes have
recently been a feature of public company practice" on account of the "vast amount of
money involved, violent opposition of shareholders, length, and expensive litigation."
claims mature. The present bondholder may consequently find the market
value and salability of his bonds improved. Finally, in many cases the prin-
cipal deterrent may be the lack of adequate legal remedies for creditors who
object. In the case of stockholders, this lack of litigation may again be due
to many different reasons. Many stockholders may be ignorant of the dangers,
although this point is to some extent modified by the fact that at least ten
state statutes require that management give the stockholders a more or less
detailed summary of the proposed plan for reducing stated capital in notifying
them of the meeting called for a vote on the proposed plan,6 and that at least
two of those ten statutes32 require that a certain portion of stockholders must
consent to the particular plan for making use of the capital surplus transferred
from stated capital. In addition, many stockholders may desire to reap divi-
dends or to improve the present salability of their shares, irrespective of the
possibility that the equity represented by the shares may at some future time
be damaged or wiped out as a result. Another reason may be derived from
the fact that, in at least thirteen states,6 4 only the consent of a certain pro-
portion of voting shares is ordinarily necessary to effectuating the reduction
of stated capital, so that possibly dissenting non-voting shares would therefore
not be heard, and from the fact that, in at least one state, adversely affecting
non-voting classes of shares may be barred from voting on the reduction of
capital by reason of a provision in the company's articles or an amendment
thereto.6 5 Finally, a reason for lack of serious objection by stockholders may
63. ALA. CODE AwN. (Mlichie, 1928) § 7003; CAL. CiV. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) §
348; ILL. STAT. Aim. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 32, § 157.59; N. D. Coa.i'. Lwrs A.-. (Supp.
1925) § 4557; Omo GEx. CODE A=x. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-39; Or%. STAT. (1931)
§ 9775.
64. DFr.. LAws 1933, p. 388; GA. CODE An. (Michie, 1926) § 2201; In.%uo CODE Am.
(1932) § 29-148; LA. Grsr. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1125; IE. Rnv. STr.T. (1930) p. 874, §§ 51,
52; Mminn. Laws 1933, c. 300, § 38; Mox". Rnv. CODE (1921) §§ 5920-5922; N. C. COD-Z
Aim. (Michie, 1931) § 1131; R. I. Laws (1931-1932) c. 1941, § 53 (B2); Tzx.m. CoDz
Aim. (Williams, 1934) § 3736; UTAr R v. STAx. Amw. (1933) § 183-2-44; VA. CoDZ
(Michie, Supp. 1932) § 3781; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 185, § 40. The Tennessee statute would
allow a reduction of stated capital merely by a resolution of the board of directors and
without any requirement that assent of stockholders be secured, where the certificate of in-
corporation of the company or any amendment thereto authorizes such procedure. Similarly.
the North Carolina statute would appear to allow a reduction by a mere resolution of the
board of directors where the reduction is not accompanied by an amendment to the
corporate charter.
65. W. VA. CODE (1931) 31-1-12, § 12. However, seven statutes provide in substance
that no plan for the reduction of stated capital and/or distribution of resultant exces asts
shall discriminate between holders of different classes of stoch in violation of the equal
or prior rights of holders of any single class or classes. FA, Coio. Lws Aum;. (1927)
§ 6548; LA. GEr. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1126; Mass. CODE AiM. 1930 § 4133; NEV. Corwp.
LAws (llyer, 1929) § 1624; N. Y. CoNsoL. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 60, § 38 (12); Onmo
Gm. CODE (Page Supp. 1935) § 8623-39 (such a meaning may be implied from the state-
ment that the reduction may be made in "any way not unfair, inequitable or repugnant to
law"); TrEm. CODE AxNr. (Williams, 1934) § 3736. The statutes of Delaware, Florida, Miss-
issippi, Nevada, New York, Tennessee and West Virginia, however, permit such diccimina-
tions where a certain proportion of the shares of the classes adversely affected have voted for
the plan of reduction of stated capital.
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be suggested by the fact that in only one state is it possible for a dissenting
stockholder to bring suit, within a proper period following the stockholders'
meeting at which the management's plan was adopted, to have the plan annulled
or modified, so that the reduction in capital shall not exceed the actual impair-
ment of capital.60
No matter what practical non-legal considerations exist to restrain many
creditors and stockholders from litigating the validity of the write-downs, these
considerations do not apply to all such interested persons; nor do they prove
the social desirability of the write-downs. Adequate legal remedies must be
afforded those who wish to contest the validity of the write-downs, or to secure
compensation for their resulting injuries. The effect of the existence of such
remedies would be not only to protect these individuals through actual litiga-
tion, but also to exercise a healthy restraining influence on the discretion of
corporate management. By providing those remedies and thus checking the
more patent abuses and inconsistencies of the write-down movement, state legis-
latures may do much to guide the movement into socially more desirable
channels.
The write-down plan should be treated by the state legislatures as a form
of voluntary reorganization of presumably solvent companies0 7 For it in-
volves a recapitalization on a lower investment basis, which may present grave
dangers to the security of creditors. Furthermore, it is usually accomplished
by the wiping out of at least a part of the shareholder's book equities, although
not necessarily his real equities. And it may often be accompanied by the
modification or wiping out of the preferences of certain classes of shares and
by grossly unequal treatment between various classes. 8 In fact, at least one
corporation statute provides specifically that a reduction of stated capital may
be treated as a voluntary reorganization, giving dissenting stockholders certain
rights69 which the same statute seemingly allows management to avoid at will
66. ME. REv. STAT. (1930) p. 874, § 53. The New York Statute provides, however,
that a stockholder who dissents from the proposal to reduce stated capital and whose pref-
erential rights would be adversely affected by the plan of reduction, may make a demand
upon the corporation at least twenty days prior to the date on which the meeting of stock-
holders is held, to have his shares appraised by appraisers appointed by a court and to
secure payment of the appraisal value in return for his shares. N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Ca-
hill, Supp. 1934) c. 60, §§ 21, 38.
67. One of the arguments, or threats which accompanied the propaganda in favor of
the write-down movement was that, if such write-downs were not voluntarily allowed to
be accomplished, the same results could be achieved by means of receivership, reorganization
or merger. "Urges Better Accounting," N. Y. Times, April 22, 1932, at 34, col. 4; Hoxsty,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 22; see Daniels, supra note 4, at 302, 309.
To the effect that such reductions of stated capital and accompanying write-offs are In
effect voluntary reorganizations or liquidations of part of the corporate businems, see Seeley
v. New York Nat. Exchange Bank of New York, 8 Daly 400, 402 (N. Y. 1878), aff'd, I8
N. Y. 608 (1879); Strong v. Brooklyn Cross-Town Rr. Co., 93 N. Y. 426 (1883); see cases
cited in Greenough and Ayer, Funds Available for Corporate Dividends in Washington (1934)
9 WA H. L. R v. 63, 72 n. 35.
68. See Morgan, sura 31 at 346.
69. Onro GEn. CODE Axx. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-72. The dissenting stockholder Is
given a right to file a written demand upon the corporation within twenty days of the
stockholder's meeting at which the reduction of stated capital was approved, for cash pay.
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by simply calling the procedure a reduction of stated capital, and following
the ordinary statutory procedure provided for the latter purpose." o
If on considerations of political expedience and convenience it is impractical
for the states to provide expertly qualified administrative tribunals to supervise
the often complex adjustments of these voluntary reorganizations, the problem
should be handled by state courts of general jurisdiction with broad, discre-
tionary powers.
71
One possible statutory procedure for handling these voluntary reorganiza-
tions might be to require first that the corporate management pass a resolution
setting forth in complete detail a statement of the company's financial con-
dition, together with the extent, method, and reasons for the proposed reduction
of capital, the nature of the losses proposed to be cancelled by that means,
the amount of the future dividends, if any, expected to be produced thereby,
or the amount of any proposed liquidating dividend to be paid directly from
capital surplus transferred from stated capital.72  Every stoclolder should
then be mailed a notice of the special stockholders' meeting to vote on the
proposed plan, the notice to contain the directors' resolution in full" and to
be mailed at least a month in advance of the meeting74 in order to give the
ment of the fair value of his shares as of the day before the vote was taken. The New
York statute, however, has the came provision in its procedure for reduction of stated
capital. Note 66, supra.
70. The section of the statute devoted to the procedure for accomplishing a reduction of
stated capital concludes: "Any reduction ... and any adjustment or change so authorized
shall be presumed to be fair and equitable to all shareholders." Orxo G=.-. Coon AD ;.
(Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-39.
71. This is the method used under the English Companies Law, which requires that,
before the reduction of share capital may be effected, the special resolution of the corpora-
tion and its stockholders for the reduction of share capital must be confirmed by the court
on petition of the company; and the order of the court, together with the minutes of re-
duction taken by the court, must be filed with the Registrar of Companies. 19 & 20 Gzo.
V, c. 23, §§ 55, 58 (1929). The only American statute which requires confirmation by a
court is that of Maine; but it requires confirmation only where, within thirty days after
the stockholders' meeting which resulted in a favorable vote on the proposed reduction of
stated capital, a dissenting stockholder brings a suit in equity for revision of the proceed-
ings on the ground that the reduction exceeds the "actual impairment of capital." The
court may in such case annul or modify such reduction proceedings. The action of th2
court, or in case no bill in equity is filed, the action of the corporation in accordance with
the statutory procedure, shall be conclusive on all parties, whether stockholders or credi-
tors. MF. Rxv. STAT. (1930) p. 874, § 53.
72. While no existent state statute goes to this extent in requiring detailed information
as to the reduction of stated capital in the resolution, at least one statute goes a sub-
santial distance in this direction. Omo GN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8623-39.
73. The following statutes, for example, are similar in that they require the purpose
and amount of the proposed reduction of stated capital to be set forth in the notice: N. D.
CoaIx. LAws An. (Supp. 1926) § 4557; OaIA. STAT. (1931) § 9775. So far as appars.,
however, no statute requires that the notice to stockholders contain the complete informa-
tion here proposed to be required.
74. At least two statutes require thirty-days notice. ARiz. REv. Coon (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 589; ALA. CoDE Axne. (Michie, 1928) § 7003. The Kentucky statute provides for
20 days notice. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 553. Delaware requires only ten days notice
Del. Laws 1933, pp. 388-391. Practically all the remaining statutes have no time require-
ment whatever.
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stockholder adequate opportunity to consider the proposal. Directors should
be made civilly liable to stockholders for false or misleading statements or
omissions in the resolution as printed in the notice, to the extent of the damage
the stockholder may suffer as a result.75 The proxy accompanying the notice
should contain equal space both for an affirmative and a negative answer, to
avoid malpractices in this respect that have appeared in England and, perhaps,
also in the United States.76 The affirmative vote of at least a majority, prefer-
ably two-thirds in amount of each class of shares, should be required. 77  Fol-
75. As a result of abuse of the write-down movement in England, suggestion has been
made that the Companies law be amended to make directors liable in such cases, just
as they are liable for misleading or untrue statements in prospectuses. Morgan, supra note
31, at 346, 347.
76. Morgan, supra note 31. Parliament is now being pressed to amend the English
Companies Law to this effect.
77. The provisions of the statutes vary considerably in this respect. Delaware requires
the written consent of all voting shares, or a resolution of the board of directors plus the
favorable vote of a majority of voting shares at a special meeting of stockholders called for
the purpose. Del. Laws 193S, p. 388, § 28 (a) (b). With varying limitations, eight
statutes require the assent of a majority of voting shares. GA. CODE ANN. (Michte, 1926)
§ 2201; ILL. STAT. AxN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) § 157.59; ME. Rnv. STAT. (1930) p. 874, §
51 (where however, the reduction is for the purpose of wiping out an impairment of capl-
tal, as in the case of write-down of fixed assets, a favorable vote of two-thirds of all out.
standing voting stock is required); Minn. Laws 1933, c. 300, § 38 (I); Nrv. ComP. LAws
(Hillyer, 1929) §§ 1606, 1624 (plus favorable vote of the majority of shares of any class or
classes whose preference would thereby be decreased); TENiN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934)
§ 3736; UTAH Rxv. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§ 18-2-44 to 18-2-45 (unless the articles of In-
corporation otherwise provide). Nine statutes require the affirmative vote of a majority of
outstanding shares, whether voting or non-voting. ARiz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928)
§ 589; Ar.A. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7003; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, Supp. 1933) §
348; IND. STAT. ANrN. (Burns, 1926) § 4834; MAss. LAWS ANN. (1933) c. 156, § 41 (If two or
more classes of stock have been issued, the favorable vote of a majority of each class
outstanding and entitled to vote is required, including in any event, where par value
stock is changed to no-par, a majority of the outstanding stock of each class adversely
affected); NEB. Coin.. STAT. (1929) § 24-103; N. H. Laws 1931, c. 69; OR. CODE ANN.
(1930) § 25-223; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 281-5. Twelve statutes re-
quire a two-thirds affirmative vote of all shares. CoLo. STAT. ANNr. (Courtright, 1930)
§ 1016; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3420; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 5, §§ 289-295; KAN. REV.
STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 17-215 to 17-217; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 553; Micir, CoMt,.
LAWS (1929) § 10010; N. D. Comp. LAWS Am. (Supp. 1925) § 4557; OKLA. STAT. (1931)
§ 9775; S. C. CODE (1932) § 7689(a); TEX. Civ. STAT. Amr. (Vernon, 1927) art. 1332;
VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) § 5795 (but if the stock be divided into several classes, the favorable
vote of two-thirds of each outstanding class entitled to vote is necessary) ; Wis. STAT. (1931)
§ 180.07; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) §§ 28-137 to 28-139. Six statutes require an affirm-
ative vote of two-thirds of all voting shares. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-148; LA. GEN.
STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1125; Mont. Laws 1931, §§ 5918-5923; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill,
1930) c. 60, § 37, 3a, 3b (if the purpose of the reduction is merely to reduce or increase
the number of no-par or par shares, or in case all of the company's capital stock is divided
into par value shares, only a favorable vote of a majority of voting shares is required; but
if the preferences of any class or classes of shares will thereby be changed, there must also
be a favorable vote of two-thirds of the shares of such class); VA. CODE (Michle, Supp.
1932) § 3781; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 185, § 40. Rhode Island requires the affirmative vote
of a majority of the shares of each voting class. R. I. Laws 1931-32, c. 1941, § 53, c. B (2).
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lowing the affirmative vote, management should be required to petition the
proper court for confirmation of the proposed plan,78 submitting to the court
the resolution properly signed by the company's executive officers, a copy of
one of the notices to the stockholders, separate lists of the names and addresses
of assenting and dissenting stockholders,79 and the certified proxies or ballots
upon which stockholders cast their vote,80 together with lists of the names and
addresses of any other stockholders and of all creditors and the nature and
amount of the claims of each. 8' Suitable newspaper publication of the pro-
ceedings should then be required, giving the proposed plan in detail s- together
with the court before which the proceeding is pending and the statutory length
of time for its pendency, perhaps three months, subject to extension by the
court. At the same time, a notice similar to that sent to stockholders should
The Mlissippi statute requires the affirmative vote of a majority of voting shares, or,
if any class would be adversely affected by the reduction of stated capital, the affarmative
vote of a majority of the shares of such class or classes voting as a clas, plus a majority
of the shares of every other class as a class. Miss. CODE Auim. (1930) § 4133. Two statutes
require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of each class outstanding. Omo Gmr. CoDn (Page.
Supp. 1935) § 8623-39; W. VA. CODE (1931) 31-1-12. North Carolina requires two-thirds
of each class of voting shares. N. C. CODE Ami. (Michie, 1931) § 1161. Florida requires
four-fifths of all shares. FA. Coim. Laws A=x. (Supp. 1934) § 6017 (1).
The English Companies Law requires the affirmative vote of a three-fourths majority
of those shares voted; but this does not necessarily mean three-fourths of all shares. Com-
plaint has been made that the Companies Law is antiquated in this respect, since the stock-
holder polls upon such "vitally important resolutions represent only a ridiculously small
proportion of the total shares," thus enabling a compact group to effectuate reductions of
share capital which are grossly unfair to certain classes of stockholders. Morgan, loc. cit
supra note 31.
78. Six state statutes require confirmation of the plan of reduction of stated capital by
the Secretary of State, or the corporation commissioner, or state charter board; but none,
with the exception of the Maine statute under certain circumstances (supra note 71) re-
quire confirmation by a court. ILL. STAT. Aim. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 157-59; L.m. STAT.
Aim. (Burns, 1926) § 4834; KAw. REv. STAT. A=. (1923) §§ 17-215 to 17-217; L.. Gm-.
STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1125; MAss. Az'iN. LAWS (1933) c. 16, § 45; Tr.=. Am;. Civ. SrxT.
(Vernon, 1927) art. 1332. Nearly all the remaining statutes, however, require only that a
certificate or resolution of reduction of stated capital, stating the fact of compliance with
the statutory procedure and, often, the nature and amount of the reduction, and signed and
acknowledged by the chief executive, officers of the corporation be filed with the Secretary
of State, or similar officer. Under some statutes, an additional copy must be filed in the
office of the county recorder or registrar of deeds for the county in which the principal
office of the corporation is located.
79. The Connecticut statute provides similarly as to assenting stockholders, the purpose
being to hold such assenting stockholders liable to creditors if the corporation becomes in-
solvent as a result of the subsequent distribution of capital. Co.m GE!. STAT. (1930) §
3240.
80. For a similar provision, see R. I. Laws 1931-1932, c. 1941 § 53, cl. B. (2).
81. Cf. note 46, supra.
82. Cf. notes 44, and 45, supra. The English Companies Law provides similarly that
the court may order that the Company publish the reasons and causes of the reduction "as
the court may think expedient with a view to giving information to the public." 19 &
20 Gxo. V, c. 23, § 57 (2b) (1929).
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be sent to each creditor,83 informing him of the statutory period during which
he might be permitted to object either personally before the court, or before
an impartial master appointed by it, or, where necessary, by correspondence
with the court or master, as the case might be. Notice of the pendency of
the proceedings and the similar right to object should also be sent to stock-
holders who dissented.8 4 If no objection is registered with the court or master
during the statutory period for the pendency of the proceedings, the plan of
reduction of stated capital should be automatically confirmed. The corporate
management, however, should still remain liable for any false or misleading
statements or omissions in the resolution and notices that may later be shown
to have resulted in damage to stockholders or creditors.85 If, however, objec-
tion is made, the court or its master acting for it should have full discretion
to dismiss the objections, or to compel the corporation to pay the object-
ing stockholder the market value of his shares as of the day previous to the
stockholders' meeting,8 6 or the creditor the full or modified amount of his claims,
or to make some suitable substitute provision.81 This should be a condition
precedent to confirming the reduction. If the court or master, following an
objection brought by a dissenting stockholder or creditor, and upon its own
83. The English Companies Law contains similar provision. See note 45, supra. Sec-
tion 60 also makes it a misdemeanor for any director willfully to conceal the name of, or
misrepresent the amount or nature of the claim of any creditor entitled to object. And
Section 59 provides that if, following the confirmation of the plan of reduction by the court,
the corporation is unable to satisfy the claim of any creditor who was entitled to object
to the reduction of share capital, but was in ignorance of the proceedings and not on the
list of creditors furnished to the court by the company's directors, those holding stock at the
time of the reduction may be liable to contribute for the payment of the claim an amount
not exceeding the extent to which such stockholders would have been liable on calls or
unpaid contributions, if the company had commenced to be wound up on the day before
the said date.
84. While the English Companies Law does not contain a similar provision, it does pro-
vide that the holders of "not less in the aggregate than 15% of the issued shares" of a
particular class of stock may apply to the court to have the variation of their rights by
means of the reduction of share capital cancelled. 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23, § 61 (1929).
One reason for suggesting a more liberal provision in American statutes than that present
in the English Companies Act, is the difficulty of welding a compact group of dissenting
stockholders out of the widely distributed group of shareholders in the usual American cor-
poration.
85. Cf. note 76, supra.
86. For similar provisions in state statutes, see note 66, supra.
87. This is substantially the provision as to creditors under the English Companies Law.
See note 47, suPra; cf. CANADA STATS. (1934) §§ 49-58, p. 335. In addition to such a
general provision as to dissenting stockholders and creditors, the statute might suggest
specific means of securing creditors against abuse of the write-down, such as by requiring
the corporation, before paying any subsequent dividends, to set aside from the freed
capital surplus or from the resultant improved future earnings a sufficient sum in the
form of a trusteed sinking fund to repay creditors at the time their claims mature. As
to preferred stockholders, such suggested specific methods might include (1) paying such
stockholders the market value of their shares as of the day before the meeting of stock-
holders took place, or (2) the par value of their shares, before any dividends resulting
from the write-down may be paid to common stockholders.
investigation determines that the facts stated or omitted in the resolution and
notices of the management were false or misleading, or that the plan as pro-
posed will jeopardize the present or future solvency of the company, it may
refuse to confirm the plan in any form, or may offer to the petitioners a
modified plan. If the latter alternative is adopted, the original procedure
might be followed as to the resolution by the board of directors and the securing
of the requisite assent of stockholders; but, once-the plan is adopted by stock-
holders owning the requisite number of shares, the court should this time
forthwith confirm it. If the confirmed plan provides for a cancellation of
fixed asset or other losses against capital surplus transferred from stated capital,
every future profit and loss statement of the company, on which are shown
earnings due to the present write-downs, should dearly distinguish between
those earnings accruing by reason of such write-downs and those accruing from
other sources. Similarly, every future balance sheet over the same period
should point out the original cost of the revalued assets, the date of each
revaluation and the amount and the basis thereof, and the portion of earned
or other surplus arising by reason thereof, and that portion of earned or other
surplus otherwise created~8 Likewise, all future recipients of dividends accruing
by reason of the write-downs and reduction in stated capital should be notified
of the source at the time of payment.8 9 Finally, it might be required as in
England that, subsequent to the reduction in stated capital, the company add
to its name the words "and reduced. 9 0
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS AND LEGAL CATEGORIES
RPPORTED cases are replete with many forms of stating the distinction be-
tween suretyship or guaranty," and indemnity2 contracts in the instances where
83. The English Companies Law requires companies to reveal in their balance shets
"how the values of fixed assets have been arrived at." 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23, § 124 (1929).
Compare the similar provisions under the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts, supra
note 56.
89. It has been suggested that "the disclosure to stockholders might take the following
form" (1) notice on the balance sheet beside the plant item concerning the date and fact
of the appraisal, (2) statement on the income sheet of the amount of net income based on
cost, (3) earmarking of surplus representing that part passed thereto in excess of income
based on cost valuation of assets, (4) charging cash dividends first to earned surplus ba"d
on cost, (5) notification to stockholders of the source of any cash dividends based on the
earmarked surplus." Daniels, supra, note 4, at 309.
90. The English Companies Law contains a similar provision. 19 & 20 Gro. V, c. 23,
§ 57 (2a) (1929).
1. The terms suretyship and guaranty are used synonymously in this discussion without
any attempt to refer to the distinctions supposed to exist between them. For an exhaustive
analytical discussion and criticism of the differences supposed to exist, see Radin, Guaranty
and Suretyship (1929) 17 CAL.F. L. RPv. 605, and (1930) 18 Cuip. L. RM,. 21.
2. Indemnity is a term used in a variety of senses. See Arnold, Indemnrty Contracts
and the Statute of Frauds (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 401, 413; Treanor, Ralonrake of
Corporate and Non-Corporate Suretyship Decisions (1927) 3 L,'. L. J. 105, 213-216. Thus
it is used to mean an original, independent contract to save the indemnitee against contingent
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the distinction is invoked. For example, it is often said that a contract of
suretyship is one to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another,
whereas a contract of indemnity is one wherein the promisor agrees to save
the promisee harmless from a loss.3  Or, it may be said that the surety's
promise is secondary and collateral to another promise, while the indemnitor's
promise is original and independent of any other contract.4 And a promise of
suretyship is sometimes said to be a promise to do an affirmative act, while
a promise of indemnity is merely to repair a loss, the liability of the indemnitor
occurring only after the promisee has sustained actual loss.5 Still another
definition says that a promise of suretyship is one to protect the promisee
against loss from the default of a third person, while a promise of indemnity
is one to protect the promisee from liability to a third person., Thus, as
a matter of definition, suretyship may be distinguished from indemnity by
the fact that a contract of the former type envisages a legal relationship
concerning three parties, whereas a contract of indemnity concerns a legal
relationship between only two parties.7 That is, typically, suretyship is said
to exist where two persons are liable on the same debt, one as principal, one
contingently liable if the principal defaults, and the normal expectation is
that the debt will be paid by the principal, or that he will reimburse the surety
in the event of payment by the surety.8 On the other hand, a contract of
loss of a specified character. Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., 126 Ark. 535, 191 S. W. 32 (1917).
And it is used to mean a right to recover for injuries, Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538,
546, 129 N. E. 265, 269 (1920), or as the implied right of reimbursement owed to one who
has discharged the debt of another, U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank,
17 F. (2d) 913, 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Indemnity insurance has a meaning which
distinguishes it from life insurance. Wayland v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Mo.
App. 221, 235, 148 S. IV. 626, 630 (1912). Indemnity is also used to mean "the stipulated
desideratum to be paid to the assured in case he has suffered a loss through the perils
or contingencies specified." Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576, 579 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1912).
3. Howell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934);
see Eckhart v. Heier, 37 S. D. 383, 384, 158 N. W. 403, 404, (1916).
4. Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 260, 105 Atl. 687 (1919); Oppenheim v. National
Surety Co., 105 Okla. 223, 231 Pac. 1076 (1925); 28 C. J. 892.
5. Mahana v. Alexander, 88 Cal. App. 111, 263 Pac. 260 (1927); see Westville Land Co.
v. Handle, 112 N. J. L. 447, 452, 171 AtI. 520, 524 (1934); Eckhart v. Heler, 37 S. D. 382,
384, 158 N. W. 403 (1916). And see Comment (1932) 11 TENN. L. REv. 61, 63.
6. Somers v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 191 Cal. 542, 217 Pac. 746 (1923);
McManus v. Tralles, 253 S. W. 406 (Mo. App. 1923); Oppenheim v. National Surety
Co., 105 Okla. 223, 231 Pac. 1076 (1925).
7. Treanor, supra note 2, at 217-218; Merrill, Nebraska Suretyship (1930) 8 Nmn, L. 13.
267, 270; STFARNs, LAw or SuprYsm, (4th ed. 1934) §5.
8. ARANT, SupzTys=i (1931) § 5; SxrANs, LAW op Sursmrs.n (3d ed. 1922) § 5.
A suretyship relation is recognized whether or not there is a privity between the principal
and the security party. Hecker v. Mahler, 64 Ohio St. 398, 60 N. E. 555 (1901); Mathews v.
Aikin, 1 N. Y. 595 (1848); Wright v. Garlinghouse, 27 Barb. 474 (N. Y. 1858); General
Ry. Signal Co. v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 203 N. Y. 407, 96 N. E. 734 (1911).
Nor is it necessary that a surety party enter into the agreement at the time that the
contract between the principal and his creditor is made. McKibben v. Fourth National
Bank, 32 Ga. App. 222, 122 S. E. 891 (1924); Leslie v. Compton, 103 Kan. 92, 172 Pac.
1015 (1918); Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, 50 Atl. 454 (1901).
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indemnity is said to exist where, upon the occurrence of an agreed contingency,
one person alone becomes liable to the obligee.
But, inasmuch as the function of both suretyship and indemnity is the
same,9 namely to provide security against loss, there is a wide field in which
the distinctions as made are hopelessly confused. Assume, for example, that
B wishes to shift the risk of a contingent loss, and that such loss involves
the non-fulfillment of an obligation which C owes to B. If B secures himself
by procuring A to be "surety" for C, or if he secures himself with a promise
of "indemnity" insuring himself against loss suffered in case C defaults,' 0 the
risk assumed by the security party in either case is the same in that it is
dependent on the same contingency. The condition precedent to the security
party's liability is the default of a personal obligation, and hence three parties
are in fact involved. Yet in a large number of cases in which exactly these
factors are present, the situation is legally regarded wholly from the view-
point of the relation of security and secured, and the contract is called one
of indemnity." Thus, in a given set of facts, one court will construe the
situation as a suretyship transaction, while another court, or the same court
at a different time will find there has been an indemnity relationship estab-
lished. In other words, the legal relationship may be, and often is, different
from the factual relationship.
12
One of the most fruitful sources for instances in which a distinction between
suretyship and indemnity is invoked, is cases wherein the statute of frauds
is interposed as a bar to the enforcement of an oral promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another.' 3 It is well established that a
contract of "indemnity" does not come within the statute, whereas a contract
of suretyship does.' 4 But the cases are irreconcilable as to when a given
situation is indemnity and when it is suretyship.'5 The chief criterion by
9. Mahana v. Alexander, 8S Cal. App. 111, 116, 263 Pac. 260, 263 (1927); Ar.Ar.
Surmn (1931) 27. See also Treanor, supra note 2, at 199.
10. Generally it is held that the label used by the parties is not governing nor des
it indicate their intent. Cheesman v. Wiggins, 122 Ind. 352, 23 N. E. 945 (18S9); Dolgaff
v. Schnitzer, 209 App. Div. 511, 205 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1st Dep't, 1924); Nugent v. Wolfe, 111
Pa. 471, 4 "Atl. 15 (1886). See Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and the Statute of Frauds
(1928) 41 HARv. L. RV. 689, 694.
11. See notes 19, 24, 37, 42, infra.
12. "Certainly the cases justify us in saying that one contract called an indemnity may-
in reality be a guaranty and another designated as guaranty may in truth be an indemnity
contract." Arnold, supra note 2, at 414.
13. See Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 260, 264, 105 Aft. 687, 6SS (1919).
14. Thomas v. Cook, 8 Barn & Cr. 728 (K. B. 1923), is regarded as the precedent
for this rule that a contract of indemnity is not within the statute. The statement has
been repeated in countless cases. See Jones v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216 (1895).
15. But some courts, recognizing that indemnity may be and often is used synonymouJ-y
with suretyship, say that a promise of indemnity is within the statute if it is a promis:
to answer for the debt of another. See Cheesman v. Wiggins, 122 Ind. 352, 23 N. E. 945
(1889); Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399, 401 (1870). See also 1 Wnusr-Ton, Co:.Trt,.cr-
(1920) § 482: "The greatest confusion exists in regard to the question whether promi--
to indemnify are within the statute. . . .A promise to indemnify a creditor against loss
if he sells goods to another, or advances money to him, is certainly a promie to answer
for the debt or default of another, and of course within the statute; yet the me of the
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which a distinction is made is whether or not a contract is "independent," and
if it is found to be so, the contract is said to be one of indemnity, and en-
forceable even though oral.10 Theoretically, perhaps, an independent contract
is never one to answer for the debt of another,17 but actually the test has
been greatly extended so that a contract which factually appears to be one
to answer for the debt of another is often legally termed independent and
hence one of indemnity.1 8 The cases dealing with identical situations reach
opposing results on the basis of reasoning confused by a conflict of legal and
factual criteria. Thus, for example, if A promises B to indemnify him if B
will become surety for C's promise to D, some courts hold that A's promise
is "original and independent" of C's implied promise to B to reimburse B,
and therefore hold A's promise is one of indemnity, which is enforcible though
oral in form.19 Other cases, indistinguishable in fact, have been decided pre-
cisely contrariwise.20 It has been pointed out that the confusion in these cases
arises partly out of the fact that B, the promisee, occupies a dual status.-"
On the one hand he is, or may become, a debtor to D. And it is well
established that a promise to a debtor to pay his debt is not within the statute
word indemnify in such a transaction is entirely proper. It is therefore a primary question
whether the promisor agrees, not merely to indemnify, but to indemnify for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another." And yet this recognition of confusion in terminology
does not serve to clear up the real confusion in the cases nor to identify the factual with
the legal relationship. See Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 480, 4 At. 15, 17 (1886);
Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438 (1875). And see Steinmetz, Contracts of Guaranty
and Indemnity and Credit Insurance (1910) 44 Am. L. REv. 736, 746 et seq.
16. Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., 126 Ark. 535, 540, 191 S. W. 32, 34 (1917); S.
Landow and Co. v. Gurian, 93 Conn. 576, 107 AtI. 517 (1919); Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind.
315, 321 (1880) ; Wilson v. Smith, 73 Iowa 429, 35 N. W. 506 (1887); cf. Curtis and Gartside
Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 58 Okla. 470, 474, 160 Pac. 465, 466 (1916).
17. Some courts have asserted, as would seem to be correct, that a promise cannot
be independent if the principal debtor's obligation continues to exist, but only if the new
promisor is solely liable. Spear v. Farmers' and Mechanics Bank, 156 111. 555, 41 N. Y
164 (1895); McManus v. Tralles, 253 S. W. 406, 409 (Mo. App. 1923); Easter v. White,
12 Ohio St. 219, 226 (1861); Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 481, 4 At. 15, 17 (1886);
Mankin v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 376, 60 S. E. 248, 249 (1908).
18. The decision as to whether or not a contract is within the statute has thus very
frequently been based on the test as to whether or not the contract is independent rather
than on whether or not it is a contract to answer for the debt of another. See, for
example, first paragraph of opinions in Spear v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 156 111.
555, 41 N. E. 164 (1895) and Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. 396 (1841). And see criticism
of this tendency, in opinion of Grover, J., in Brown v. Weber, 38 N. Y. 187 (1868).
19. Resseter v. Waterman, 151 Ill. 169, 37 N. E. 875 (1894); Stoltenberg v. Johnson,
163 Ill. App. 422 (1911); Dyer v. Staggs, 217 Ky. 683, 290 S. W. 494 (1927); Hawes v.
Murphy, 191 Mass. 469, 78 N. E. 109 (1906); Minick v. Huff, 41 Neb. 516 (1894); Jones
v. Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446, 40 N. E. 216 (1895); Ferrell v. Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383 (1876).
20. Posten v. Clem, 201 Ala. 529, 78 So. 883 (1918); Spear v. Farmers' and Mechanlcg'
Bank, 156 Il1. 555, 41 N. E. 164 (1895); Craft v. Lott, 87 Miss. 590, 40 So. 426 (1905);
Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627, 50 AtI. 454 (1901); Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St.
219 (1861); Bayard v. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills, 290 Pa. 79, 137 AtI. 910 (1927);
Wolverton v. Davis, 85 Va. 64 (1888).
21. See Corbin, supra note 10, at 699.
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of frauds, for no suretyship relation is established by such a pronise.2 The
promise of A, in this aspect, is a promise to assume the debtor's debt by
substituting himself as debtor, not if B the debtor does not pay, but abso-
lutely. But in another aspect of the case, B is a creditor of C. By becoming
surety for C, B has a right of reimbursement against C, the principal obligor,
and A's promise thus becomes also a promise to B as creditor to pay the debt
of another person, C, if C does not pay. Since this is true, it is apparent
that this situation cannot really be classified in a vacuum as one either of
suretyship or of indemnity, but depends entirely upon the point of view with
which the relationship is regarded.3
Many similar instances can be given in which the results of cases are dearly
inconsistent. Thus, an oral promise by A to indemnify B who becomes bail
bondsman for C has been held by some courts a promise of indemnity,- and
by others a suretyship agreement,25 and hence unenforcible or enforcible as
the case may be. The decision again seems to depend on whether the promise
of A is regarded as concerning only A and B, or whether it is considered as
envisaging a relationship of A, B, and C on account of C's duty to pay the
"indemnity."
The test of whether a contract is independent or collateral has been further
extended in some cases by adopting the test that if the promisor received a
"new consideration" for his promise,2 0 or had a "leading purpose" in making
the promise,27 despite the fact that his promise is made to the creditor and
22. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole, 258 Fed. 169 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); Garroway v.
Jennings, 189 Cal. 97, 207 Pac. 554 (1922); Aldrich v. Ames, 75 Mass. 76 (1S57) (the
promise in this case could also have been construed as one made to the creditor for the
debt of the principal); Ware v. Allen, 64 Aliss. 545, 1 So. 738 (1886).
23. Mluch of the written material dealing with the distinction between suretyship and
indemnity has approached the problem with a view to rationalizing the conflicting dei-
sions. Since it has been utterly impossible to harmonize the decisions, despite valiant
attempts, the conclusion of most of the articles written on the subject has been that certain
decisions are right and others are wrong. Such a conclusion is based on grounds either
of some policy which the author argues should be adopted, or on some supposedly logical
grounds. See Arnold, supra note 2; Burdick, Suretyship and The Statute of Frauds (1920),.
20 CoL. L. Rnv. 153; Corbin, supra note 10.
24. McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686, 78 Ati. 335 (1910); Anderson v. Spence, 72
Ind. 315 (1880); Keesling v. Frazier, 119 Ind. 185, 21 N. E. 552 (1889); Gonzales v. Garcia.
179 S. W. 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
25. Mlay v. Williams, 61 riss. 125 (1883); Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471, 4 At. 1S
(1886). But it is usually held that in criminal bail cases the result must in any case be
different because on grounds of public policy the surety has no right of reimbursement
from the principal. See Corbin, supra note 10, at 698; Arnold, supra note 2, at 409-410.
26. Wllox v. Townsend, 245 Mich. 632, 223 N. W. 226 (1929); Mallory v. Gillett,
21 N. Y. 412 (1860); White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222 (1888); Schwoerer & Sons Inc.
v. Stone, 130 App. Div. 796, 115 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1st Dep't, 1909); Day v. Morgan, 134
Wis. 595, 200 N. W. 382 (1924). See also HANNA, CAsEs o., SEcUnn, (1932) 352n; Com-
ment (1917) 2 Coax. L. Q. 209. Cf. Birchell v. Neaster, 36 Ohio St. 331, 337 (1881).
27. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479 (1891); Smith v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264, 29 Ad.
496 (1894); Patton v. Mills, 21 Kan. 163 (1878); Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. 396 (1841);
Gaines v. Durham, 124 S. C. 435, 117 S. E. 732 (1922); Housley v. Strawna Merch. Co.
253 S. W. 673 (Tex. 1923). See also, Arnold, The Main Purpose Rule and the Statute
of Frauds (1924) 10 Coae. L. Q. 28.
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is to pay the debt of another, it is not within the statute of frauds. When
these factors are discovered, the courts have held the contract independent, 8
and such contracts have thus been assimilated with contracts of "indemnity." 9
Ignoring, however, the vagueness of the tests as to whether or not a con-
tract is "independent," and its subordinate tests of whether the promisor
received a "new consideration" or had a "leading object," 0 it is apparent
that in many of the cases where the promisor's promise is called independent,
and his promise held enforcible, a tripartite relationship exists, factually speak-
ing. This is because the nature of the condition precedent to the third party's
liability is the default of another person, the principal debtor, and this liability
is discharged if the principal pays.31 It appears, therefore, that there is no
real distinction in these cases, in the sense that the courts talk of the dis-
tinction, which can ever be used as a means of understanding the cases. The
explanation for these cases, and hence the explanation of what the distinction
is between suretyship and indemnity, is based on a recognition of the reason
why the distinction is made, rather than on how it is made. The real identify-
ing earmarks of the cases placed in the "indemnity" category may often be
28. The holdings in these cases assert that although the security party's payment to
the creditor is actually the payment of the debt of another, such a circumstance is merely
coincidental, because the security party undertook the obligation to pay as his own
obligation. Since he received an independent consideration or had a leading object, he ig
independently bound to pay the debt and the actual payment of the debt of another is
merely incidental. Reed v. Holcomb, 31 Conn. 360 (1863); Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mat.
396 (1841); Mankin v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 379, 60 S. E. 248, 250 (1908).
29. Many of the cases do not actually label the transaction which is rationalized In this
way as one of indemnity, but merely hold that the contract is not governed by the statute
of frauds. But other cases have held that the contracts in such cases are contracts of
indemnity. McCormick v. Boylan, 83 Conn. 686, 78 AtI. 335 (1910); Mills v. Brown,
11 Iowa 314 (1860); Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263, 22 N. E. 164 (1889); Ferrell v,
Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383 (1876). Cf. Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 260, 105 Ati.
687 (1919) (not a statute of frauds case, but same holding).
30. The test of whether or not a promise in a given instance is independent is obviously
,very elusive. Cf. Bartolotta v. Calvo, 112 Conn. 385, 152 AtI. 306 (1930). The promise
of a third person to pay the debt of another must always, of course, be supported by a
consideration. And If the promise is made after the original transaction between the debtor
and creditor, such promise must be supported by some new and independent consideration
in any event. See McCord v. Hines Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 509, 512, 102 X. W. 334, 335
(1905). See Carey, Guaranties and The Statute of Frauds in Wisconsin (1923) 2 Wis. L.
Rzv. 193, 194; Note (1916) 2 CoRx. L. Q. 209, 210. Thus it is obvious that the "new
consideration" and "leading object" rules do not mean exactly what they say and differ-
entiations must be made between promises which will be enforced and those which will
not, though in both instances there is actually a "new consideration" or a "leading object."
See 1 BRANDT, StuREYs=P (3d ed. 1905) § 80; Carey, supra, at 216.
31. In other words, in most of these cases there is no pretense but that the principal
obligor is still bound by his own promise so that his default is the condition precedent
to the third party's duty to pay the creditor. Furthermore there is no doubt but that
in most of these cases the security party would be granted a right of reimbursement against
the principal obligor after the former had paid the creditor. For this reason the doctrinei
of "new consideration" and "leading object" were criticized by Grover, J. in Brown v.
Weber, 38 N. Y. 187 (1868).
found in the fact that the evidence showing the existence of the alleged oral
contract is so clear that justice requires its enforcement. "2  Thus, where the
promisor had an object of his own to serve, or received some consideration
for his promise which obviously accrued to his benefit, in the view which
many courts take of the purpose of the statute of fraudsp it would be out-
rageous to allow the promisor to escape the duty which he dearly assumed.
The indemnity label, thus, has merely been attached to designate conveniently
a category of cases wherein an oral promise to answer for the debt of another
has been enforced despite the statute of frauds.
Other cases in which the distinction between suretyship and indemnity often
arises, are those dealing with contracts of corporate or compensated surety
companies, whose business is the supplying of surety bonds. Typical instances
of the contracts to which such companies are parties are those guarantying
the fidelity and honesty of an employee3 4 guarantying that collection of a
judgment can be made if execution of the judgment is stayed pending an
appeal,35 and numerous other forms of promises. 0 An analysis of the rela-
32. It has been frequently suggested that when there is a "leading purpose" or a "new
consideration" moving beneficially to the promisor, the oral promise is not easiy faUhlzd
and hence the evil at which the statute of frauds is aimed does not need to be considered
so strongly. See HA'A, CASES oz SFcu r, (1932) 352n.; Bnovw,, STrxrui or Fnwns
(5th ed. 1895) § 212; Corbin, supra note 10, at 700. It is obvious that theze so-called
doctrines are thus merely means of evading the statute. The same result of evasion can
often be reached by leaving to the jury as a question of fact whether or not "cole credit"
was given by the creditor to the third party promisor. In other words if "'ole credit"
is given the promisor, he only is liable, the principal debtor being merely a third party
beneficiary of the agreement. Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 243 Mass. 499, 143 N. E.
309 (1924); Chase v. Day, 17 Johns 114 (N. Y. 1819); James v. Caron, 94 Wis. 632,
69 N. W. 1004 (1897). But if the principal's debt is already subsisting, sole credit cannot
be given the promisor unless there is a novation. The doctrines of "new consideration"
and "leading purpose" supplement the means of evading the statute by allowing enforce-
ment of promises in cases where actually the principal debtor is still obligated.
33. The manner in which all parts of the statute of frauds has been riddled by excep-
tions is well known. The exceptions are made on the assumption, partly at least, that
the statute was not intended as a rigid substantive rule of law which would panalize these
who actually had valid contractual claims as well as those whose claims were fictitious,
but was rather intended as a rule of evidence to exclude the possibility of recovery by a
claimant on perjured testimony. Hence it has appealed to many courts that when the
promisor's interest in the transaction is clearly revealed, there is no risk of enforcing a
trumped up promise. See Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 487 (1891); Reed v. Holcomb,
31 Conn. 360 (1863).
34. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133 (1898); New Amsterdam Casualty
Co. v. Central National Fire Ins. Co., 4 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); General Ry.
Signal Co. v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 203 N. Y. 407, 96 N. E. 734 (1911).
35. American Surety Co. v. Koen, 49 Teax. Civ. App. 98, 107 S. W. 933 (1903); Reed
v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 231 Pac. 450 (1924).
36. See, for example, American Bonding Co. v. Pueblo Investment Co., 10 Fed. 17
(C. C. A. 8th, 1906) (guaranty of the performance of covenants by a les-ee); United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank, 17 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927)
(guaranty of county deposits in bank); State ex. rel. Karcher v. Roth, 330 Mo. 105, 49
S. W. (2d) 109 (1932) (guaranty that sheriff would not abuse his power). And se
Lunt, Fidelity Insurance and Suretyship (1932) 161 AirvAus 105, for description of various
types of guaranty bonds available from such corporate sureties.
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tionship contemplated by these contracts convincingly shows that three parties
are factually involved and that all the earmarks of suretyship are present.
Yet many cases have held such contracts are not contracts of suretyship, but
are contracts of "indemnity." Here, again, the determination of the courts
has been explained on the ground that the third party's promise is supported
by an "independent consideration," called a premium, which factor has been
used in the assimilation of the contracts with insurance or "indemnity" con-
tracts.3 7 This position is the more readily acceptable in the courts because
such companies, like insurance companies, engage in the business for profit,
calculate their risks on an actuarial basis, and charge premiums accordingly. 38
But, in these cases also, the "indemnity" label has apparently been attached
because the courts have desired to escape certain legal consequences which
supposedly would follow from calling the contracts suretyship contracts. Chief
among these consequences is the strict rule of interpretation in favor of the
surety long applied to such contracts 30 This rule grew out of the fact that
sureties were usually accommodation parties whose release from their gratuitous
promises was deemed justified on the slightest pretext. 40 The undesirability
of these principles as applied to compensated sureties4 I led courts to classify
37. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133 (1898); Carstairs v. American Bond-
ing and Trust Co., 116 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 3d, 1902); National Surety Co. v. McCor-
mick, 268 Fed. 185 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920); Rule v. Anderson, 160 Mo. App. 347, 142 S. W.
358 (1911); Whitestown v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 72 Misc. 498, 131 N. Y, Supp.
390 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Shakman v. U. S. Credit System Co., 92 Wis. 366, 66 N. W. 528 (1896);
United American Fire Ins. Co. v. American Bonding Co., 146 Wis. 573, 131 N. W. 994
(1911). And see FROST, GuARANTY, INsup-AxcE (1909) 18; Steinmetz, supra note 15, arguing
that contracts of credit insurance are like indemnity insurance.
38. Supreme Council, C. K. A. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 63 Fed, 48, 58 (C. C. A
6th, 1894); Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co., 73 Fed. 95, 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896);
Lakeside Land Co. v. Empire State Surety Co., 105 Minn. 213, 117 N. W. 431 (1908);
Young v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 77 Atl. 623 (1910).
39. The uncompensated or accommodation surety has always been regarded as a
"favorite of the law." Crane v. Buckley, 203 U. S. 441 (1906); Jewel Tea Co. v. Shep-
ard, 172 Iowa 480, 154 N. W. 755 (1915) ; Lange Co. v. Freeman, 13 S. W. (2d) 1092 (Mo.
App. 1929). Hence the contracts of such sureties were always construed, when terms were
doubtful, in favor of the surety. Anderson v. Bellenger, 87 Ala. 334, 6 So. 82 (1889) ;
Gard v. Stevens, 12 Mich. 292 (1864); Rogers v. Warner, 8 Johns 92 (N. Y. 1811); Whit-
ney and Schuyler v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82 (N. Y. 1840); Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y, 307, 314,
33 N. E. 311, 313 (1893).
40. Sureties were released from their gratuitous obligations, for example, if the credi-
tor extended time of payment to the principal. Cambria Bank v. Lanier, 135 Iowa 280,
112 N. W. 774 (1907), or if there was an alteration of the contract, Stillman v. Wickham, 106
Iowa 597, 76 N. W. 1008 (1898); Woodruff v. Schultz, 155 Mich. 11, 118 N'. W. 579
(1908).
41. "The deep solicitude of the law for the welfare of voluntary parties who bound
themselves from purely disinterested motives never comprehended the protection of primary
enterprises organized for the express purpose of engaging in the business of suretyship for
profit. To allow such companies to collect and retain premiums for their services, graded
according to the nature and extent of the risk, and then to repudiate their obligations on
slight pretexts that have no relation to the risk, would be most unjust and immoral, and
would be a perversion of the wise and just rules designed for the protection of voluntary
sureties." Rule v. Anderson, 160 Mo. App. 347, 358, 142 S. W. 358, 362 (1911)
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contracts of the latter in the category of "indemnity," and to construe the
contracts according to principles applied to insurance contracts. And in other
cases than those dealing with corporate surety companies, similar technique
is often employed in an effort to escape some technical requirement. When
the rules usually applied to sureties as to what defenses are available, for
example, become embarrassing in particular cases, courts have frequently
escaped the rigors of the rules by switching categories and calling the contracts
indemnity contracts.- In none of these cases can any discernable difference
be observed between the relationships to which the terms suretyship and in-
demnity may be alternately applied. The explanation of the distinction rests
rather upon the reason for which it is invoked.
4 3
It might be suggested that instead of extending the "indemnity" category
by the use of tenuous bases of distinction, in order to allow the enforcement
of certain oral contracts to answer for the debts of another, it would have
been feasible for courts to make a frank exception to the statute of frauds
rule, for example, by holding contracts enforcible where proof was convincing
and the promisor's interest in the contract established. Similarly, it might be
pointed out that it would be possible for courts to apply different principles
of construction to contracts of compensated sureties than to contracts of
accommodation sureties, without invoking a metaphysical distinction between
contracts of suretyship and contracts of indemnity.44 Thus the decisions
rendered would be more easily understandable if the true basis for them were
apparent, while the law established would perhaps be more predictable than
it is. The result reached in particular cases where these distinctions are used
has usually been satisfactory, but there has been established a body of case
law setting up an illusory distinction, which in turn is capable of creating vast
confusion, and may produce undesirable results seemingly based on precedent.
Illustrative of the confusion which can be created, the source of whichT1
directly traceable to this illusory distinction, is a recent case, Howell v. Comn-
missioner of Internal Revenue,4 5 involving a wholly different question for
decision, but in which the elusive distinctions between suretyship and indemnity
are invoked. The plaintiff and other stockholders of a bank contracted to
"indemnify" the bank to a certain amount against loss which might be sus-
tained by reason of the non-payment of certain notes held by the bank. The
loss was sustained, the indemnity paid, and though the notes were retained
by the bank, the plaintiff claimed that in effect he was the equitable assignee
of the notes to the extent of the payment of his share of the "indemnity," and
therefore that he had a claim for reimbursement against the makers of the
42. See Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., 126 Ark. 535, 191 S. W. 32 (1917) (compensated
surety company case where court held defendant had no right to be released from his
obligation even though he gave notice to the plaintiff to proceed against the debtor, be-
cause defendant was held to be an indemnitor); Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 269.
105 Atl. 687 (1919) (same holding though defendant was not a corporate surety company).
43. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 220. The author explains this entire phenomenon as
the result of "an idea so prevalent a few decades ago that every situation had to be brought
within a formal legal category wherein doctrinal rules of supposed general validity auto,
matically produced the proper result."
44. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 220.
45. 69 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
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notes. He claimed that this debt, being uncollectable, entitled him to make
a deduction on his income tax statement as a "debt ascertained to be worth-
less and charged off." The court, in considering the problem, discussed the
differences between contracts of suretyship and contracts of indemnity. It
found that the plaintiff had entered into the agreement "for his own purposes,"
that he had "no intention of paying the debt of the principal debtors," and
hence held that the contract was not one to pay the debt of another, but was
an "independent contract," and was therefore one of indemnity. The court
then concluded that because the contract was one of indemnity, the plaintiff
had no right of reimbursement from the makers of the notes such as to give
him a right to consider them his debtors, and to make their debts to him
deductable on his income tax statement.
The categorical technique as here employed leads to a result which disregards
the usual application of some theory granting reimbursement to the third party
in such cases. It is well settled that in a suretyship transaction, when the
security party is compelled to discharge the obligation upon the default of the
principal, the payment by the third party does not discharge the obligation
itself. By the operation of the fiction of an implied promise of reimbursement
on the part of the principal to the security party, or by subrogating the security
party to the rights of the creditor, the obligation of the principal is maintained
in favor of the security party.46 There are some technical differences between
the rights under an implied promise, and rights by subrogation or equitable
assignment. 47 Thus, an implied promise depends on the fact that there was
46. Mellette Farmers' Elevator Co. v. H. Poehler Co., 18 F. (2d) 430 (D. Minn. 1927);
Mathews v. Aiken, 1 N. Y. 595 (1848); See SmFaus, Suarnsmp 503; SUELDOx, Svimo-
GArION (2d ed. 1893) 136.
47. Historically the remedy on an implied promise of reimbursement was available
as a remedy in a legal action. Hall v. Smith, 5 How. 96 (U. S. 1847); Katz v. Moeslnger,
110 Ill. 372 (1884); Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y. 571 (1872); Carter v. Jones, 40 N. C.
196 (1848). Subrogation, on the other hand, was historically wholly equitable In nature.
Young v. Vough, 23 N. 3. Eq. 325, 328, 329 (1873). But the right of subrogation Is now
almost universally cognizable in a court of law where the subrogee is treated as the assignee
of the claim against the principal, or because in code states there is no difference between
a legal and an equitable right. See Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11
(1924); Boyd v. McDonough, 39 How. Pr. 389 (N. Y. 1870).
It is also true that an implied promise of reimbursement is raised to one who has
paid only a part of the debt of the principal, because the assumption is that the debt wa%
paid at the principal's request. Mellette v. Farmers' Elevator Co. v. H. Poehler Co., 18
F. (2d) 430 (D. Minn. 1927); Vermeule v. York Cliffs Improvement Co., 105 Me. 350,
74 Ati. 800 (1909); STEA.Ns, SuxRvs= m § 279. But the general rule is that subroga-
tion is available only to one who has paid the whole obligation of the principal so that
equity can substitute the payor to the rights of the creditor without prejudicing the credi-
tor or the principal. United States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73 (1920); United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 228 Fed. 448 (C. C. A.
6th, 1915); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fouts, 11 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); National
Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F. (2d) 34 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). But this require-
ment that the whole debt of the principal must be paid before subrogation will be granted
has given way to &ore liberal holdings. Thus an insurer whose liability is limited to a
specified sum and who has paid that sum is subrogated pro tanto though the loss suffered
by the insured is greater than the security afforded by the policy. Offer v. Superior Court,
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privity between the debtor and third party,4 s but even if there was no privity
between them, the security party may be subrogated 0 or treated as the
assignee of the creditor's rights against the debtor.50 Whatever theory is used,
the principle actuating the grant of the right is based on the idea of preventing
the unjust enrichment either of the creditor or of the debtor. 1 The creditor,
though he is legitimately entitled to the double security for which he bargained,
is not entitled to collect from both obligors on one claim. And the principal
debtor is not entitled to escape the consequences of his default simply because
his creditor has been satisfied.
The court in the Howell case found that the contract was one of "indemnity"
and concluded that the plaintiff had no right of reimbursement. Mhile an
implied promise of reimbursement, perhaps, could not be raised in this case
because of lack of privity between the plaintiff and the principal debtors, this
technical limitation is actually of little consequence because the courts can
apply the principle of subrogation or equitable assignment so as to allow
reimbursement to the third party.52 And actually the grant of such reimburse-
ment in one form or another is made in every type of situation where the
burden of loss should be borne by another than the one who has borne it.53
194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924); Martin v. Lehigh Valley Rr., 90 N. J. L. 2538, IC0 At.
345 (1917); Powell and Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 8 S. E. 426 (1916).
Nor can the insured defeat the right of the insurer by a compromise settlement and re-
lease of a tort feasor. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Prezioso, 93 N. J. Eq. 313, 116 At].
694 (1922); Powell and Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916).
Furthermore courts can grant reimbursement to one who has paid only part of the debt
by treating him as the assignee of so much of the claim as he has paid. Carter v. Joncs,
40 N. C. 196 (1848).
4S. Leslie v. Compton, 103 Kan. 92, 172 Pac. 1015 (1918); 1 BmfvlmT, Sur=3a-P
AxD GuA, u= § 231.
49. Subrogation does not depend on privity of contract nor is it limited in its application
to sureties and quasi-sureties. SEMMON, SUBROoA17O., 342. Offer v. Superior Court; 194
Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924); Mathews v. Aiken, 1 N. Y. 595 (1848); General Ry. Signal
Co. v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., 203 N. Y. 407, 412, 96 N. E. 734, 736 (1911); Hecher
v. Mahler, 64 Ohio St. 398, 60 N. E. 555 (1901).
50. Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924); Ocean Accident and
Guarantee Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 N. Y. 37, 47, 147 N. E. 3S1, 3S3
(1925).
51. See Royce v. Bank of Commerce, 21 Olda. 484, 96 Pac. 640 (19D3); Cope v. John-
son, 123 Okla. 43, 46, 251 Pac. 985, 987 (1926). It may be supested that the promise
of a security party can be construed, in accordance with the function he really serves, to
mean a promise to assume the risk of loss, not necessarily to bear that lon- absolutely
Thus the security party will be obliged to bear the loss if it occurs by reason of an irre-
sponsible contingency, or if the person causing the loss is unable to pay. But if a p2rson
is responsible for the loss and is able to compensate for it, public policy would s.em to
dictate that such a tort feasor or defaulter should not be allowed to escape the cone-
quences of his act because of the fortuitous circumstance that the loss was insured against.
52. Compare Royce v. Bank of Commerce, 21 Okla. 484, 96 Pac. 640 (1903) and Cope
v. Johnson, 123 Okla. 43, 251 Pac. 985 (1926). Both of theze case3 involved fact situation
similar to those in the Howell case, and in both of them the right of subrogation was al-
lowed. See also Love v. Dampeer, 159 Aliss. 430, 132 So. 439 (1931).
53. Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 228 Pac. 11 (1924); Richardson v. American
Surety Co., 97 Okla. 264, 223 Pac. 389 (1924); U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bram-
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It is now well recognized, for example, that insurers who have paid a loss
which has arisen, not because of irresponsible forces, but because of the fault
or wrong of responsible human agency, are entitled to reimbursement from
such tort feasor, or to exoneration from liability if the tort feasor makes good
the loss. 54 Thus, fire insurers who have paid the insured a loss from fire caused
by the tort of another have a right of recovery against the tort feasor.65 A
marine insurer is granted a right to recover against the owner of a vessel whose
fault caused the loss which the insurer was bound to pay.50 The same prin-
ciple likewise is commonly applied to a junior lien-holder or purchaser of land
who pays a prior lien in order to protect his interests,5 7 and in numerous other
common types of situation. 8 There are some limitations on the right, to be
sure,59 but in general, some form of reimbursement is allowed not only to one
who is bound by his own contract to pay the debt of another, 0 but to one who
has any interest to protect, 1 to one who feels morally obligated to pay the
well, 108 Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923); McCormick v. Irwin, 35 Pa. 111 (1860); Murray
v. O'Brien, 56 Wash. 361, 105 Pac. 840 (1909); McNeil v. Miller, 29 W. Va. 480, 2 S. E.
335 (1887).
54. Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U, S. 397 (1889)
(insurer of goods in transit subrogated to insured's right against carrier) ; United States
v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 247 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) (insurer of mall sub-
rogated to rights of United States to recover on bond of thieving employee of Post Office) ;
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hann, 196 Ala. 234, 72 So. 48 (1916) (insurer entitled to reimbursement
from third party whose negligence in constructing a wall caused injury to property of In-
sured); Ocean Accident Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240 N. Y. 37, 147 N. E.
351 (1925) (insurer subrogated to insured's rights against manufacturer of defective goods
sold to customers); Coop Furniture Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 264 S. W. 201 (Tex. CIV.
App. 1924) (insurer subrogated to insured's rights against party who negligently broke In-
sured's plate glass window).
55. Allen-Wright Furniture Co. v. Hines, 34 Idaho 90, 200 Pac. 889 (1921); Russell v.
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Rr., 195 Iowa 993, 191 N. W. 806 (1923); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N. W. 4 (1925).
56. Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); See
SHELDON, SUBROGATION 342.
57. Cook v. Kelly, 200 Ala. 133, 75 So. 953 (1917); Murray v. O'Brien, 56 Wash, 361,
105 Pac. 840 (1909); McNeil v. Miller, 29 V. Va. 480, 2 S. E. 335 (1887).
58. See note 54, supra.
59. It is a much quoted rule that reimbursement by subrogation will not be invoked
in favor of a mere volunteer. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534 (1888) ; I-Ilers
v. Exum, 158 Ga. 19, 32, 122 S. E. 784, 790 (1924); Shinn v. Budd, 14 N. 3. Eq. 234, 237
(1862); Koehler v. Hughes, 148 N. Y. 507, 42 N. E. 1051 (1896); Bobier v. Horn, 95
Okla. 8, 11, 222 Pac. 238, 241 (1923) ; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore
261, 277, 217 Pac. 332, 338 (1923). Several reasons are assigned for this rule. See SHnLooN,
SUBROGATION 362; Comment (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 381. In any case, however, the
rule against volunteers has been limited in application and the grant of a right of subro-
gation has steadily expanded. See Holloway, Subrogation (1926) 99 CmnT. L. 5. 275,
295; Comment (1925) 39 HARv. L. Rxv. 381; Note (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 337,
60. E.g., insurers and sureties. See note 54, supra. Contra: Spire v. Spire, 104 Kan.
501, 180 Pac. 209 (1919).
61. E.g., junior lienholders. See note 57, supra. The right is granted on this basis to
stockholders who have paid corporate debts to protect their interests in corporate property.
Redington v. Cornwell, 90 Cal. 49, 27 Pac. 40 (1891); Bush v. Wadsworth, 60 Mich. 25.,
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debt,6 2 or to one who mistakenly thinks himself bound to pay.P
The application of the equitable right of reimbursement to such a variety
of cases indicates that the courts have recognized that when one person, for a
reason of equitable appeal, has paid the debt of another, he creates, in effect,
a suretyship relation.64 In such cases it is the factual relationship of the
various parties which is of significance, not the formal or artificial criteria
attending the classification of contracts under the terms "indemnity" or "surety-
ship." In other words, as a frequent thing in cases where a right of reimburse-
ment has been the question at issue, courts, instead of attaching weight to
factors which make the contract seem "independent," have focused attention
on factors which show the factual tripartite relationship existing under the
contract. Hence, there usually arises no need for talking in terms of "indem-
nity," and if the case is not strictly one of suretyship, the result reached is
the same as if it were.
It may be that the loose conceptions permitted by the indemnity terminology
could be considered devices whose utility would be destroyed by an attempt
to find a more rigorous set of criteria for distinguishing between indemnity
and suretyship. But, on the other hand, the lack of predictability when such
criteria are used is very evident. And the impossibility of determining the
real basis for decisions in cases which invoke this concept can scarcely be
considered desirable. Furthermore, the illusion that there is a real distinction
may and apparently does lead some courts to adapt to one situation tests which
have been used in other situations, apparently conceiving that the result which
follows, however undesirable, is forced upon them by precedent. Thus in the
Howell case one is left either with the impression that, if any good reason
existed for not granting the plaintiff the right to make a deduction on his income
tax statement, that reason was concealed by the opinion of the court, or else
that the court felt compelled to reach an undesirable result because it was subject
27 N. W. 532 (1886). The cases of Royce v. Bank of Commerce, and Cope v. Johnzon,
supra note 51, can be put into this class of cases. So also, it would seem, could the Howell
case be cbssified if decided differently.
62. Dalton v. Dalton, 172 Ky. 585, 189 S. W. 902 (1916) (wife paid mortgage on hus-
band's land). See Sn oN, SUBROGATION 368.
63. Simmons v. Goodrich, 68 Ga. 750 (1882) (surety could have avoided paying be-
cause creditor had varied the risk undertaken by the surety); Shaw v. Loud, 12 Bl.-
446 (1815) (surety could have defended on grounds of statute of limitations); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Rowland Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 269, 119 S. E. 362 (1923) (insurer had
a good defense so that it would not have had to pay the insured); See also Taylor v
Roniger, 147 Mlich. 99, 110 N. W. 503 (1907); Gooch v. Botts, 110 Mo. 419 (1892). Con-
tra: Scandinavian Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rr. Co., 104 -Neb.
258, 177 N. W. 178 (1920).
64. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 218: "But suppose the loss occurs to the insured be-
cause of the wrongful act of a third person under such circumstances that the insured has
a claim against him for the loss. . .As between the wrongdoer and the insurer, the l-l
should fall upon the former, so we have the essential elements of a suretyship relation ani
the law so treats it." See Hall and Long v. The Railroad Companies, 13 Wall 367, 370
(U. S. 1871); Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp. v. Hooker Electrochemical Co., 240
N. Y. 37, 52, 147 N. E. 351, 355 (1925); SEMMON, SUBROGATIo:iN 342; Hnnis, L..w or
SUBRoGATiON (1889) § 651.
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to the illusion that some real distinction exists between suretyship and indem-
nity in such a case, and that reimbursement could only be granted to a surety.
The real question presented in the Howell case was whether or not the income
tax act either expressly or impliedly permits a deduction for a loss of the char-
acter sustained by the plaintiff. It is certainly arguable that his ability to pay
a tax has been decreased by reason of the "indemnity" which he has paid. It
is true that the plaintiff claims this deduction on the theory that he is in the
position of a creditor holding worthless claims. The determination of his
status as creditor is hence preliminary to the decision of his right to make a
deduction. But the latter issue is capable of adjudication without invoking
the illusory distinction between suretyship and indemnity. The principles
governing the application of the doctrines of subrogation or equitable assign-
ment or reimbursement are not in the least dependent upon any categorical
labeling, but may themselves indicate the true nature of the relationship. 0
Thus the court's explanation of its result on the grounds that the contract
is independent, and hence one of indemnity, is no explanation at all in the
light of the many cases where some form of reimbursement has been granted
in favor of one whose promise was equally independent. 0 Whatever the form
of the transaction, the tripartite relationship exists, so that the tenuous dis-
tinction drawn makes an irrelevant explanation. T
The conclusion of the attempt to discuss the difference between suretyship
and indemnity has resolved itself in part into an explanation of what appears
to have been the purpose behind the use of such terminology in some cases
whereby similar factual situations were classified into different legal categories.
In other words, the distinction between suretyship and indemnity in cases of
this nature is of significance only when some question is presented for litigation,
and the court feels that the decision of that question will be aided by a resort
to the distinction, in order to attain the result desired. Hence, it is conceivable
that an oral contract to answer for the debt of another person would be treated
as, and called, a contract of indemnity for the purpose of enforcing the
promisor's duty despite the statute of frauds. And yet the same contract
might be treated as one of suretyship for purposes of granting a right of
reimbursement to the third party promisor against the principal debtor.08
65. "Whoever is liable to pay the debt of another, whether for value, as in the case of a
broker who receives a commission for incurring liability, or gratuitously, as between him-
self and the person originally or primarily liable, is a surety." Imperial Bank v. London and
St. Katherine Docks Co., 5 Ch. D. 195, 200 (1877). "A surety is any person, who, being
liable to pay a debt, is entitled, if it is enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other
person who ought himself to have paid it before the surety was compelled to do so." Wend-
landt v. Sohre, 37 Minn. 162, 163, 33 N. W. 700, 701 (1887).
66. See notes 53-56, supra.
67. See notes 53-57, supra.
68. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hjorth, 187 Wis. 270, 273-4, 202 N. W. 665, 666
(1925): "While it is universally held that the contract of an indemnity company guarantee-
ing to an employer the fidelity of employees is a contract of insurance, such holdingg have
generally been in cases involving the rights of the insured against the indemnity company
and have related to a construction of the contract of insurance. . . ; It would seem that
where an employee makes application to an indemnity company to guarantee his fidelity to
his employer, the relation of principal and surety . . . is created just as much as though
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Whether a contract is one of suretyship or indemnity can thus be answered,
sometimes, only by referring to the circumstances which give rise to the need
for the use of that distinction, and there certainly cannot be any basis for
predicting, at the time a contract is made, into what category it may fall.
In part, however, the difference supposed to exist is no doubt viewed by
courts as a rule of law which must somehow be discovered, understood and
applied. Inasmuch as the categorical technique has been used to decide cases
involving various types of issues, each category is viewed as providing a whole
series of results which necessarily follow when a given situation is classified
therein. Thus, a case which has decided that an oral promise by a third
person is enforceable because it is a promise of indemnity, may be used as a
precedent for a case which decides that the third party promisor is bound by
his promise despite the failure of the promisee to give him notice of the default
of the principal, each case on the ground that the contract is one of indemnity
rather than one of suretyship.
That the reasoning in the cases which invoke these distinctions is rarely
understandable is a natural enough result. A case which has consciously
utilized the categories to attain the desired result is a confusing precedent when
a sincere attempt is being made by a different court to discover the universal
test for other cases of the same nature, and produces a far more confusing
result in the case being decided. Furthermore, some courts have apparently
been unable to ignore the factual relationship in favor of the legal relationship
on which other courts have based their decisions,0 so that a prior case is
either overruled or an attempt made to distinguish it by some further refine-
ment. The line of cases, even within one jurisdiction, thus presents a doubtful
array of material on which to base either a prediction or a decision. The
remedy, if any, would seem to lie in ignoring entirely the supposed categories
and actually deciding cases on the particular factual issues presented. But,
in the absence of such a remedy, it must be recognized that definitions of
suretyship or indemnity are cast in terms of result rather than in terms that
will lead to results.
EFFECT OF SECTION 7 (a) OF NIRA ON THE VALIDITY
OF A CLOSED UNION-SHOP CONTRACT
Psuorp to the enactment of Section 7(a) of the NIRA, a closed union-shop'
the application had been made to a private individual and such private individual had ex-
ecuted a bond to the employer." Thus the courts consistently allow reimburement to a cor-
porate surety company. Mellette Farmers' Elevator Co. v. H. Poehler Co., 13 F. (2d)
430 (D. Minn. 1927); Colonial Trust Co. v. Fidelity Co., 144 Did. 117, 123 At. 137 (1923);
National Surety Co. v. Berggren, 126 Minn. 188, 148 N. W. 55 (1914); Gilbertsn v.
Northern Trust Co., 53 N. D. 502, 207 N. W. 42 (1925).
69. See the opinion in Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 43S (1375).
1. Commonly called the "dosed shop." Strictly speaking it should be divided into two
classes according to whether the doors of membership in the union are open or shut.
BEBxs , Smrcrm AxRcLas oN rz CLosED Suop (2d ed. 1922) 201-207.
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agreement as such was valid.2 In return for the employer's promise to hire
only union members, the union would give consideration in the form of a
promise to supply labor, to call off a strike or not to call one during the term
of the contract, to refrain from boycotting, to accept a specified wage scale,
or would permit the employer to use the union label. If an employer dis-
charged union workers and engaged nonunion men to fill their places, in some
states, notably New York, he could be enjoined.3  But a majority of courts
would refuse to grant such specific performance of the agreement. 4 In some
cases equitable remedies sought by unions were refused on the ground that
actions at law would have been adequate and that specific performance of a
contract would not be granted unless there was a mutuality of remedy as well
as of obligation. 5  Thus it was argued that because the employer could not
have enforced the union promise to supply labor, personal services being in-
volved, the union could not enjoin violation of the contract. Yet even in
jurisdictions where these objections carried, the closed union-shop device was
considered of great aid to labor in its attempts both to regiment labor and
2. Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717 (1914); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N
Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1905). See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 250-
251, 270 (1917). Generally, while a strike for improved conditions or to benefit union
members has been deemed lawful, and the resultant "closed shop," valid, a strike to In.
jure nonmembers has been held unlawful, and the "closed shop" thereby achieved, invalid.
Nat. Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902). The New
York courts generally found proper motives and means, Exchange Bakery & Restaurant
Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927), but it was otherwise in Massachusetts
where strikes to secure closed union-shops were held illegal. FRANKFURTER AND GHZMNE.
THE LASOR INJUNCTION (1930) 28-31. See also Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. 348,
63 AtI. 585 (1906). In other instances existing agreements have been held illegal as being
in restraint of trade or monopolistic. Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 AtI. 600
(1913); Polk v. Cleveland Railway Company, 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1925).
But it has been indicated that only a person who has been deprived of the right to work
may attack the contract as monopolistic. Des Moines City Railway Co. v. Amalgamated
Association, 204 Iowa 1195, 213 N. W. 264 (1927).
3. Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't, 1922),
noted in (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 380; Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y
Supp. 311 (1928); Ribner v. Racso Butter & Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N. Y. Supp. 132
(Sup. Ct. 1929), noted in (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 410.
4. See Mason, Organized Labor as Party Plaintiff In Injunction Cases (1930) 30 COL.
L. Rzv. 466; Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 682, 690; Witte, Labor'J
Resort to Injunctions (1930) 39 YAix L. J. 374.
5. Schwartz v. Cigar Makers International Union, 219 Mich. 589, 189 N. W. 55 (1922)
See Schwartz v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W. 522 (1922). Contral
Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't, 1922). Cf.
Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243 (1927) (employer could
not enjoin breach of the union's agreement not to strike). But cf. A. R. Barnes & Co. v.
Berry, 156 Fed. 72 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1907) (employer could enjoin union leaders from
inciting a strike); Gilchrist Company v. Metal Polishers, 113 AtI. 320 (N. J. Ch. 1919)
semble; Meltzer v. Kaminer, 131 Misc. Rep. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1927)
semble. With respect to the requirement of mutuality, see Schlesinger v. Quinto, supra; PoMr-
zRoy, SPEcn~ic PEpORmAxcE (3d ed. 1926) §§ 162-165; Stone, The Mutuality Rule in Neu,
York (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 443; Cook, The Present Status o] the "Lack of Mutuality"
Ride (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 897.
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to secure effective collective bargaining. The agreement, if not an enforceable
contract,6 at least would create moral obligations reenforced by the fear of
strike and boycott,7 and would allow the employees to be represented in col-
lective bargaining by more experienced union officials.
Sections 7(a) of NIRA8 purported to acknowledge these principles and to
strengthen the arm of organized labor by recognizing the propriety of colective
bargaining and of membership in a union 0 But the wording of the Section
is open to interpretation invalidating the union shop contract. The Section
declares that employees shall have the right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own free choosing, and that no employee and no one
seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join
any company union or to refrain from joining, or organizing, or assisting a
labor organization of his own choosing. Despite the ostensible purpose of the
Section, the language of this clause, although obviously directed against the
"cyellow-dog" contract,'0 can be construed to have outlawed likewise the union
shop contract. For when an employer agrees to employ only members of the
X union he binds himself in effect to require as a condition of employment
that his employees refrain from joining the Y or any other union or from re-
nouncing the X union. If his employees should shift to the Y union, expulsion
from the X union ordinarily would follow."1 In New York the X union could
compel the employer to discharge them.' 2  Even if he refused, he would be
6. With respect to the nature of collectve labor agreements and the theories of enforce-
ment, see Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests In American Labor Union Wrorh7.
Agreements (1933) 9 IND. L. J. 69; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements In American Law
(1925) 10 ST. Louis L. REV. 1; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements In American Law (1931)
44 HAav. L. Rxv. 572; Comment (1931) 31 COL. L. REnv. 1156; Comment (1933) 11 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rxv. 262; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221. For a philosophical analysis,
see Duguit, Collective Acts As Distinguished From Contracts (1918) 27 YXZ L. J. 753.
7. Where the purpose was to promote the interests of the union men, the union in some
states could call a strike to compel the discharge of non-members. Kemp v. Division No.
241, 255 Il. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); Roddy v. United Aline Workers of America, 41
Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126 (1914). But cf. Berry v. Donovan, 138 Mlass. 353, 74 N. E. 603
(1905); Lucke v. Clothing Cutters & Trimmers Assembly, 77 Mld. 396, 26 At. 505 (1893);
Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 A. 165 (1905).
8. 48 STAT. 198, 15 U. S. C. A. 707(a) (1933).
9. The most recent and complete treatment of the legal problems raised by the Section
appears in a note (1935) 48 HAv. L. R-. 630-659. See also DAuolzE=, L. noa Umo
Tm NRA (1933); Sm, L.AoR A = Nv:w DraL (1934); McNatt, Organised Labor antd
the Recovery Act (1934) 32 MIcIM L. REv. 780, 800-410; Comment (1934) 34 COL. L.
R.. 1529; Comment (1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 85, 117-125. Comment (1933) 19 ST. Los
L. rv. 32, 40-42; Comment (1934) 43 YA.E L. 3. 625.
10. The principal legal difference between this clause of the NIRA and Section 3 of
the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101, 103 (1932),
is that the former prohibits the use of "yellow-dog" contracts whereas the latter went only
to the remedy in the federal courts. McNatt, supra note 9, at 306.
11. But to the effect that expulsion from the union does not automatically terminate
the employment so as to make the expelled member liable to the union in damages, for
having stayed on in employment, see Shinsky v. Tracey, 226 Mlass. 21, 242 114 N. E. 957.
958 (1917).




bound to deny them the right to bargain through different representatives, since
ordinarily the union-shop contract would provide that representatives of the X
union were to be the exclusive bargaining agents. Such reasoning when referred
to the contrary declarations of the Section has induced pronouncements to the
effect that union-shop agreements are no longer valid.' 3 But that this inter-
pretation may readily be avoided,1 4 and that the closed shop contract may
yet be specifically enforced was demonstrated in a recent New York case.16
The plaintiff Doll and Toy Maker's Union had secured an agreement with
the defendant doll manufacturing corporation whereby the latter would em-
ploy only members of the union, except that if the union were unable to furnish
the desired number of men, the corporation could employ nonunion workers
who had obtained working cards from the union. Subsequent to this agreement
the defendant discharged some union workers and proceeded to transfer to Its
plant in Massachusetts work which would have been done by the dismissed
men. Alleging that this move was made for the sole purpose of avoiding the
obligation to hire union labor, plaintiff sought to compel performance of the
agreement by enjoining permanently this and other alleged violations of the
contract. The defendant contended that the agreement was invalid under
Section 7(a) and therefore could not be enforced. The court, declaring the
Section to be constitutional and thus applicable,10 held that the agreement was
13. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bowles, 31 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 425 (1934). A strike for a
closed shop has been held to be in violation of the clause. Elkind & Sons, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks International Protective Association, 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 169 Atl. 494, 496 (1933).
For expressions of similar effect see (Sept. 26, 1933) U. S. L. WEE and language used
by the National Labor Board in In the Matter of General Cigar Company, NLB Case
No. 163 (Feb. 6, 1934); In the Matter of Finck Cigar Company, N. L. B. Case No. 228
(May 12, 1934). But the National Labor Relations Board has avoided express commit-
ment as to whether closed union shops with bona fide unions are legal. In the Matter of
Tamagua Underwear Company, NLRB, Case No. 27 (Aug. 6, 1934); In re Hildinger-
Bishop Company, NLRB, Case No. 86 (Oct. 25, 1934); See Comment (1935) 48 HAav.
L. Ray. 630 657. Cf. In re Bennett Shoe Company, NLRB, Case No. 159 (Dec. 10,
1934) (discharged workers having ratified the closed union shop agreement, were estopped
to deny its validity). See also (1933) 47 Hav. L. Rav. 85, 122, ff. 263, 264,
14. The argument has been advanced that the wording of the Section is avoided by
saying that in realty it is the union rather than the management which compels membership
as a condition of employment. See the address of Milton Handler, then General Counsel
to the National Labor Board, (May, 15, 1934) U. S. L. Wamc 4, 6.
15. Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 153 Misc. 738, 277 N. Y. Supp. 47 (Sup, Ct.
1934). A temporary injunction had been granted previously. Farulla v. Ralph A. Freund-
lich, Inc., 152 Misc. 761, 274 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1934). But see note 40, infra. Cf.
Sherman v. Abeles, 265 N. Y. 383, 193 N. E. 241 (1934); (1935) 20 CoaR. L. Q. 240. The
New York Court of Appeals recently held that peaceful picketing for a closed union-
shop was legal. Wise Shoe Company, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, N. Y. Times,
Feb. 28, 1934, at 1, col. 7.
16. Prior to the NIRA attempts to outlaw the "yellow dog" contract were held uneon.
stitutional. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S,
1 (1915). It is said that these cases would need to be overruled if the principal result h
reached. Comment (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 237, 245. But the New York Court
of Appeals has not been willing to follow the Supreme Court decisions, notably the Hitch-
man case. Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 410, 182 N. E. 63, 65 (1932). Never-
theless, a lower court has recently held that despite the Section, an employer may dis-
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nevertheless binding. "Closed shops" had not been outlawed by NIRA be-
cause, it was said, Congress never had that intention. The parties were given
a week to settle their differences as to whether or not the contract had been
violated by the defendant.
Despite the verbal difficulty inherent in the broad language of the Section,
the principal conclusion is sound as respects the validity of the union-shop con-
tract. In view of the widespread existence of closed union-shops, and of their
importance to organized labor, it is probable that if Congress had intended
their outlawry, the intention would have been phrased in no uncertain terms.
That Congress did not so intend is borne out further by the legislative history
of the Act.17 Section 7(a) as originally drafted forbade the employer to re-
quire membership "in any organization" as a condition of employment, whereas,
at the instance of the American Federation of Labor, the wording was changed
to forbid the employer to require membership in a "company union."' 8  More-
over, since the union shop device is a means of securing effective bargaining,
which itself may be but a means to the avowed ends of industrial coUperation
and of better living conditions for the worker, and since the purpose of Section
7 (a) was to promote the same ends,'9 the device and Section rather than being
inconsistent, are functionally harmonious. Consequently, the statutory wording
should be given favorable construction by the courts. This can be done by
restricting application of the clause, prohibiting the employer's interference
with free choice of union membership, to the "yellow-dog" type of situation
which it was designed to meet. Such a limitation would have the effect that
although an employee could not be discharged for membership in the union of
his choosing,2° he could be dismissed for nonmembership in the union having
the shop agreement.21 Nevertheless, with reference to the validity of a union-
charge an employee for any reason, or for no reason. H. B. Rosnthal-Ettlinger Co. v.
Schlossberg, 149 Misc. 210, 266 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Sup. Ct. 1933). See also In re Opinion
of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931); In re Opinion of the Justices, 1 5
Atl. 640 (N. H. 1933), indicating that the Adair and Coppage cases are still to be followed.
Section 7(a) has been held unconstitutional by a Federal District Court as applied to com-
panies not engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. Weirton Steel Co., N. Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1935, at 1, col. 8. The case is being appealed. If Section 7(a) or the
NIRA is held unconstitutional or otherwise inapplicable (e.g. to uncoded industries) the
validity of dosed union-shops agreements remains as before.
17. See Witte, The Background of the Labor Prouisions of the NIRA (1934) 1 U. oz
CHL L. REv. 572, 579.
18. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H. . 5664, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933) 118.
19. 48 STAT. 198, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933).
20. See Comment (1935) 48 HAuv. L. REv. 630, 696. An employer violates Section 7(a)
if upon the termination of a union-shop contract be discharges union men without cauzz.
In re Boston Upholstery Companies, NLRB, Case No. 209 (Dc. 22, 1934); d. FryMs v.
Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168 Ad. 862 (1933). But d. Sherman v.
Abeles, 265 N. Y. 383, 193 N. E. 241 (1934).
21. But cf. Norris-LaGuardia Act. 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 102 (1932). "... though
he (the individual unorganized worker) should be free to decline to a-sodate with bis
fellows.. .' White House Statement, N. Y. Times, March 26, 1934, at 1, col. 6: "Reduced
to plain language, Section 7(a) of NIRA means ... (c) Discrimination againt employee
because of their labor affiliations or for any other unfair or unjust reason is barred."
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shop contract, the collective bargaining provisions, which give the employees
the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choos-
ing, as interpreted in the Houde and other decisions of the labor boards, may not
be ignored.2 2 If a majority of the workers in a given plant should desire to be
represented in the bargaining by men other than the union representatives con-
templated in the union shop agreement, the question would arise as to which
prevailed, the closed union-shop contract or the will of the majority workers .
2
3
The collective bargaining provision as interpreted under the majority rule would
require that the contract should not be enforced under Section 7(a) where the
majority does not continue to wish to be represented by the contracting union.2 4
If the majority rule is upheld by the courts, 25 this would have the effect of
writing into a union-shop agreement the condition subsequent that the contract
is valid unless and until renounced by a majority of the employees in the
contracting company. 26 If the condition occurred, the union would have no
action against the employer, unless in violation of the Section the employer had
coerced his employees to abandon their union affiliations.2 7 Whether the new
majority group should be allowed to conclude its own closed shop and compel
the discharge of the minority is, however, subject to some doubt.28 If the new
22. In the Matter of the Denver Tramway Corporation, NLRB, Case No. 149 (March
1, 1934); In the Matter of Houde Engineering Corporation, NLRB, Case No. 12 (Aug.
30, 1934), noted (1934) 34 COL. L. Rav. 1362; followed in In the Matter of Guide Lamp
Corporation, NLRB, Case No. 42 (Sept. 4, 1934). The judicial power of the NLRB is
discussed in Smethurst, Effect of Administrative Interpretation on the Powers of The
National Labor Relations Board (1935) 3 Gao. WAsH. L. Ray. 141. Comment (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 599.
23. See e.g., Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Company, 7 F. Supp. 340
(E. D. I1. 1934), noted in (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rav. 396; Stanley v. Peabody Coal Company,
5 F. Supp. 612 (S. D. Ill. 1933).
24. In the Matter of Hildinger Bishop Company, NLRB, Case No. 86 (Oct. 25, 1934).
Compare United Electrical Coal Companies v. Rice (E. D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1934), (Jan, 15,
1935) U. S. L. WEx 11.
25. The constitutionality of the majority rule as established in the labor board decisions
has been sharply attacked on the ground that the rights of minority individuals are in-
fringed. Sargent, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining Under Section 7(a) (1934) 29
ILL. L. Rav. 275. For an impartial discussion, see (1935) 48 IIARv. L. Ray. 630, 632-640.
26. Compare Section 8(3) of the newly proposed Wagner National Labor Relations Bill,
N. Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1935, at 14, col. 2. In case of doubt as to the majority, upon peti-
tion, an election conducted under NIRA auspices would be determinative. If undue pres-
sure was brought in the election, the group having a majority prior to the vote would con-
tinue to represent the workers in bargaining. In re Danbury & Bethel Fur Company,
N L R B, Case No. 116 (Nov. 22, 1934).
27. Comment (1935) 48 HAgv. L. RE. 630, 64448.
28. It is possible that even in New York, where a rival union may go comparatively
far in efforts to displace a competitor (Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690
(1931) such an agreement could be held invalid on the ground of unlawful purpose. See
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARV. L. Rav. 663; cf. Goyette v, C. V. %Vat-
son Company, 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923). But the situation would not be likely
to arise, if the minority comprised a large group, since the employer would not then sub-
mit to a closed shop demand. Or if the doors to the new union were open, the minority
could switch to it.
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group became a company union, it is probable that a closed shop agreement
would be invalid, for the Section in prohibiting the requirement of member-
ship in "any company union" forbids such an arrangement.-
Aside from these problems in connection with the effect of NIRA on the val-
idity of closed union-shop contracts, the principal case raises the further ques-
tion of how such a contract may be enforced if the employer seeks to move his
business to a different location. Ordinarily there is no provision in the con-
tract expressly binding the employer to maintain the same business site. Con-
sequently, the union may not enjoin a change of location unless the change was
made in bad faith for the sole purpose of discharging union men and of re-
placing them with nonunion workers in violation of the contract. 0  But such
bad faith seldom will be found. Usually the employer will have a plausible
argument to show lower production costs, by virtue of the change, making pos-
sible a saving to the consumer. But, in the computation, he may not rely on a
lower, nonunion wage scale, for even though the change was in good faith he is
obliged, before hiring any nonunion men to do the transferred business, to em-
ploy members of the contracting union who appear for work at the new loca-
tion. In reality, however, there would be a wage saving, if the new location
were in nonunion territory at a distance too far for commuting, since the dis-
charged or other union workers could not afford to seek new and nearer homes.
Yet even assuming that the contract expressly forbade a change of location and
that it clearly appeared that the move was a subterfuge designed to rid the
employer of his union obligations, it is conceivable that in the absence of the
applicability of Section 7(a), a majority of state courts would refuse to enjoin,
or to give damages equal to the lost wages. The promise might be treated as
other promises in collective labor agreements which, if held valid in the first
place, are not specifically enforceable on one or more of a number of technical
grounds.31 But a different result is reached under 7(a) before the National
Labor Relations Board,32 and should be attainable in the Federal courts and in
those state courts which uphold the constitutionality of state recovery actsP
29. In the Matter of Tamaqua Underwear Company, NLRB, Case No. 27 (Aug. 6,
1934).
30. Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't, 1928); and
see cases cited note 32, infra. A simila situation is presented where the union Eeeks to
enjoin dissolution or reincorporation by the employer. See (1934) 34 Cor. L. RLv. 376.
But cf. note 40, infra.
31. See articles cited note 6, supra. Thus an agreement, to be enforceable, must be for
a definite duration. In the Matter of National Aniline & Chemical Company, N*,LRB,
Case No. 33, (Oct. 3, 1934). In many jurisdictions even prior to the NIRA there vas a
tendency in the same direction. Comment (1931) 19 CArw. L. REv. 183; (1931) 15 Mun;.
L. REv. 251.
32. In the Matter of Consolidated Film Industries, NLB, Case No. 257 (June 30,
1934) ; In the Matter of George Royle and Company, NLB, Case No. 265 (June 30, 1934) ;
In the Matter of Maujer Parlor Frame Company, NLRB, Case No. 21 (Aug. 13, 1934);
In the Matter of the Fischer. Press and Fischer Press Inc., NLRB, Case No. 70 (Sept. 22,
1934); In re Globe Gabbe Corporation: In re Shuster Gaio Corporation, NLRB, Casa
No. 206 (Dec. 22, 1934).
33. As to validity of state Recovery acts see Comment (1935) 29 ILL L. Rxv. 777;
Comment (1935) 33 AicH. L. R.y. 597. The legislative sanction accorded colective bar-
gaining by the Recovery acts should serve to strengthen the collective labor agreements and
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For regardless of the existence of a contract, the Section in making it illegal
for an employer to discharge on the basis of union membership or to deprive
workers of their rights to collective bargaining, would prohibit a transfer of
business for the sole purpose of avoiding labor obligations.84 Some courts,
however, might refuse to entertain such a suit on the ground that under Sec-
tion 3 (c) of the NIRA a private party is not entitled to sue.85
The doubts as to constitutionality and enforceability, and the desirability of
reaching a determination before damage is done, should inspire the use of the
declaratory judgment in such cases.3 6 When the supposed breach of a union.
shop agreement is doubtful and injury is threatened, the parties concerned, to
avoid resort to the expensive and socially undesirable combat by pickets and
policemen, should be able to secure a speedy declaration of their rights8 7 in
the manner prevailing in foreign countries. 8 Thus, if an employer had legiti-
mate reasons for wishing to move his business, but desired to avoid the risk of
violating the contract or the Section and probably to avert union threats of
strike or boycott, he should be entitled to a declaration before going ahead.
And in the principal situation, if the union had sought a judgment prior to the
consummation of the defendant's transfer to Massachusetts, the result might
have been less costly and more favorable. It is likely that in such a suit a
court would be more readily disposed to find the deciding element of bad faith
dictate effective enforcement by specific performance. Fucns, SomE LEoAt AsPEcTs ov
Tim ENOIRCEMENT OF CoLLEacrE LABOR AORaErsNx's (1934) 9-10 (Graduate thesis In the
Yale School of Law library).
34. Where there is a contract the union might have to elect whether to rely on tho
alleged breach of it or the violation of Section 7(a). "A mere breach of contract Is not In
itself a violation of Section 7(a)." In the Matter of Chicago Defender, Inc., N L I. B.
Case No. 126 (Oct. 20, 1934).
35. Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. Fla. 1933), noted in (1934) 43 YALx
L. J. 480; Progressive Miners of America v. Peabody Coal Company, 7 F. Supp. 340 (E. D
Ill. 1934), noted in (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rxv. 396.
36. The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, Judicial Code, § 2740, 48 STAT. 9S5, 28
U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934), affords the remedy in cases of "actual controversy." Such a contra.
versy would exist in the principal type of situation, since the employer is under a duty
by virtue both of the agreement and of Section 7(a). Cf. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Railway Company v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933), BoRcnuAR, DECLARAToRY J nVoMNrs
(1934) part II, c. IV, and pp. 594-595.
37. But labor's resort to the declaratory judgment so far has been unsuccessful. A
union suit for a declaration of its rights under 7(a) was refused in Hary v. United Electric
Coal Company, 8 F. Supp. 655 (E. D. Il. 1934), on the ground chiefly that the private
party could not have brought suit for an affirmative relief. See note 39, supra. In Scars-
dale Slupply Company v. Pearce, 153 Misc. Div. 296, 274 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
a suit, brought by the company for a declaration as to the legality of a proposed union.
shop agreement, was refused on the ground that the question was moot since there was no
jural relation. Such reasoning could not apply if the contract were signed. And it has been
held that to avoid hardship the effect of a statute on the legality of a contract may be de-
clared before the contract goes into effect. Warren v. Commerce Union Bank, 192 Tenn.
67, 274 S. W. 539 (1925).
38. BOaCHARD, supra note 36, cases cited at 401-402. Fuchs, Collective Labor Agree.
ments In German Law (1929) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 1, 24-26.
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on the employer's part39 than in the usual case where the employer already has
undergone the expense of moving. 40
JUDICIAL RESTORATION OF THE GENERAL PROPERTY
TAX BASE
DESPITE the fact that it does not reach those intangibles which have become
a great and ever-increasing part of the national wealth, and despite the fact
that various forms of excise have been resorted to,2 the general property tax
upon real estate or upon real estate and tangible personalty remains the back-
bone of American local taxation. Not only in rural areas but even in cities, it
produces more than sixty-five percent of the revenue.3 The recent unhappy
efforts of such cities as New York to enlarge revenues by other means, includ-
ing income and inheritance taxes, have been only the most striking example
of the unsuitability of more modem tax devices to the needs of taxing juris-
39. Under the decisions both of courts, supra note 30, and of the labor board:, supra
note 32, although the contracting employer is obliged to hire union men if they appear at
the new location, the change is not enjoined unless made in bad faith.
40. Indeed, the fact that the employer had already so removed and started operation in
the new location led the Federal District Court in Massachusetts to nullify the effect of
the decision in the instant case. The closed union-shop contract was voided under Sub-
section AT of Section 77B of the Federal Bankruptcy Act on the ground that compliance with
the labor contract, which here resulted in closing the factory to which the employer had re-
moved, imperiled the financial stability of the corporation. N. Y. Sun, March 20, 193S, at 1.
col. 4.
1. From an economic point of view this is the greatest weakness of the general property
tax, due not only to inherent dishonesty of taxpayer and assessor but also to the fact
that the property tax, although workable when applied to tangible objects of fairly ctable
value in a fairly stable economy, is mechanically unfitted to intangible objects of rapidly
fluctuating value and of easy concealment. The result has been that the burden has in-
creasingly fallen on real property, which has not proportionately shared in the incrcase
of general wealth. See SEuG0IAN, ESSAyS ON TAXAIOz (9th ed. 1921) 62; Gr=., TnxO='
&AIT PRAcCE OF MOD=u TAXAYON (1933) c. 22. For a discussion of the difficulty of
reaching intangibles by the general property tax see Compton, Ohio at the Crosroads
(1931) 9 TAx MAG. 13. This has compelled many states either to substitute an income
tax for the older form of taxation or to add an income tax. Municipalities and other
local units still rely principally on the property tax, often restricted to real property and
sometimes aided by state funds. See Leffler, Ebb Tide in Taxation (1933) 22 NAr. Mu..
Ray. 541 (statistics on proportion of tax burden borne by general property tax). Se2
also Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, 928.
2. To the effect that these have been only partially successful , see Comment (1934) 43
YAzXE L. J. 924, 942-944.
3. In 1931, 310 cities, whose population comprised 38.6% of the total population of the
United States, obtained approximately 66.2% of all their revenues from general property
taxes. U. S. BunxAu or Cm-sus, Fnu Ac , STAT~Tcs or Cir=s HMn;o Ovn 30,C00
Porur.ATiox (1931). See generally Leffler, supra note 1.
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dictions developed under the simpler functioning of the property tax.4 Sweep-
ing reorganizations of local governmental structures and local tax systems have
not been forthcoming. But the necessary expenses of local government are be-
coming increasingly greater, and concomitantly the necessity is growing more
urgent for better utilization of the existent property tax.5 The abuses of this
tax, which have been abundantly recognized in the past without the simultaneous
recognition that their abolition would go far towards restoring the measure of
efficiency needful to provide for the costs of modern local government,0 now
demand correction.
Two of the most prevalent sources of abuse, and likewise two of the most
essential factors in the efficiency of the general property tax, are the valuation
of the individual units to be taxed, and the granting or withholding of exemp-
tions sought by potentially taxable units.7 The sum of these units is the tax-
base, the multiplicand to which the general tax rate is applied to produce the
total of the levy. When this is eaten away by mismanagement, special privilege,
or corruption, the physical power of the taxing jurisdiction to raise money is
gravely impaired, the governmental credit suffers, and if it is sought to remedy
the inadequacy of the tax base by raising the rate, there is danger of early reach-
ing the point of diminishing returns. Furthermore, the honest taxpayer who is
not the recipient of special privilege suffers not only as a member of the com-
munity but also in his individual capacity, since his own share of the com-
munity tax burden will be proportionately higher. Moreover, local governmental
units, especially since the depression, often resort to consistent over-valuation in
order to evade the intended effect of laws limiting the tax-rate or the debt in-
4. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1934, § 1, at 1, col. 8; Nov. 15, 1934, at 1, col, 1;
Nov. 17, 1934, at 1, col. 8; Nov. 21, 1934, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 6, 1934, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 9,
1934, § 1, at 1, col. 3; Dec. 10, 1934, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 18, 1934, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 29,
1934, at 1, cols. 6, 7.
5. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1935, at 9, col. 1 (report by A. M. Hillhouse, Research
Director of the Municipal Finance Officers' Association).
6. Compton, Romance and Reality (1931) 9 TAx MAo. 432; Connolly, Miuslelpal
Taxation and Finance (1933) 11 TAx MAG. 367, 402; Hughes, The Status of the General
Property Tax in Illinois (1932) 10 TAx MAo. 333, 334; Todd, Taxation of Personal
Property (1931) 9 TAx MAo. 212; Todd, The Taxation of Real Estate (1934) 12 TAx
MAG. 533; see N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 24, 1935, § 10, at 1, col. 8. Generally, however,
there has been a failure to realize that the special financial problems growing out of the
depression, and the previous boom are quite distinct from the question of whether under
normal conditions the general property tax can adequately provide for the worklng needs
of modem local government. That these needs will remain heavy, even when the load
of debt accumulated by long decades of governmental extravagance has been liquidated,
is self-evident from a consideration of the vastly increased scope of governmental services.
For a convenient summary of the growth of the tax burden see GRMzN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 225 et °seq. Relief also is a heavy burden upon local and state governments
and is expected to continue so for an indefinite period. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1934,
at 1, col. 8; Dec. 8, 1934, at 11, col. 1; Dec. 13, 1934, at 3, col. 1; Dec. 15, 1934, at 1,
col. 8; Feb. 25, 1935, at 1, col. 2.
7. NATIOxAL TAX Associ A Ox, PROCEEDINGS or THz TtmTam n'i CoNTRENcI (1920)
243; Cross, General Tax Exemption (1933) 11 TAx MAo. 338; Haensel, State and Local
Tax Problems (1934) 12 TAx MAG. 651; see Todd, Exemption and Tax Delinquency (1934)
12 TAx MAG. 159.
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curring power, thus imposing a weight of concealed illegality upon the taxpayer.
There are many problems and abuses in other parts of general property tax
administration, including very grave defects in tax collection. But even should
every other difficulty be satisfactorily overcome, the property tax will remain
both unfair and inadequate unless the problems of valuation and exemption are
solved.
These problems lie within the province of the courts, and need not wat upon
improbable legislative reform for solution. Valuation is not a purely ministerial
task of carrying out a legislative or constitutional mandate, but involves a high
degree of administrative discretion.8 It is, even more, a quasi-judicial function,
from which, although it may be necessary first to exhaust a complicated sys-
tem of administrative remedies, there is always an ultimate appeal to the
courts.9 Exemption is entirely a legal problem, viz. the judicial interpreta-
tion and application to particular instances of statutes usually general in nature.
The actions of the courts in this field of tax law necessarily bear a vital rela-
tion to the effectiveness of the general property tax. It will be profitable, there-
fore, to investigate what legal principles have guided the judiciary, whether
any failures to make good use of the judicial power have been due to the estab-
lished legal principles or to a misuse of them, and finally to consider what the
courts could do to remedy the situation and to make their ultimate control of
the tax base effective in the interests of fairness and adequate revenue return.
Valution. The principles of valuation are simple. The first principle, and the
most widely ignored, is that property must be taken at "fair cash value," "true
value," "actual cash value," or the equivalent term.'" In theory, if this be done,
the second principle, that of uniformity, will be attained. In practice, however,
the courts were met, at least before the depression, with a condition of general
underassessment which only the catastrophic decline in realty values ended.
Partly, this was the result of continuous pressure by individual taxpayers, each
of whom hoped that his underassessment would be a little greater than his neigh-
bor's underassessment. Partly also, in states where local assessment has been
8. Miller & Lux Inc. v. Richardson, 182 Cal. 115, 118, 187 Pac. 411, 416 (1920);
German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 495, 52 So. 292, 294 (1910). To
the same effect, but without explicit statement of the reason are: Coulter v. Louisville
& Nashville Rr. Co, 196 U. S. 599 (1905); Mercantile Nat. Bank of New York v. Mayor
& Council of New York, 172 N. Y. 35, 37, 64 N. E. 756, 760 (1902); Shattuck v. Smith,
6 N. D. 56, 69 N. W. 557 (1896); Morgan's L. T. R. and S. Co. v. Board of Reviewrs,
41 La. Ann. 1156, 3 So. 507 (1887).
9. Balfour v. City of Portland, 28 Fed. 738 (C. C. D. Ore. 1896); Boody v. Watson,
64 N. H. 162, 165, 9 At. 794, 798 (1887); Van Deventer v. Long Island City, 139 N. Y.
133, 134, 34 N. E. 774, 775 (1893); Northern Pacific Rr. Co. v. Pierce, 55 Wash. 103,
109, 104 Pac. 178, 179 (1909); Vancouver Waterworks Co. v. Clarke County, 55 Wash.
112, 104 Pac. 180, 181 (1909); Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534,
537, 167 Pac. 35, 38 (1917).
10. CoorE, T _XA=oN (3d ed. 1924) § 1146; Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 Pac.
530 (1890); Willis v. Crowder, 134 Ind. 515, 34 N. E. 315 (1893); Tremont & Suffolk
Mills v. City of Lowell, 163 Mass. 283, 39 N. E. 1028 (1895); People ex rel. Empire
Mortgage Co. v. Cantor, 197 App. Div. 437, 1S9 N. Y. Supp. 646 (1st Dep'L 1921).
11. Compton, Rozance and Reality (1931) 9 TAx MMv;. 432; Hughes, Tbe Stalus of
the General Property Tax in Ilhinois (1932) 10 Tx Mt. 333, 334; Todd, Thec Taxation
of Persondal Property (1931) 9 TAx M1W. 212.
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the basis for the taxation of larger governmental units, assessors were moved by
local loyalty to hope that their unit might be more under-assessed than other
units, thus escaping its just burden of taxation. State or county Boards of
Equalization have sometimes sought to overcome this practice, but perhaps
because their appointment or continuance in office was often influenced by the
same political considerations as that of the assessors, only a small amount of
good was accomplished. 1 Occasionally statutes have recognized the tendency
and authorized the use of 40% or 50%o or some other percentage of "true value"
for tax purposes. When such allowance has proven too low for adequate tax-
ation, with the result that legislatures were compelled to raise the authorized
percentage, the courts have held that the taxpayer has no vested right and need
not even be heard in the matter.12 In the absence of statute authorizing such
consistent undervaluation, courts have had to face it as an open and notorious
illegality. Accordingly, when a Board of Equalization has attempted to raise
tax assessments by a fixed percentage, the courts have wavered apparently
as influenced either by sympathy for the individual taxpayer whose assessment
has been "arbitrarily" raised,' 3 or by desire to assist in the administrative task
of securing larger levies. 14
But the principle of full valuation has been most troublesome where it has
come into conflict with the equally pervasive principle of equality and uniform-
ity. This latter principle has not been as openly ignored as the former, for it is
usually a provision of the state constitution, and has been read into the Four-
teenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.' 5 On the other hand, it is so
much more indefinite, so much undercut by judicial refusal to pry closely into
the discretionary elements of valuation that it has proven of little practical value.
Uniformity has been held to mean not only the application of the same tax rate,
but also the application of the same basis for valuation.' 0 Nevertheless, uni-
formity and equality have been held not to debar the making of reasonable
classifications as to kinds of property, which may not only be taxed at different
rates, but even assessed by different and not always equivalent systems."
12. People ex rel. Correll v. Cairo U. & C. Rr. Co., 247 Ill. 327, 93 N. E. 402 (1910);
People ex rel. Campe v. Board of Review of Cook County, 290 Il. 467, 125 N. E. 274
(1919); People ex rel. Browne v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Rr. Co., 300 Iii. 467, 133
N. E. 212 (1921).
13. Rancho Santa Margarita v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App. 186, 14 P. (2d) 589
(1932); Kittle v. Shervin, 11 Neb. 65, 7 N. W. 861 (1881); cf. Wallace v. Bullen, 6 Okla.
757, 54 Pac. 974 (1898).
14. First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 166, 176 Pac. 498 (1918).
15. Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907); Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, Nebraska, 260 U. S. 441 (1923). Cf. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Town-
ship of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918); Contra: Bell's Gap Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
134 U. S. 232 (1890); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 175 U. S. 194 (1897).
16. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539 (1879); Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S.
153 (1879); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907).
17. State Rr. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875); Bell's Gap Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
134 U. S. 232 (1890); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897); Michigan Central
Rr. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245 (1906); Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S, 373




Such a limitation, while it may in some circumstances be necessary, effects a
large breach in the protection of uniformity.
Where the courts have encountered single instances of gross inequality, how-
ever, they have generally been inclined to remedy them. Not only provable
fraud18 but even nonprovable or "constructive" fraud is a recognized ground for
relief. But just what is unfair discrimination or what state of unalgnment con-
stitutes constructive fraud, is very uncertain. 19 For example, in Floridafr3'
where local government is said to be below the average, the courts are more
alert to see and check constructive fraud than in Massachusetts, where local
government is supposed to adhere to higher traditions. ' More difficult for the
courts has been the problem of how to treat the requirement of uniformity when
the facts did not warrant the appellation of constructive fraud, and the problem
was merely that the complaining taxpayer was less under-assessed than others.
Some jurisdictions, particularly in earlier decisions, held that a taxpayer who is
not assessed above the fair value of his property has nothing of which to com-
plain,2 2 at times disposing of the rule of uniformity by empty invective against
18. Kansas City Southern Rr. Co. v. May, 2 F. (2d) 6S0 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Walsh
v. King, 74 Mich. 350, 41 N. W. 100S (1889); Solomon v. Township of O-coda, 77 Mich.
365, 43 N. W. 990 (1889); Auditor General v. Prescott, 94 Mich. 190, 53 N. W. 1053
(1892); Auditor General v. Jughitt, 132 Iich. 311, 93 N. W. 621 (1903); cf. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585 (1907); Roberts v. American
Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 94 Fla. 427, 115 So. 261 (1927).
19. Southern Pacific Land Co. v. San Diego County, 183 Cal. 543, 191 Pac. 931 (1920);
Birch v. Orange County, 88 Cal. App. 82, 262 Pac. 788 (1927); Rancho Santa Margarita
v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App. 186, 14 P. (2d) 538 (1932); First Nat. Bank of
Urbana v. Holmes, 246 ]11. 862, 92 N. E. 893 (1910); Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dark
Co. v. O'Connell, 265 ]11. 106, 106 N. E. 452 (1914); People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v.
Stuckart, 286 EL1. 164, 121 N. E. 629 (191); People ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk &
Hamilton Bridge Co., 287 l. 246, 122 N. E. 467 (1919); People cx rel Little v. St. Louis
Electric Bridge, 290 Ill. 307, 125 N. E. 280 (1919); City of Covington v. Shinlde, 25
Ky. L. Rep. 66, 74 S. W. 652 (1903); Auditor General v. Jenkinson, 90 M ch. 523, 51
N. W. 643 (1892); Andrews v. King County, 1 Wash. 46, 23 Pac. 409 (1890); Henders-on
v. Pierce County, 37 Wash. 201, 79 Pac. 617 (1905); Dickson v. Kittitas County, 42 Wash.
429, 84 Pac. 855 (1906); Case v. San Juan County, 59 Wash. 222, 109 Pac. E09 (1910);
Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 70 Wash. 48, 126 Pac. 54 (1912); cf.
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. v. Los Angeles County, 162 Cal. 164, 121 Pac. 334 (1912);
Dunham v. City of Chicago, 35 Ill. 357 (1870).
20. Graham v. City of West Tampa, 71 Fla. 605, 71 So. 956 (1916); Camp Phosphate
Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 541, 81 So. 503 (1919); cf. City of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514,
105 So. 115 (1925).
21. Inhabitants of Chicopee v. County Comm Uioners of Hampden, 82 Mas-. 38 (1860).
22. Albuquerque Bank v. Perea, 147 U. S. 87 (1893); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co.
v. People ex rel. Bertschi, 161 Ill. 574, 44 N. E. 206 (1896); People ex rel. Kempzr v.
Lots in City of Ashley, 122 Ill. 297, 13 N. E. 556 (1887); City of Lowell v. Comm!ssioners
of Middlesex County, 152 Mass. 372, 25 N. E. 469 (1890); Newport Mining Co. v. City
of Ironwood, 185 M ich. 668, 152 N. W. 1088 (1915); State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 103
Minn. 419, 115 N. W. 645 (1908); Lehigh Valley Rr. Co. of N. 1. v. State Board of
Taxes & Appeals, 174 At. 359 (Md. 1934); People ex rel. Nathan Warren v. Edward
Carter, 109 N. Y. 576, 17 N. E. 222 (1888); cf. Fletcher Paper Co. v. City of Alpana,
160 Mich. 462, 125 N. W. 405 (1910); Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. City of Man-
chester, 70 N. H. 200, 46 At. 470 (1900).
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the practices of assessors. 23 Some courts granted the taxpayer relief apologeti-
cally, stating that although what ought to be done was to raise all assessments
of the jurisdiction, since this was impractical, individual relief would be granted.2 4
And the majority rule was to disregard entirely any public question in the in-
dividual case, and to state baldly that since an illegality must be suffered it
should rather be breach of the rule of true value than breach of the principle
of uniformity, so that a taxpayer whose assessment was out of line might without
further consideration have it lowered to the prevailing proportion. 25 A recent
case in New York has developed the converse of this situation, applying to it
the same logic but with inverted result. 26 Here the declining true value of real
estate had apparently fallen far below the assessed value. The taxpayer com-
plained that his property was assessed at far above the full cash value, which was
the legal basis. He was met with the argument that his property was no more
over-valued than any other property in the same taxing district. Thus, it was
asserted, no injustice was done him, while substantial injustice would be done
to other tax payers if his assessment alone were lowered. This reasoning,
coupled, no doubt, with knowledge of the taxing jurisdiction's urgent need, ap-
pealed to the court, and once more uniformity triumphed over fair cash value.
Almost all of these decisions have shown a marked and natural disinclination
towards avoidable interference with the scope of administrative functions re-
quiring a large measure of discretion. But where the courts have felt themselves
compelled to intervene, they have not shown any broad understanding of the
problem. No real attempt has been made to visualize the sum at issue in a par-
ticular case as a typical part of the general levy or as a permanent unit of the
tax base. Little regard seems to have been given the fact that the manner or
adequacy of the assessment is a matter of public importance with wide-spread-
ing, long term implications. Such an attitude, of course, is not the fault of
the legal principles, fair value and uniformity, since lack of vision can vitiate
any rules broad enough for general guidance. But these two principles, although
commendable aspirations for all taxing systems, have never acquired through
23. Louisville Rr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1509, 49 S. W. 486, 488 (1899).
24. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Nebraska, 260 U. S. 441, 446 (1923);
Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City v. Central Rr. Co. of N. J., 212 Fed. 76, 81 (C. C. A.
3d, 1914); cf. Peninsular Power Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 195 Wisc. 231, 218
N. W. 371 (1928).
25. Pelton v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 143 (1879); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban
Rr. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917); Taylor v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 88 Fed. 350
(C. C. A. 6th 1898); Mobile & Ohio Er. Co. v. Schnepper, 31 F. (2d) 587 (E. D. Il1.
1929); Randell v. City of Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 AtI. $23 (1893); Camp Phosphate
Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919); Washington County v. First Nat. Bank of
Weiser, 35 Idaho 438, 206 Pac. 1054 (1922); People ex rel. Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Rr. Co., 300 Ill. 399, 133 N. E. 325 (1921); Eminence Distilling Co. v. Henry County,
178 Ky. 811, 200 S. W. 347 (1918); Knox v. Southern Paper Co., 143 MisS, 870, 105
So. 288 (1926); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 Atl. 653 (1930); State ex
rel. Oregon lr. & Navigation Co. v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535, 116 Pac. 7 (1911); Savage
v. Pierce County, 68 Wash. 623, 123 Pac. 1088 (1912); Pacific Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. Wooster.
34 P. (2d) 451 (Wash. 1934).




judicial interpretation the real utility which able jurists have given to equally
vague ideals in contracts or agency. Therefore in assessment-law courts must
build up a new structure, not so much by reversing existing decisions as by
filling in a vacuum. This would involve adding to the present legal recognition
that assessments should be fair and uniform, methodological principles for the
achievement of that result. The courts could test the validity of the assessors'
results by applying certain quasi-scientific formulae for valuation, worked out
by practical real estate men and now in use in the administrations of some pro-
gressive cities.27 Or if these rules seemed inapplicable to less homogeneous types
of property, a capitalization of the average income produced over a five or ten
year period might be used as a yardstick. Under this system residences in-
habited by the owners should be given a fair rental value as is done in com-
puting the British income tax.29 Realty held for development might be measured
by capitalizing average current profit on plots sold. Other practical tests of this
kind could be devised to meet other situations, and even if their accuracy were
rough, they would save the courts from the helplessness exhibited in most pres-
ent and past decisions. Further, the adoption of such standards for review
would compel assessors and Boards of Equalization at least to rationalize their
results by similar methods, so that, for example, an assessor could no longer
openly guess at the value of a great railroad bridge aided only by casual con-
versation with neighboring shop keepers. 0
If courts were to begin interpreting the problem of valuation in this way, not
only would the methodology of assessment improve and new techniques con-
stantly develop, but also some of the changed mental attitude might gradually
penetrate the legislative milieu thus aiding reform in ways beyond the power of
the courts. For example, much of the incompetence characteristic of local asses-
sors in the poorer or smaller taxing units might be abolished if the process of
assessment were taken over by the state, and adequately salaried state assessors
with high civil service qualifications appointed.3 ' By the imposition of a heavy
tax on increments in property value, the proceeds of which were strictly ear-
marked for debt retirement, taxing units could be saved from the worst effects
of a diminished yield when property values undergo the inevitable slumps which
follow on boom periods.32 These refinements, however, are of secondary im-
portance compared with the immediate necessity of placing valuation upon
a reasonable judicial basis.
Exenption. Nevertheless, even if the process of valuation were improved to
27. For description of some of these methods see Donahue, Methods of Relef from
Inequalities in Property Assessment Applied in Greenuich, Connecticut (1931) 9 TAx M'C
362; Todd, Taxation of Real Estate (1934) 12 TAx AMAG. 533.
28. See recommendations to this effect in aensel, supra note 7.
29. _,comm TAx Ace, 8 & 9 Gm. V, c. 40, Schedule A (1918).
30. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, 161 Ill. $74, 575, 44 N. E. 206, 203 (1696).
31. The efficacy of this or any other reform which merely shifts the parsonnel upon
whom heavy and constant temptation or political pressure must rest is gravely to 12
doubted, but it might be of some avail. And that such a system would hardly prove worse
in operation than the prevalent practice of local assessment see R roaT or mu Omo TA
CoammssioN (1930); Compton, Romance and Reality (1931) .9 TAX MAO. 432; Hughes,
Status of the General Property Tax in IlUnis (1932) 10 T= ,,.. 333, 334.
32. See generally Haensel, supra note 7.
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its utmost, not enough would have been accomplished unless abuses in the
granting of exemptions were also remedied. Tax exemption has a more direct
and perhaps a proportionately greater effect on the size of the tax base than has
mere under-valuation. An examination of the scope of tax.exemption reveals
that it has constantly broadened, more in some states than in others, but ap-
preciably in all.33 The reasons for this condition are twofold: first, there is the
traditional moral and humanitarian attitude which in taxation takes the form of
disliking to burden any property owner actively engaged in socially good works;
secondly, tax exemptions afford organized groups of many kinds a colorable
opportunity for lobbying.3 4 The constant working of these causes and the
natural tendency of exempt organizations to grow wealthier, often increasing
thereby the percentage of exempt property within the jurisdiction first granting
the exemption, have all combined to form a grave problem." Exemptions once
granted are seldom withdrawn. Indeed, the Supreme Court decided early that
exemptions granted by a contract which did not reserve any privilege of rescis-
sion were irrevocable under the constitutional protection of the obligation of con-
tracts,3 6 and if the exemptions, as is more frequently the case, are statutory,
legislative inertia or continued pressure usually holds the statutes on the books.
Exemption, by contrast to the complex process of valuation, is merely the ap-
plication and interpretation of more or less explicit statutory or constitutional
33. The value of real property and improvements exempt from taxation in the United
States is about 12% of the value of all such property. In thirty-one states exempt property
is six to fourteen percent of the taxable real estate. Most nontaxable property is in the
District of Columbia and in the Rocky Mountain district. Where data are available, two
to fifteen percent of personal property is exempt. A forty year study shows the total
of exempt property increasing faster than the value of taxable property. Stimson, Tax
Exemption in Illinois (1932) 10 TAx MAG. 453. See also Stimson, Exemption of Property
from Taxation (1934) 18 MINN. L. Rxv. 411; Todd, Tax Exemption and Tax Delinquency
(1934) 12 TAX MAG. 159. The amount of tax exemption in New York State increased
from $1,327,914,982 in 1904 to $6,696,761,639, in 1933, a jump of 404.3 percent. The
percentage of exemption to the total property, however, increased from 18.81 in 1904
to 23.8% in 1933. Crider, New York's Exemption Problem (1934) 12 TAX MAo. 603,
note on 604. The following official reports stress the growing menace of tax exemption:
REPORT OF THE Owro TAX CozmrrassioN (1930); REPORT orT na VEPm.Nn TAX Com-
massION (1930); REPORT Or THE RHODE IsLAND TAX Coa nssIoN (1931). See also Cross,
supra note 7.
34. Exemplifying this pressure is the experience of Wisconsin. Here the courts for a
long time refused to exempt the powerful, incorporated benevolent and fraternal orders
such as the B. P. 0. E. Under political pressure the legislature passed a statute specially
exempting such orders, but specifically refusing it to the less-powerful though otherwise
similar college fraternities. See Chamberlain, Tax Exemption of Greek Letter Fraternities
(1930) 4 U. or Cnr. L. REv. 186; Grooms, Exemption of College Fraternity Property (1926)
14 Ky. L. J. 338.
35. See notes 6, 7, 11, 34, supra.
36. New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (U. S. 1812). Exemptions granted by statute,
however, are considered mere privileges and may be revoked at any time. Rector of
Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, 302 (U. S. 1860); Grand Lodge
v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143 (1897); Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U. S.
100 (1916) State ex rel. Foote v. Bartholomew, 108 Conn. 246, 142 AUt. 800 (1928);
Shiner v. Jacobs, 62 Iowa 392, 17 N. W. 613 (1883); Contra: Atwater v. Woodbrldge,
6 Conn. 223 (1826).
provisions. 37 This would not seem, necessarily, to be a task incapable of pre-
cise delineation, but actually the law of tax exemption has remained more fluid,
its limits more vague, and the application of its guiding principles less pre-
dictable than any other aspect of general property tax law. The theory advanced
for most types of exemption is that the exempt institution serves some worthy
public purpose, religious, charitable, educational, or governmental; or that it
furthers the public welfare in some special way as is the case with temporary
grants to foster manufacturing, encourage a railroad and so forth.p The diffi-
culty, however, both with the statutes and the theory, is that the purpose and
use of property is not always clear in itself and has been rendered less so by
judicial laxity in borderline cases.
Thus, in determining what kinds of property fall under a religious exemption,
it would be impossible to deny the claims of churches and the ground whereon
they stand, or likewise the claims of those parts of camp-meeting grounds used
exclusively for devotional exercises.30 Once outside the church or burial plot,
however, uncertainty begins, and it is here that many courts have immolated
the tax base to the humanitarian principle. Generally a church is and ought
to be exempt on land necessary to give it light and air,* but a California court
has gone so far as to grant exemption on a valuable plot used for parking pur-
poses by those attending church in a congested area. Parish houses adjoining a
church and used sometimes for religious, sometimes for secular purposes, have
on occasion been held exempt,4 - although, except when parsonages are exempted
by name, the courts generally have been consistent in holding them taxable on
the ground that their primary purpose is not religious. 3 Many Roman Cath-
37. Statutory language varies infinitely from state to state and even from decade to
decade. Sometimes exemption is merely by statute, sometimes it is a constitutional pro-
vision, and at other times there is merely a constitutional grant to the legislature of the
power to make certain types of exemption, in pursuance of certain public policies, as for
example, to encourage manufacturing, irrigation etc., or there is a prohibition against making
certain kinds of exemption thought to be corrupt or undemocratic.
38. CooLrz, TA-Aiox (3d ed. 1924) § 653.
39. First Unitarian Society of Hartford v. Town of Hartford, 65 Conn. 365, 34 At].
88 (1895); Inhabitants of Fox Croft v. Pisquataqua Valley Camp-Meeting Association,
86 Mle. 78, 29 AtI. 950 (1893); cf. Davis v. Cincinnati Camp Mfeeting Association, 57 Ohio
St. 257, 49 N. E. 401. Contra: People ex rel. Breymeyer v. Watseka Camp Meeting
Association, 160 Ill. 576, 43 N. E. 716 (1896) (but only on wording of statute requiring
ownership in congregation). See generally Comment (1927) 11 LIn. L. Rnv. 541;
CooL-y, TA..m-cAnm (3d ed. 1924) § 742. Cemeteries are sometimes exempt for analogoua
reasons. See CooLEY, TmUAnox~ (3d ed. 1924) § 736.
40. Third Congregational Society of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 147 Mass. 396,
398, 18 N. E. 68, 69 (1883).
41. Immanuel Presbyterian Church v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176, 265 Pac. 547 (1928).
Cf. All Saints' Parish v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 178 Mass. 404, 59 N. E. 1003 (1901);
Enochs v. City of Jackson, 144 Miss. 360, 109 So. 864 (1926).
42. St. Pauls Church v. City of Concord, 75 N. H. 420, 75 AUt. 531 (1910).
43. People ex rel. Thompson First Congregational Church, 232 III. 158, 83 N. E. 536
(1907); Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874); Trinity Al. E. Church v. San Antonio,
201 S. W. 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). For exceptionally liberal construction of exemption
rule see Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte
County, 118 Kan. 742, 236 Pac. 809 (1925); Contra: State v. Kittle, 87 W. Va. 526, 105
S. E. 775 (1921); State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson, 44 S. D. 63, 182 N. W. 315 (1921).
See generally Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1197.
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olic dioceses have endeavored without success to secure exemption for the houses
of priests on the ground that religious activities are customarily carried on
within,44 yet parts of camp-meeting grounds used to house those in attendance,
as a store to dispense supplies, or premises to stable horses have at times been
held exempt.45 Religious societies such as societies for Bible, Sunday school,
or missionary purposes have on the whole been less successful in securing ex-
emption. 46 This has not been so much due to judicial unwillingness as because
they form a less distinct class and hold their property in forms less susceptible
to simple purpose analysis. Y. M. C. A. organizations and other similar church
societies that have sought exemption as religious organizations have met vary-
ing fates,47 although it is difficult to see how they could in any respect qualify
under the customary statutory terms of "exclusively religious" purpose, unless
specifically named in the statute.
Even more unsettled than the exemption of religious organizations is that
of educational institutions, since the legitimate activity of these can assume
so many forms and aspects. First, the public school system is so universally
exempted that there is no litigation thereon. Exemption to private schools not
run for profit is usually freely granted,48 although sometimes limited to those
offering higher education. 49 It is universally conceded, though rarely if ever
44. Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N. E. 962 (1907); St. Joseph's Church
v. Assessors of Providence, 12 R. I. 19 (1880).
45. Davis v. Cincinnati Camp Meeting Association, 57 Ohio St. 257, 49 N. E. 401 (1897)
(called a charitable rather than a religious exemption, but this is unimportant as the
purpose of the exempt property was, and was termed, religious). Contra: Alton Bay Camp
Meeting Association v. Town of Alton, 69 N. H. 311, 45 Atl. 95 (1898) (as to stock
of groceries); Inhabitants of Fox Croft v. Pisquataqua Valley Camp Meeting Association,
86 Me. 78, 29 AtI. 951 (1893); cf. Ferry Beach Park Association v. City of Saco, 127 Me.
130, 142 At. 65 (1928).
46. For a more complete account see Baker, Tax Exemption (1928) 7 Tax. L. REv.
384, 406; Baker, Tax Exemption Cases (1928) 8 Tax. L. REv. 196, 204. Typical examples
of this kind of case are the following: a Boston society owned buildings, partly for storage,
partly for lease to religious organizations, partly for worship by the owners. Exemption
was refused. Evangelical Baptist Benevolent Society v. City of Boston, 204 Mass. 28,
90 N. E. 572 (1910). A Philadelphia Society maintained a store for the sale and occa-
sional free distribution of religious works. It also sold Webster's dictionary and other
standard moral works. All income went for religious purposes but it was held only par-
tially exempt. American Sunday School Union v. Taylor, 161 Pa. St. 307, 29 Atl. 26
(1894). A similar society in Illinois was held exempt under a substantially similar statute,
although the only distinction that even the court could find, other than a weak verbal one,
in the exemptions law of the states was that the latter organization did not sell Webster's
Dictionary. Congregational Sunday School and Publishing Society v. Board of Assesors,
290 Ill. 108, 125 N. E. 7 (1919). Cf. North West Publishing House v. City of Milwaukee,
177 Wis. 401, 188 N. W. 636 (1922). A trust fund for the maintenance of an evangelist
to preach through Kentucky the doctrines of the Primitive Christians was held taxable.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 119 Ky. 208, 83 S. W. 572 (1904). In this case, however,
as there was no suitable religious exemption in Kentucky, it was sought to call it "char-
itable." This blurring of terms is not unusual.
47. People ex rel. Gore v. Y. M. C. A., 157 Ill. 403, 41 N. E. 557 (1895); Common-
wealth v. Y. M. C. A., 116 Ky. 711, 76 S. W. 522 (1903).
48. Phillips Academy v. Inhabitants of Andover, 175 Mass. 118, 55 N. E. 841 (1900);
St. John's Military Academy v. Edwards, 143 Wis. 551, 128 N. W. 113 (1910).
49. Common Council of Indiana v. McLean, 8 Ind. 328 (1856).
adjudicated, that dancing schools, riding academies, and so forth, are not ex-
empt. Business schools may be exempt if not run for a profit-a sine qua non
with all exemptions.50 Given an exempt institution then, is it entirely exempt,
and if not, what parts of it are exempt? Universally, buildings and land used
for educational, literary, or scientific purposes (which may include the farm
land of an agricultural college) are exempt.5 ' So likewise are campuses and
playgrounds 52 Dormitories and dining halls are generally exempt, 3 following
the authority of the famous Yale University case,5 4 which by exhaustive his-
torical argument proved that eating and sleeping have traditionally been part
of the Anglo-Saxon educational process. The houses of professors and uni-
versity presidents are by the majority rule taxable on the ground that they,
like parsonages, are used primarily for residential purposes.55 The contrary
rule, however, is strong. 6 Property used for income or endowment is some-
times exempted from taxation but more often not.P Where the property is
of mixed use-partly for educational purposes, partly for income, it is often
taxed on the portion producing an income and exempt on the remainder.Ps
Property necessary to the proper functioning of the exempt organization and
which only incidentblly produces revenue is usually exempLY Often the only
50. Lawrence Business College v. Bussing, 117 Kan. 436, 231 Pac. 1039 (1925).
51. In re Syracuse University, 124 Mlsc. Rep. 788, 209 N. Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
52. Yale University v. Town of New Hl~aven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 Atl. 87 (1899); Emerson
v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 185 Mass. 414, 70 N. E. 442 (1914); Where, however,
an athletic field was leased for hire to non-students, even although this leasing took place
at times when no students were able to use it, exemption was refused. People of New
York ex rel. Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 App. Div. 312, 90 N. Y. Supp. 315 (2d Dep't,
1904).
53. City of Chicago v. University of Chicago, 228 Ill. 605, 81 N. E. 113S (1907);
President of Harvard v. Assessors of Cambridge, 175 Mass. 145, 55 N. E. 844 (1930);
In re Syracuse University, 124 MIisc. Rep. 788, 209 N. Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
54. Yale University v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 Ad. 87 (1899).
55. bid; Knox College v. Board of Review of Knox County, 303 Inl. 160, 139 N. E.
56 (1923); St. James Educational Institute v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N. E. 636
(1891); President etc. of Williams College v. Assessors of W'Allamstown, 167 Mass. 505,
46 N. E. 394 (1897).
56. Phlips Academy v. Inhabitants of Andover, 175 Mass. 118, 55 N. E. 841 (1930);
President of Harvard v. Assessors of Cambridge, 175 Mlass. 145, 55 N. E. 844 (190);
Emerson v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 185 Mass. 414, 70 N. E. 442 (1914); In re
Syracuse University, 124 Misc. 788, 209 N. Y. Supp. 329 (1925). Factors which seem
of weight in assisting the minority to their decision are (1) that the houses are on the
campus, (2) that all right and title remain in the educational corporation, (3) that as in
the case of a president's house, such property is an emolument of office and used in fulfilling
its duties.
57. Non-exempt: People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Board of Directors Chicago Theological
Seminary, 174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198 (1898); Knox College v. Board of Review of Kno"
County, 308 II. 160, 139 N. E. 56 (1923); State ex rel. Boss v. Hess, 113 Ohio St. 52,
148 N. E. 347 (1925); cf. State ex rel. Farr v. Martin, 105 W. Va. 60D, 143 S. E. 356
(1928). Exempt: State ex rel. Waller v. Trustees of Wliam Jewell College, 234 Mo. 299,
136 S. W. 397 (1911).
58. Knox College v. Board of Review, 308 3]. 160, 139 N. E. 56 (1923); Ottawa
University v. Board of County Commissioners of Franklin County, 48 Kan. 460, 29 Pac
598 (1892).
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question before the court is the interpretation of a special charter or legis-
lative grant, and of course there is no general rule for these. 0
The taxable status of the college fraternity appears to be midway between
the educational institution and the charitable organization. The fraternity
has sought exemption on either or both grounds and has been allowed it on
both, although practically all of the eastern courts and many western courts
have refused to exempt it at all unless compelled by specific statute. 0
Exemption as a charity has been the most abused category: organizations
for the relief of the helpless, the ill, or the indigent, hospitals, sanatoria, or-
phanages, camps, low-cost lodging or eating houses, 1 benevolent and protective
associations, such as the B. P. 0. E., Odd Fellows, Masons, etc.,0 2 burial
59. People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Board of Directors, Chicago Theological Seminary
174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198 (1898); State ex rel. Waller v. Trustees of William Jewell
College, 234 Mo. 299, 186 S. W. 397 (1911).
60. Non-exempt: People ex rel. Carr v. Alpha Pi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational
Association of the University of Chicago, 326 Ill. 573, 158 N. E. 213 (1927); Inhabitants
of Orono v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Society, 105 Me. 214, 74 At. 19 (1909); Inhabitants
of Orono v. Kappa Sigma Society, 108 Me. 320, 80 Atl. 831 (1911) ; 'People ex rel. D. K. E.
of Hamilton College v. Lawler, 74 App. Div. 553, 77 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th Dep't 1902),
aff'd 179 N. Y. 553, 71 N. E. 1136 (1904). Exempt: State ex rel. Daggy v. Allen, 189
Ind. 369, 127 N. E. 145 (1920); Kappa Kappa Gamma House Association v. Pearey, 92
Kan. 1020, 142 Pac. 294 (1914); Beta Theta Pi Corp. v. Board of Commissioners of
Cleveland County, 108 Okla. 78, 234 Pac. 354 (1925); see generally Chamberlain, Tax
Exemption of Greek Letter Fraternities (1930) 4 U. or CiN. L. REV. 186; (1914) 52 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 995.
61. Hospitals, sanatoria and homes for the indigent offering charity to all without
discrimination are exempt without question. Board of Review of Cook County v. Chicago
Pollclinic, 233 Ill. 268, 84 N. E. 226 (1908); In re Application for Judgment against Certain
Lots, 27 Minn. 460, 8 N. W. 595 (1881); Adams Co. v. Catholic Diocese of Natchez, 110
Miss. 890, 71 So. 17 (1916); In re House of the Good Shepherd of Omaha, 113 Nab. 489,
203 N. W. 632 (1925); Corporation of Sisters of Mercy v. Lane County, 123 Ore. 144,
261 Pac. 694 (1927); Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio 259 S. W. 926 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924); cf. Johnson v. Mississippi Baptist Hospital, 140 Miss. 485, 106 So. 1
(1925). There is often exemption, however, even when charity is offered only to some
specific class, sometimes so narrowly classified as to include only members of a particular
organization. Kansas Masonic Home v. Board of Commissioners, 81 Kans. 859, 106 Pac,
1082 (1910); Grand Lodge of Masons v. Board of Review, 281 11. 480, 117 N. E. 1016
(1917); Nat. Navy Club of N. Y. v. City of N. Y., 122 Misc. 89, 203 N. Y. Supp.
114 (Sup. Ct. 1923); People ex rel. Masonic Hall Asylum Land v. Farrell, 130 Misc.
142, 223 N. Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1927); cf. Trustees of Academy of Protestant Epis-
copal Church v. Taylor, 150 Pa. 565, 25 AtI. 55 (1892) ; But see St. Louis South Western
Ry. Co. v. Gates, 23 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Morning Star Lodge v. Hayslip,
23 Ohio St. 144 (1872). Such institutions do not lose their exemption by taking fees from
those who can pay. School of Domestic Arts & Science v. Carr, 322 11. 562, 153 N. E,
669 (1926); New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 355, 91 N. E.
385 (1910); Corporation of Sisters of Mercy v. Lane County, 123 Or. 144, 261 Pac. 694
(1927). But see Girls' Friendly Society v. Stafford, 46 R. I. 29, 124 AtI. 470 (1924).
Exemption was sustained even in the case of a working girls' summer home taking mainly
those who could pay their own maintenance. Women's Christian Ass'n of Philadelphia v.
Lippincott, 153 Atl. 261 (1908).
62. Courts denying exemption have done so generally on the ground that the property
was used principally for social purposes and only incidentally for charitable purposes. St.
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societies, fraternities, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., Y. M. H. A.,63-almost every
kind of organization not run for profit 4 and not exclusively a social or sport-
ing club has sought to escape taxation as a charitable institution. The courts
have had to flounder in a morass of strange facts and have held both ways
on almost every question. Courts are not usually technical in their analysis
of these cases, and the statutory phrases "exclusively used for charitable pur-
poses," "purely public charity" seem to mean less than nothing.
Property of the federal government has been so long and so thoroughly
exempt that there is no litigation of present concern regarding its taxability.P
Most states make similar exemption of their own property throughout their
lesser political subdivisions although it has been held that property of another
state or its political subdivision was not exempt. 0 The question of whether
public property is held for a governmental purpose arises usually in regard
to municipal corporations. Generally property held to be used for a govern-
mental purpose is exempt whether situated either within or without the owner-
municipality. 7 Whether waterworks, drainage systems, electric light plants,
etc. are for "governmental" or "proprietary" purposes, which are not exempt,
depends either on the economic views of the court or on the particular Ian-
Louis Lodge B. P. 0. E. v. Koeln, 262 Mo. 444, 171 S. W. 329 (1914); Wilson v. I cking
Aerie, 104 Ohio St. 545, 135 N. E. 545 (1922); People v. Mizpah Lodge (Odd Fellows)
228 N. Y. 245, 126 N. E. 703 (1920); State v. McDowell Lodge, 96 W. Va. 611, 123 S. E.
561 (1924). (This case, p. 563, has an excellent list of cases in other jurisdictions on same
point.) Trustees of Green Bay Lodge v. City of Green Bay, 122 Wis. 452, 10 N. W.
837 (1904). Courts granting exemption presumably have merely chosen to overlook the
social purposes. Horton v. Colorado Springs Masonic Building Society, 64 Colo. 529, 173
Pac. 61 (1918); Salt Lake Lodge, B. P. 0. E. v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192 (1911).
63. Non-exempt: State (Trustees of Y. M. C. A.) v. City of Patterson, 61 N. J. L.
420, 39 AtI. 655 (1898); City of San Antonio v. Y. M. C. A. 285 S. W. 844 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926); People ex rel. Young Mlen's Association for Mutual Improvement v. Sayes,
23 Misc. 1, 50 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1898). Exenpt: Little v. Newburyport, 210
Mass. 414, 96 N. E. 1032 (1912); Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y. M. C. A. 115 Va. 745,
S0 S. E. 589 (1913).
64. A few courts have even held the activities of D. A. R. Chapters, or at l]ast the
activities of certain D. A. R. chapters, charitable within the meaning of the exemption
statute. People ex rel. Greer v. Thomas Walters Chapter of the D. A. R. 311 Ill. 304,
142 N. E. 566 (1924). Probably the most extraordinary exemption decision of all time
is the one holding the exclusive Keystone Battery A of the National Guard a "purely public
charity." City of Philadelphia v. Keystone Battery A, National Guard, 169 Pa. 526, 32
Atl. 428 (1895).
65. See Comment (1934) 44 Y=Ar L. J. 326, 335-340.
66. People ex rel. Murray v. City of St. Louis, 291 Ill. 600, 126 N. E. 529 (1920).
67. City of New London v. Perkins, 87 Conn. 229, 87 A. 724 (1913); City of Frankfurt
v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 699, 94 S. W. 648 (1905); Commonwealth v. City of
Louisville, 133 Ky. 845, 119 S. W. 161 (1909); Town of Canaan v. Enfield ,rilage Fire
District, 74 N. H. 517, 70 At. 250 (1908); City of Newark v. Inhabitants of Verona Tp.,
59 N. J. L. 94, 34 Atl. 1060 (1896); Commonwealth v. City of Richmond, 116 Va. 69,
81 S. E. 69 (1914). For a distinction made between realty and personality in exemption
see City of Pasadena v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 171, 187 Pac. 418 (1920). Contra:
Sanitary District of Chicago v. Gibbons, 293 Ill. 519, 127 N. E. 691 (1920).
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guage of the charter or statute authorizing them.68 Generally, a municipal
enterprise producing more than incidental revenue, or whose primary purpose
is revenue, is not exempt.69 Public parks and recreation grounds are exempt,
including property left in trust, income of which was to be used for the main-
tenance of parks and recreation grounds. 0
There remains the more limited field of special exemption to individuals
or to classes such as to railroad corporations, to manufacturers, or to builders
of houses in a time of housing shortage."' Where such exemptions are per-
mitted by state constitutions the usual ground is public policy of a special
or exigent kind,72 and they are universally declared to be subject to strict
interpretation.73 The rule requiring "strict interpretation", however, does not
always preclude a court from extending the meaning of the word "manufac-
turing." 74  In other instances courts which profess to employ the same rule
of strict construction have overlooked irregularities in making the award,76
and the operative term "machinery" has been applied with singular looseness. 6
In general, although the special grant was favored during the expansion periods
of the nineteenth century and was revived during and after the World War,
it has grown less in repute and is likely to diminish in extent unless the trend
of public opinion should again change. 7
68. City of Frankfurt v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky L. Rep. 699, 94 S. W. 648 (1906);
Commonwealth v. City of Louisville, 133 Ky. 849, 119 S. W. 161 (1909); Traverse City
v. East Bay Tp., 190 Mich. 327, 157 N. W. 85 (1916); City of Providence v. Hall, 49
R. I. 230, 142 At. 156 (1928); Village of Swanton v. Town of Highgate, 81 Vt. 182, 69
Ati. 667 (1908).
69. Exempt: State v. City of Columbia, 115 S. C. 108, 104 S. E. 337 (1920); Common-
wealth v. City of Richmond, 116 Va. 69, 81 S. E. 69 (1914). Non Exempt: State v.
Clinton Township, 49 N. J. L. 370, 8 Atl. 296 (1887); Swanton v. Highgate, 81 Vt. 152,
69 Atl. 667 (1908).
70. Burr v. City of Boston, 208 Mass. 537, 95 N. E. 208 (1911); cf. People v. City of
Chicago, 124 Ill. 636, 17 N. E. 56 (1888).
71. E.g., N. Y. CoNsor. LAws (1920) c. 62, § 4b.
72. Held constitutional on this ground in Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle, 204 App. Div.
710, 199 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't, 1923), aff'd 236 N. Y. 554, 142 N. E. 281 (1923).
Held unconstitutional in Koch v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 97 N. J. L. 61, 116
At. 328 (1922).
73. Deleware Registration Trust Co. v. Delaware Forge & Steel Co., 1 Del. Ch, 381,
138 Atl. 620 (1927); Caverly-Gould Co. v. Village of Springfield, 83 Vt. 396, 76 Ati. 39
(1910) ; See also cases in notes 74, 75, 76, infra.
74. Commonwealth v. W. 3. Sparks Co., 222 Ky. 606, 1 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1928); State
v. Sugar-Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902). But see H. M. Rowe Co. v. Beck,)
149 Md. 251, 131 At. 509 (1925).
75. Colton v. City of Montpeller, 71 Vt. 413, 45 Atl. 1039 (1899).
76. David J. Joseph Co. v. City of Ashland, 223 Ky. 203, 3 S. W. (2d) 218 (1928).
Where farm products rather than machinery are the language of exemption, this term also
takes on new meanings. See Clay County v. Hogan, 145 Miss. 857, 860, 111 So. 373, 374
(1927). But see H. M. Rowe Co. v. Beck, 149 Md. 251, 255, 131 At. 509, 511 (1925).
Some western states exempt mining claims for the practical reason that it is imponible
to estimate .their value, but such exemptions are not extended to improvements made or
minerals extracted. Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal. 148 (1859).
77. See Stimson, Exemption of Property from Taxation (1934) 18 MmN. L. Rzy.
411, 417.
Taking exemption decisions as a whole, it is safe to say that no institution
deserving exemption on any of the customary grounds has failed to win it.
It might also be said, almost categorically, that no institution not deserving
an exemption on any such grounds has failed to be refused one in some
jurisdiction. What has occurred, however, is that in all jurisdictions some
abuses have crept in, and these have opened the door to many others, some
by logical necessity, some by the political leverage of the first exemption.
Regarded individually, many of these questionable exemptions might appear
reasonable, but when the general consequences of exempting such a class of
property are visualized, the harm done by diminishing the tax base far out-
weighs any possible good. That an organization of a certain kind is wealthy,
or that there are many similar organizations of great aggregate wealth, would
not seem a logical reason for refusing an exemption concededly sound if
granted to a poor or to an isolated type of institution. Practically, however,
viewed in the light of the larger public policy of raising adequate revenue
for governmental purposes, such a discrimination is necessary if exemptions
are to be granted at all. Nevertheless, this larger view is precisely what
almost all of the courts refuse to take. Each case is considered in isolation,
and as a result the law is in confusion and its workings almost wholly harmful.
This result is not compelled by the legal principles governing exemption,
which like those of valuation, are too vague for real guidance. Thus, the
declaration that exemption statutes must be strictly construed is repeated as
if by rote in some of the loosest constructions.78 Exemption is often said to
be granted because the exempt property is said to be sustaining a burden that
might otherwise fall upon the state but this phrase is seldom used for pur-
poses of refusal.79 The absence of a profit motive seems always to be essential,
78. People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangeliscbe Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132, 94
N. E. 162 (1911); People ex rel. Greer v. Thomas Walters Chapter D. A. R., 311 Ill. 304,
142 N. E. 566 (1924); School of Domestic Arts and Science v. Carr, 322 Ill 562, 153 N. E.
669 (1926); People ex rel. Carr v. Alpha Pi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational A-ociation
of the University of Chicago, 324 M1l. 573, 158 N. E. 213 (1927); Santa Roma Infirmar, v.
City of San Antonio, 259 S. W. 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
Connecticut avoids the necessity of applying such a rule to religious or educational
organizations by declaring that these were never exempted from taxation but are non-
taxable. Yale University v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 At. 87 (1899).
Other states modify the rule of strict construction by saying that regard must be had
to the intent of the legislature. Phillips Academy v. Inhabitants of Andover, 175 Ma-s.
118, 55 N. E. 841 (1900); In re Syracuse University, 124 Misc. 788, 209 N. Y. Supp.
329 (1925); People enx rel. Masonic Hall Asylum Fund v. Farrell, 130 Misc. 142, 223
N. Y. Supp. 660 (1927); State v. Kittle, 87 W. Va. 326, 105 S. E. 775 (1921).
Other courts frankly admit that the rule of strict construction, although applicable to
private exemptions, is not to be used with respect to those granted for religious, educational,
charitable or public purposes. City of Pasadena v. Los Angeles County, 132 Cal. 171,
187 Pac. 418 (1920); State ex rel. Waller v. Trustees of William Jewell College, 234 Mo.
279, 136 S. W. 397 (1911) ; State v. City of Columbia, 115 S. C. 103, 104 S. E. 337 (1920) ;
Commonwealth v. City of Richmond, 116 Va. 69, 81 S. E. 69 (1914); d. Beta Theta Pi
Corp. v. Board of Commissioners of Cleveland County, 10 Okla. 78, 234 Pac. 3S4 (1925).
79. See Trustees of Academy of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 130 Pa. 565,
569, 25 AtL 55, 57 (1892). But see Layman Foundation v. City of Louisville, 232 Ky.
259, 264, 22 S. W. (2d) 622, 625 (1929) (this formula actually used to refuse exemption
to a charity operating entirely in another state).
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but it is in no sense a test of exemptibility.80 Service rendered to members
of a community without discrimination is a frequently employed phrase but
the courts have permitted so many special discriminations while giving lip
service to this criterion, that it cannot any longer be considered of value.8 1
If an exemption is to be refused, it is almost always on the strict construction
rule.82 Yet if the courts were to overrule or distinguish on the facts decisions
which encroach upon principles meant to be rules of limitation, the conventional
legal phrases could still be used, and the break with the past effectually masked.
It would be better, however, if courts recognized openly that public policy has
changed and that it is no longer desirable to interpret statutes loosely in order
to help some institution theoretically carrying a burden which would otherwise
fall upon the state. It is doubtful whether the governmental unit would con-
sciously choose to take on the "burdens" either in the way or to the extent
that the private organization has assumed them. And it is certain that even
if the governmental unit were to take on these burdens it would not and
could not allocate the expenses with the local discrimination inherent in the
concealed subsidy of an exemption.
Again, of course, the legislative branch of the government could render
valuable assistance if it chose to do so. The repeal of present exemption
statutes, honeycombed with extensions, would ease the task of judges trying
.to effect a reversal of policy. New and more explicit statutes would be free
of present abuses and would, at the worst, take time to accumulate new ones.
A declaration of legislative policy in restraint of existing exemptions would
furnish a starting point for a new type of judicial opinion. But whether or
not legislatures assist, the ultimate responsibility and the ultimate control, both
as regards valuation and as regards exemption rest with the courts. Deter-
mination of the tax base is only broadly legislative. The application of the
legislative will to each individual unit thereof, being judicial, or quasi-judicial,
comes eventually under the close and detailed review of the courts. In the
quality of this review of particular cases and in the effectiveness of the prin-
ciples therein laid down for general administrative guidance lies the most
important factor in the present day adequacy of the general property tax.
80. Lawrence Business College v. Bussing, 117 Kan. 436, 231 Pac. 1039 (1925); Traverse
City v. East Bay Township, 190 Mich. 327, 157 N. W. 85 (1916); People ex rel, Young
Men's Association for Mutual Improvement v. Sayles, 23 Misc. 1, 50 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup.
Ct. 1898); Trustees of Green Bay Lodge v. City of Green Bay, 122 Wis. 452, 100 N. W.
837 (1904).
81. Grand Lodge of Masons v. Board of Review, 281 111. 480, 117 N. E. 1016 (1917);
Kansas Masonic Home v. Board of Commissioners, 81 Kan. 839, 106 Pac, 1082 (1910);
Kappa Kappa Gamma House Association v. Pearcy, 92 Kan. 1020, 142 Pac. 294 (1914);
Contra: Morning Star Lodge v. Hayslip (Odd Fellows), 23 Ohio St. 144 (1872).
82. St. Louis South Western Rr. Co. v. Gates, 23 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 8th 1927);
People ex rel. Breymeyer v. Watseka Camp-Meeting Association, 160 11. 567, 43 N. E
716 (1896); People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelische Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132,
94 N. E. 162 (1911); People ex rel. Murray v. City of St. Louis, 291 Ill. 600, 126 N. E.
529 (1920); State ex rel. Farr v. Martin, 105 W. Va. 600, 143 S. E. 356 (1928); Methodist
Episcopal Church Barasa Club v. City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N. W. 258 (1918);
For example of very strict construction without mention of the rule of strict construction
see: Johnson v. Mississippi Baptist Hospital, 140 Miss. 485, 106 So. 1 (1925).
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